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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to examine the nature and progress 
of Russo-American relations. The study addresses two principal questions. 
Why, at the end of the nineteenth century, did the long Russo-American 
friendship turn into a bitter rivalry? Why was Manchuria prized sufficiently 
by each to risk jeopardizing this friendship? In answering these questions 
an attempt is made to view the relationship from both the Russian and 
American standpoints, since the actions of one, whether economic, political 
or military, frequently prompted counter-moves from the other. 
To obtain a broad perspective the whole century is included. It 
was over this entire time frame that the relationship first flourished and 
then quickly withered. Attention is centered on Northeast Asia, for it 
was in that region that Russian-American interactions were most numerous and 
where the expansionist drives of both nations finally intersected. The 
study traces how the geographic gap was gradually bridged across the North 
Pacific. 
Throughout the century these interactions stemmed primarily from 
the initiatives of private individuals and businesses--fur hunters, whalers, 
merchants and entrepreneurs. Consideration of these private contacts and 
the process through which the two governments were slowly drawn into confron-
tation provides one of the underlying themes explaining the estrangement. 
In order to understand the historic foundations of the amicable 
relations, attention is directed at the high degree of cooperation displayed 
during the 1850s and 1860s. Highlighted are the circumstances surrounding 
the benevolent neutrality exhibited toward Russia during the Crimean War and 
Russia's reciprocation during the American Civil War. Although both govern-
ments were drawn more deeply into the affairs of Northeast Asia, the results 
at mid-century seemed mutually beneficial. Russia acquired the Amur region, 
and the United States was permitted to purchase Alaska. 
By contrast, examination of the escalating events of the 1890s--the 
political turmoil in Korea, the construction of Russia's Siberian railroad, 
the defeat of China by Japan, the subsequent diplomatic successes of Russia 
and the projec.t.i.on of American seapower into the Far East--reveals heightened 
competition between Russia and the United States and deteriorating relations. 
The Russian advance into Hanchuria, which appeared about to frustrate 
America's own last opportunity to gain a foothold in Northeast Asia, was 
viewed with particular concern. 
The study concludes with an outline of the pressures placed on the 
McKinley administration to safeguard American interests in Manchuria and an 
analysis of the procedures adopted. The policy promulgated by the first open 
door notes is shown to have been a tactic designed primarily to chec~ Russian 
expansion into Manchuria. American insistence on an open door policy and 
Russian resistance to it brought to a close the long period of previously 
unquestioned friendship. 
vii 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the outset, my intentions for this dissertation were to 
examine the general question of why, toward the end of the nineteenth 
century, had Russia and the United States, aft~r a long tradition of 
friendship, become unfriendly rivals? What had caused this estrange-
ment? The more recent and dramatic shift from Grand Alliance to Cold 
War undoubtedly stimulated my curiosity in this similar, if less 
spectacular transformation some fifty years earlier. I found that many 
accomplished historians, whose interest may also have been piqued by 
the contemporary Soviet-American power str.uggle, had already examined 
various aspects of previous Russian-American relations. Yet none of 
these historical studies addressed either this particular'"question or 
answered it completely to my satisfaction. 
When the basic question was raised at all, a ~onsensus seemed 
to agree with Edward Zabriskie. In his American-Russian Rivalry 1895-
1914, Zabriskie includes a valuable and comprehensive review of the 
diplomatic exchanges which characterized the latter stages of the rivalry, 
but does not overly concern himself with searching for the basic causes. 
To him, and to many others, the rivalry occurred rather suddenly as 
the "result of the economic competition in Manchuria which began as 
early as 1895."1 This succinct answer, while having much to offer, 
spawned in my mind a whole host of nagging secondary questions. Why 
was relatively remote Manchuria suddenly considered of such vital economic 
concern to both Russia and the United States asto risk the disruption 
2 
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of a previously cordial relationship? ·Why was the United States more 
upset by the Russian expansion into Manchuria than it had been with 
3 
the Russian advances into Central Asia, the Amur basin, the Maritime 
provinces or Sakhalin Island? Why had not the United States concentrated 
on the far larger commercial markets in South and Central China, partic-
ularly along those coastal regions opposite its newly acquired entrepot 
in the Philippine Islands? Why had not the United States taken equal 
exception to the growing German, English, French and Japanese spheres 
of influence in China? In its search for markets why was the United 
States not equally concerned about the Russian market in general and 
the Asiatic Russian market in particular? For its part, why was Russia 
so reluctant to concede an open door policy in Manchuria? And so on. 
My first inclination, much like Zabriskie, had been to examine, 
in detail, the Russian-American relationships during the period between 
the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. But to answer 
these questions at all adequately, I felt compelled to reappraise the 
earlier basis for friendship and search for the roots of the rivalry. 
This necessitated broadening the scope of the investigation in several 
directions. First, the period under investigation was extended backward 
to include the entire nineteenth century. This, in turn, resulted in 
expanding the geographical area of interest to all of Northeast Asia 
and to include extra-governmental relationships as well. 
Charles Stewart Todd, a Kentucky politician and businessman, 
expressed a commonly held belief regarding the foundation of the Russian-
American friendship. Having returned from serving four years as the 
United States minister to St. Petersburg, Todd declared in 1846 that 
Russia and the United States "are destined to be. the best of neighbors, 
because they are so far off."2 At mid-century most Americans and 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Russians probably agreed with Todd. If they thought of Russia at all, 
Americans generally viewed the northern empire from a single perspective. 
To them, Russia was remotely located eastward, beyond the North Atlantic. 
The established European states lay in between, acting as a barrier 
to direct contact and any possibility of a clash of interests between 
the two nations. Russia and the United States, each as expanding powers, 
could grow in strength on their own continent, isolated from one another 
and, therefore, remain in amicable harmony. Yet across the far distances 
of the North Pacific, and at first largely ignored in St. Petersburg 
and in Washington, Americans by mid-century had long been in vigorous 
and direct contact with Russian subjects and were, on occasion, actually 
encroaching on Russian-claimed territory-. In most respects, as James 
Field has argued, the United States may have had an Atlantic orienta-
tion, but the main approach to Russia was across the North Pacific to 
Siberia. 3 It was in the Pacific that the safe separation of the two 
powers was narrowed and put at risk. 
As has been emphasized by such historians as Richard Van Alstyne 
and Walter LaFeber, the United States did not suddenly or unconsciously 
embark on an overseas expansionist path in the 1890's.4 The climax 
of imperialism at the end of the century was not an accident or an 
aberration, but can only be understood in the context of American 
activity during earlier decades. The same holds true in attempting 
to understand the shift in Russian-American relations. While Van 
Alstyne and LaFeber gave manifold examples of early American interest 
in the Caribbean, Hawaii and East Asia, they could as readily have 
included similar manifestations of Americans confronting Russians in 
Northeast Asia which preceded and set the stage for the enunciation 
of the "open door" policy. 
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Howard Kushner, .~n his Conflict on the Northwest Coast, and 
others have described the considerable interaction between the "Boston 
men" a:td the employees of the Russian-American Company. 5 But the con-
flict was not confined to the Northwest coast of North America. It 
extended, early in the century, to the very shores of Asiatic Russia. 
Americans came there in increasing numbers. Merchants set up shop 
on Kamchatka and at the mouth of the Amur. Whalers swarmed into the 
Okhotsk Sea and made themselves at home on the beaches. Naval sur-
veyors charted Siberia's coastal waters for safe passages and searched 
for coal deposits ashore on Russian territory. Unfortunately, only 
a relatively few scattered and sketchy accounts are available upon 
which to judge the extent of this interaction. For every John Ledyard, 
Peter Dobell, John D'Holf or William Collins, there were hundreds of 
other Americans who ventured into Northeast Asia, but left no record. 
Nevertheless, these trans-Pacific pioneers widened the knowledge of 
Northeast Asia in American circles and gradually set the stage for 
later events. Their impact on Russia was even greater, as can be 
seen from such Russian sources as Semon B. Okun's The Russian-American 
Company and P. A. Tikhmenev's A History of the Russian-American Company. 6 
They present additional details concerning the American presence on 
Russian soil and the Russian reactions to these incursions. Such 
conflicts that did arise from these early Russian-American confronta-
tions rarely involved the two governments, both of which largely main-
tained a "hands-off" policy regarding the actions of their citizens in 
these remote regions. And, since Asiatic Russia frequently depended 
on American seaborne commerce, a degree of cooperation was usually 
maintained that enhanced the traditional friendship. Yearly, however, 
the gulf between the Russian empire and the North American republic 
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was being bridged by these extra-governmental contacts and the prime 
basis for the friendship was eroding. By 1895 the American minister 
to Russia recognized the transition which had long been taking place 
and was warning that while "under old conditions we !."<ever came into 
contact under modern conditions we are" and that "the diffi-
culties increase of honorably maintaining that friendly relationship 
which was formerly never put to the test."7 
6 
As the century progressed, two trends materialized. First, 
L;.e focus of Russian-American interaction shifted across the Pacific 
from Alaska to Kamchatka and thence southward to the Okhotsk Sea to 
the Amur basin and finally to Manchuria. The rivalry in Manchuria 
was but the latest of a whole series of Russian-American confrontations 
in the region which had led to both cooperation and to competition. 
By the end of the century both nations still had interests which 
extended beyond the confines of Manchuria. And while the status of 
Manchuria had become the chief immediate issue, the stakes were 
greater than just the commerce of Manchuria. The perceptions of both 
protagonists were shaped by what had already transpired between them. 
Manchuria was seen as the key toward domination of not only Northeast 
Asia, but perhaps of the rest of Asia and the North Pacific as well. 
Second, the official governments began to play an increasingly 
active and continuous role in the region. In previous decades, both 
conflicts and agreements were primarily among priva~e individuals or 
businesses. The two governments intervened only sporadically and 
even then, because of slow communications, allowed the official on 
the scene a relatively free hand. At the end of the century, first 
the Russian government and then the United States, largely at the 
urging of the private groups concerned, decided to accept more direct 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
involvement. By the time the rivalry reached the Manchurian phase 
it had turned into a government-to-government affair and, therefore, 
of more significance than previous encounters. 
7 
In attempting to reconstruct some pattern in the earlier 
decades of Russian-American contact across the Pacific, I was struck 
by the degree of sensitivity which the countrymen of each nation 
exhibited toward the activities of the other. When Russians acted, 
Americans reacted and vice versa. When one group became successful 
at exploiting fur hunting or whaling, the other followed suit. When 
one opened up new territory, whether it was the Amur or Japan or 
Korea, the other was right behind. When American influence in Asiatic 
Russia appeared threatening, Russia tightened centralized control 
and encouraged more Russian settlers. When Russia constructed the 
Siberian railroad, Americans dreamed of an integrated transportation 
system connecting the West Coast with all of Asia. Neither could 
star.d by and let the other have a free hand in Manchuria so their 
interests intersected. 
To view these interactions as completely and as objectively 
as possible, it was necessary to look at the relations in Northeast 
Asia from the vantage point of both Russia and the United States. 
This was not always possible to accomplish evenhandedly, given the 
imbalance of reference material readily available, but an attempt 
was made. The work of B. A. Romanov and Andrew Malozemoff, although 
chiefly concerned with events le?.ding up to the Russo-Japanese War, 
cited many Russian documents and provided very useful background 
and motivation for the Russian expansion into Manchuria. 8 These, 
together with clippings from Russian newspapers forwarded by the 
American embassy, published selections from the Red Archives and a 
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scattering of other Russian documents, provided a rewarding, if 
limited glimpse of the Russian-held image of America. Ironically, 
the Russian authorities were, in many respects, earlier and more 
closely attuned to the consequences of the trans-Pacific activities 
of the American pione~rs than Washington officialdom. At an early 
stage they had extrapolated from the American advance to the West 
8 
Coast and Alaska, gauged the effect of an unchecked American destiny 
in Asiatic Russia, and taken measures to prevent too mcch infiltration. 
The changes in American attitudes toward Russia were more 
easily traced in newspaper and magazine articles. These attitudes, 
particularly toward the end of the century were affected by more than 
the rivalry in Northeast Asia. They also reflected disapproval of 
what would be termed today a lack of Russian concern for human rights. 
It had long been recognized that the traditional friendship existed 
between the two countries, despite diametrically opposed political 
and social systems. At century's end, improved communications, 
greater travel to Russia, and the influx of Russian immigrants to the 
United States made it far more difficult to ignore these differences. 
Thomas A. Bailey and William A. Williams, in their general explications 
of Russian-American relations have included much of the material which 
caused a worsening opinion of Russia by Americans. 9 To be balanced, 
the contemporary Russian criticism of American lynchings, materialism 
and corruption would have to be included. I have avoided the issue 
of this propaganda and counter-propaganda, except as it affected the 
major power alignments in Asia. For example, at mid-century Americans 
seemed to accept Russian expansion as a beneficial spreading of European 
civilization. Later, they were more concerned that the sweep of 
Anglo-American democratic civilization would be stemmed by Slavic 
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autocratic militarism. This change in attitude I considered a signi-
ficant factor impinging on relations in Northeast Asia. 
Which raises the point of the Anglo-American rapprochement 
toward the end of the century. Unlike William L. Langer, in his The 
Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902, I have not attempted to untangle 
the whole skein of international relations surrounding Northeast 
Asia. 10 Instead, a strenuous effort has been made to filter out only 
those threads connecting Russia and America. But Anglo-American 
relations cannot be entirely excluded, for another firm basis for the 
Russian-American friendship, aside from the great geographical separa-
tion, had always been a shared antipathy toward the international 
policies of Great Britain. Th~ growing American rapprochement with 
England toward the end of the century could be considered as a cause 
for the weakening bond with Russia. Or, taking a slightly different 
view, the more intense rivalry with Russia may have led the United 
States to seek closer ties with Great Britain. In either case, 
Anglo-American relations could not be considered entirely extraneous. 
Next, I was not convinced that the rtllalry was determined 
solely, or even principally, by economic motives. That material 
interests strongly influenced Russian-American relations in Northeast 
Asia is well documented in such studies as those by Charles Campbell, 
Thomas McCormick and Marilyn Young, as well as all the various sources 
that dealt with the work of Sergei Witte as Russia's finance minister. 11 
But most of these studies are weighted heavily in favor of historical 
materialism. It is relatively simple to comprehend and explain the 
finite terms of economic measurement, to tabulate the number of cotton 
sheetings exported to Manchuria, or to compare the dollar values of 
kerosene exports. Far more formidable is the task of gauging such 
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psycholo;ical motives as the search for glory, the sense of mission, 
or the drive for power. Moreover, economic motives were often, at 
least by Americans, articulated as rationalizations to mask what 
were considered to be less respectable imperialistic motives. Such 
rationalizations cropped up throughout the century in the words of 
Aaron Palmer, Matthew Perry, WilliHm Seward, the Adams brothers, and 
the publicists of the Ataerican Asiatic Association, to cite a few 
examples. I have attempted, not necessarily successfully, to offer 
at least some hints of these other underlying motives which drove 
Americans to Russia's back door. 
Finally, the enunciation of the "open door" policy by the 
United States in 1899 was taken as an appropriate event en which to 
conclude. The relations between the United States and Russia were 
to worsen in subsequent years, but that would have little bearing 
10 
on the origins of the quarrel. The diplomatic efforts in formulating 
and seeking agreement with its open door policy was the first overt 
manifestation of the American government's intense distrust of 
Russian aims. The gauntlet had been thrown and the Russian 
government knew it was being forced to respond and openly declare its 
intentions. The sequence of events leading up to the reluctant and 
limited acceptance of the "open door" policy has been amply constructed 
by such historians as A. Whitney Griswold, Tyler Dennett, Alfred L. P. 
Dennis and Paul Varg. 12 My approach differs in only one respect. 
The prism I have held up to the "open door" sequence filtered out all 
but a concentrated Russian-American pattern. From this pattern I have 
concluded that the American policy was deliberately designed as a 
check on further expansion of Russia into Manchuria and that the 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Russian government was fully cognizant of American intentions. The 
"open door" policy was the culmination of a century of confrontation 
in Northeast Asia and the final acknowledgment that the traditional 
friendship was at an end. 
11 
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CHAPTER I 
FUR TRADING 
The Russian-American confrontation in the Pacific Northwest, 
which culminated in the sale of Alaska to the United States, has been 
well chronicled. 1 Because it was on a much smaller scale at first, 
the history of the American interests across the Pacific, which con-
verged with Russian positions in Siberia, is less well known. These 
early American enterprises in Northeast Asia cannot be studied in 
complete isolation from events along the Northwest coast. Until 1867, 
Russian-America provided a backdrop and rationale for the ambitions 
and expansionist drives of both the Russians and the Americans in 
the Pacific. Only occasionally during the first quarter century 
did their activity overlap in Asiatic Russia, and when it did, re-
ceived little, if any, official notice in the United States. The 
imperial government and the officials of the Russian-American Company, 
however, scrutinized closely the few American incursions on their 
Asiatic shores. These early interactions can largely be summed up 
by examining the experiences of four Americans--John Ledyard, John 
D'Wolf, Peter Dobell and William Pigot. Among them, they had the 
distinction of travelling overland across Siberia and European Russia 
a total of six, and almost seven, times. Although three of them kept 
journals of their travels, only Ledyard, the man who did not complete 
his trans-Siberian travels, has achieved any lasting renown in the 
14 
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United States. Nevertheless, these four, plus the other American 
ship ~aptains, who left no record of similar voyages to Siberia, were 
every bit as much the pathfinding pioneers to Northeast Asia as the 
"mountain men" were in finding ways to cross the Rockies. And these 
early pioneers did leave lasting impressions in Russia which shaped 
Russian attitudes and policies in the region. 
The first conirontation took place August 18, 1787 in Irkutsk, 
the provincial capital of Siberia, between John Ledyard, itinerant 
American traveller, and Grigorii Shelikhov, a leading Russian fur 
merchant. Shelikhov had only recently returned to Irkutsk from a 
three year voyage in the North Pacific, during which he had founded 
the first Russian settlement on Kodiak Island. This settlement 
formed the nucleus around which Russian-America later expanded. 
Shelikhov had conceived of broad plans to assimilate the Kuriles, the 
Aleutians and regions of North America into the Russian empire and 
to develop commerce with China, Japan, the Philippines, Spanish-
America and the Amur region. As a first step in carrying out these 
projects, Shelikhov and his associates were busily engaged in per-
suading Siberian Governor-General Yakobi to endorse their petition 
to the imperial government for exclusive monopolistic rights to fur 
trading in the new territories and for measures "to discourage those 
who might have pretensions in those parts, and to stop the encroachment 
of other nations."2 
While attending to these ambitious pursuits, Shelikhov must 
have been disconcerted to meet, deep in Central Siberia, Ledyard, 
a man who definitely harbored such pretensions. Though nominally 
interested in natural history and anthropological researches, Ledyard 
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seemad chiefly to seek information about Russian discoveries in eastern 
!:iberia and Northwest America. Ledyard himself had some first-hand 
knowledge of the North Pacific and eagerly sought more. As a corporal 
of marines, Ledyard had been a member of Cook's third voyage of 
exploration. During the course of that expedition, Ledyard was set 
ashore to scout around Unalaska in order to determine whether any 
Europeans had preceded them to the Aleutian Islands. Guided by two 
Aleuts, he made the two-day ~.ourney inland, arriving at night at a 
camp. Ledyard recordeu this fiLst encounter with Russians. 
To my joy and surprise I discovered that the two men who held 
me by each arm were two Europeans, fair and comely, and 
concluded from their appearance they were Russians, which 
I soon after found to be true.3 
During his time in the Cook expedition, Ledyard also learned 
,. 
valuable geographic information. He spent several months in Kamchatka 
when his ship twice visited Avacha Bay near Petropavlovsk. It was 
during these stays that Ledyard gained a sense of how the Russians 
had established commercial and communication connections r:~etching 
from St. Petersburg via Okhotsk and Kamchatka at least as far as 
Unalaska. Without this insight, it is doubtful whether even the 
intrepid Ledyard would have imagined a west-to-east passage through 
Russia to America. 
Most important, Ledyard learned, along with the others of 
Cook's crew, what it was that had brought the Russians across the 
Pacific to the Aleutians. In March 1778 the Resolution, the ship in 
which Ledyard sailed, had moored in Nootka Sound for the purpose of 
replenishing fresh water and obta:i.ning timber for spars. In his 
journal, Ledyard noted that "this country will appear most to advantage 
respects the variety of animals, and the richness of their furs." 
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The crew bartered for a quantity of furs thinking to make warm cloth-
ing of them. Only later, during their stop at Kamchatka, did they 
realize the profit for which the furs could be sold at the Russian 
factory. The crew's regret in not loading aboard four times as 
many furs was heightened later when they discovered that the 
selling price for furs in Canton was more than double that at Kamchatka. 
Ledyard estimated "that skins which did not cost the purchaser six 
pence sterling sold in China for 100 dollars."4 
The potential for profit from fur trade made a deep impression 
on Ledyard. Upon his return to America in 1783 he quickly wrote and 
published an account of the Cook expedition and then became preoccupied 
with plans for a mercantile venture to the Pacific Northwest. For 
several years he canvassed the Northeastern seaports for financial 
backing, but no merchant entrepreneur was yet willing to hazard his 
money on Ledyard's unsubstantiated story. They thought that his schemes 
were wild and visionary. Unable to interest supporters at home, 
Ledyard took his plans to Paris and London, but the magnitude of 
his designs were overmatched by misfortune. Repeatedly his attempts 
to reach the Pacific Northwest by sea were frustrated. 
Ledyard began contemplating his overland journey through 
Russia to the Pacific in late 1785. Thomas Jefferson, then minister 
to France, may have suggested the enterprise. He certainly encouraged 
Ledyard and attempted to obtain for him a passport permitting the 
passage. Despite the refusal of Empress Catherine to grant the 
requested passport (she thought the project "chimerical"), Ledyard 
set out in December 1786 and reached St. Petersburg in March 1787. 
Ledyard received help from a chance acquaintance, an officer 
in the entourage of Paul, the heir to the throne. Through him, he 
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procured an internal passport from a provincial administrative board 
and travel orders from the post office as an "American nobleman." 
Despite his newly elevated social status, he travelled as a "messenger" 
to avoid expense.5 As in so many other of his projects, the indefati-
gible Ledyard almost carrieo off his ambitious plan. By the middle 
of August 1787, he had reached Irkutsk, two-thirds of the way across 
Siberia. From then on, though, persons and events conspired to 
thwart his venture. To Ledyard the opportunity to question Shelikhov 
about Russian trade and settlements in the North Pacific must have 
seemed an unexpectedly fortunate circumstance. Judging solely from 
the entry in Ledyard's journal concerning the meeting, relations 
between Ledyard and Shelikhov were good. 
Went this morning to see a Merchant owner of a Vessel 
that had passed from Kamschatka to different parts of the 
Coast of America. Shewed some charts rudely descriptive 
of his voyages. He says there are on different parts of 
the Coast of America 2000 Russians: and that as near as 
he can judge the number of skins produced by them in that 
Country amount of 12000: has a Vessel of his own at 
Okhotsk. Which leaves that Country for America next 
Summer, and offers me a passage in her.6 
Ledyard's persistent curiosity about Russian possessions and 
Russian trade and his dissimulation about his own participation in 
the Cook expedition, aroused deep suspicions in the minds of both 
Shelikhov and Yakobi as to L~dyard's intentions. And not all his 
questions concerned the Pacific Northwest. Many questions pertained 
to the Kurile Islands and the Russian enterprises there. When he was 
unable to obtain information on the Kuriles, Ledyard was reported to 
have stated "that those who are stronger will surely have the first 
right to occupy those islands." The eagerness with which Ledyard 
sought to join the "Northeastern secret expedition" of Captain Billings 
added to the doubts of the Russian authorities. Billings, an 
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Englishman in the employ of Russia, was a previous shipmate of Ledyard's 
from the days of the Cook expedition. Billings' mission was to 
explore Northeast Asia and the islands in the North Pacific. From 
these factors, and perhaps through deliberate misrepresentation by 
Ledyard, Yakobi deduced that the American traveller had been'sent here 
by the English Crown for reconnaissance of the local situation." 
Among Ledyard's claims were that "about ten thousand people of various 
European nationalities" were dwelling on the shores north of California. 
He also boasted that during the Cook expedition "some of the people 
living near Chukot were made English subjects."7 
After Ledyard had spent ten days in Irkutsk, Yakobi decided 
to send him on his way to Yakutsk "where there are fewer opportunities 
for the fulfillment of his intentions." Yakobi took the precaution, 
though, of warning the cammandant at Yakutsk against Ledyard's "shifty 
enterprises" a11d instructed the commandant, while giving Ledyard an 
hospitable reception, to detain him inconspicuously by stressing the 
difficulties of a winter passage to Okhotsk. Although dejected by 
the thought of the winter delay, Ledyard continued his "shifty enter-
prises," questioning the great number of Russian merchants and traders 
in town about the places they had been. Tiring of his stay in Yakutsk, 
Ledyard gladly joined Billings when he proposed to return to Irkutsk 
to pick up supplies for his expedition. But when Ledyard returned 
to Irkutsk, he was arrested and deported from Russia at the express 
order of the Empress Catherine. 8 
Many reasons for Ledyard's arrest and deportation have been 
suggested in the past. One held that the Russians believed that 
Ledyard was a French spy. Another attributed the deportation to 
Catherine's concern for Ledyard's safety. Yet another placed the 
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blame on Ledyard for alleged disorderly conduct. Ledyard himself was 
never offered any explanation. The most plausible account was first 
advanced by Ledyard's biographer, Jared Sparks. Based on circumstantial 
evidence, Sparks surmised, correctly as it turns out, that the plot 
to halt Ledyard was conceived in Irkutsk by the merchants engaged in 
the Pacific fur trade who feared foreign competitiou. Most recently 
Bolkhovitinov has confirmed Spark's theory from Russian documents. 
Using Shelikhov's notes on his conversation with Ledyard as a basis, 
the Irkutsk governor-general in November 1787 dispatched an extensive 
report on the activities of the "American nobleman John Ledyard" to 
A. A. Bezborodko, secretary to the Empress. Based on this report, 
Catherine, in December, issued the orders to expel Ledyard "with the 
admonition not to dare appear ever again anywhere within the limits 
of our empire."9 
Nor did Shelikhov live to see the fruition of his broad and 
daring projects. Four years after his death, his company and others 
were merged to form the Russian-American Company in 1799. The Tsar 
gave the new monopoly a twenty-year charter which allowed the govern-
ment to exercise direct control when it wanted to counteract foreign 
expansion, but permitting also the guise of a private company. Both 
the new company and the imperial offices concerned with Siberia adopted 
the same attitude as Shelikhov toward foreign encroachment. 
The Russians consistently attempted thereafter to follow a 
policy of keeping aggressive foreigners out of Russian frontier 
territories in Siberia and America--even lone, twenty-six year old, 
impecunious travellers such as Ledyard. But halting Ledyard did not 
keep out the American merchants. Although Ledyard failed to achieve 
any of his aspirations, other Americans would profit by following in 
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his footsteps. 
Robert Morris, the Philadelphia financier, had almost been 
persuaded by Ledyard to support his northwest coast venture. Instead, 
he outfitted the Empress of China and sailed it to Canton with a load 
of ginseng root and some furs from eastern American trading posts. 
The return of the Empress of China from the Orient in 1785 brought 
confirmation of the importance of the fur trade in China. Lacking 
specie or a readily saleable commodity, the Chinese trade would 
have languished after this first voyage except that a group of 
six Boston merchants decided, based on reading the Ledyard and Cook 
accounts, to adopt the scheme of acquiring furs along the Northwest 
coast and then exchanging them in Canton for teas and silks. 
They dispatched Captain Robert Gray in Lady Washington and 
John Kendrick in Columbia in 1787 to Nootka Sound. Following the 
trade pattern ea.isiaaed by Ledyard, fur~~e~n~t~o~--------------------
Canton and exchanged for Chinese goods which were brought home to 
Boston in 1790. From then on the "Boston men" made regular appearances 
in the North Pacific. More than 100 American vessels traded there 
during the next 25 years, most of them from Boston. As they edged 
out other rivals, the American ships reaped a bountiful harvest of 
furs, obtaining 10-15,000 sea otter pelts annually around the turn 
of the century. 10 
American ships, ranging further and further north from the 
Columbia River and Nootka Sc:-•md, began visiting Russian-American ports 
by about 1800. The first recorded commercial exchange took place 
early in 1801 when the American merchant ship Enterprise arrived at 
Kodiak. Alexander Baranov, the General-Manager of Russian-America, 
was faced by such an extreme shortage of goods that he ignored an 
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injunction against commercial contacts with foreigners. Thereafter, 
except for intermittent stoppages on direct orders from St. Petersburg, 
a lively trade transpired until the early 1840s, mostly with the 
Americans. 11 
The shortage of food and other supplies was a persistent 
concern for the Russian-American Company. Many alternative sources 
were sought and tried. The overland-overseas route through Okhotsk 
was the foremost, but it proved expensive and undependable. Periodi-
cal!~ direct sea shipments from the Baltic were arranged, but these, 
too, were costly and erratic in arrival. Local agricultural products 
from the Alaskan or upper California colonies proved inadequate, 
as did all efforts at direct trade with Spanish California, Hawaii, 
Japan or the Philippines. Only as a last resort did the company 
turn to regular trade with the Americans. The resulting agreements 
were profitable to the Boston merchants, and beneficial in many 
ways to the Russians as well. Having no means of preventing the 
Americans from trading guns and rum to the Indians in exchange for 
furs, Baranov preferred to deal directly with those American skippers 
whom he could trust. In addition to buying supplies, Bar.v.nov often 
agreed to joint hunting expeditions, splitting the furs 50-50. Baranov 
was also frequently dependent on the Americans for ships and shipping. 
To relieve his problems, he purchased eight American vessels, hired 
American craftsmen to build ships at Kodiak and Sitka, and chartered 
American ships to carry furs and goods to Canton, Okhotsk or Kamchatka. 
Through these voyages Americans became aware of the market for supplies 
in Eastern Siberia. Occasionally, the American merchants brought the 
furs that they had purchased in Russian-American to Siberian merchants 
outside of the company's monopoly. 12 
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John D'Wolf was the first American merchant-captain to enter 
into an agreement with Baranov and visit Siberia. D'Wolf skippered 
the Juno out of Bristol, Rhode Island, on a memorable voyage in 1804. 
The twenty-five year old D'Wolf commanded a crew of 26 manning a 
250-ton vessel. When ready for sea the ship and lading were valued 
at $35,000. Though D'Wolf was pTepared to trade with the Indians, 
much of the outgoing cargo was intended for sale to the Russians. 
When D'Wolf in Juno arrived in New Archangel in the summer of 1805, 
he was welcomed by Baranov. The colonies were again in serious 
straits. The party of Baron Nikolai Rezanov was inspecting the 
colonies that year and planned to winter in New Archangel. With the 
added population to feed, Baranov eagerly bought the bulk of D'Wolf's 
cargo of rum, sugar, rice, beef, pork, flour, tobacco and molasses. 
Rezanov was a son-in-law of Grigorii Shelikhov, influential in court 
circles and a high official of the company. He was energetically 
trying to solve the company's supply problems and forge together the 
North Pacific commercial empire dreamed about first by Shelikhov. 13 
D'Wolf ingratiated himself further with his Russian hosts by 
offering to sell them the ship Juno. Since the company was chronically 
short of good craft, Rezanov quickly agreed to the purchase. In 
exchange, D'Wolf received furs, a small 40-ton craft, Yermak, and a 
bill of exchange on the Russian-American company in St. Petersburg. 
D'Wolf dispatched the Yermak with his crew and the furs to Canton 
and at the invitation of Rezanov prepared to proceed to Okhotsk and 
thence overland to St. Petersburg. 14 
Unlike Ledyard, D'Wolf engendered no suspicions. The Russians 
in their gratitude set up no obstacles to his completing Ledyard's 
journey in the opposite direction, from the Pacific Northwest to 
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and was not always easy, but furnished with a passport and letters 
from Rezanov and able to draw on credit from the company's offices, 
D'Wolf was warmly received at each stage. The most difficult was 
the sea passage to Okhotsk in a small, 25-ton Russian craft which 
D'Wolf commanded. He learned first hand much about currents, winds, 
ice conditions, islands and harbors of the North Pacific. He made 
one significant observation for the future: 
This tract of ocean, from longitude 130° West, along the 
entire coast of Alashka and through the seas of Kamtchatka 
and Ochotsk, was at that time the great place of resort of 
the right whale. Persecuted in all its other haunts, it 
had sought refuge in this northern region, where as yet 
a whaleship had never made its appearance.lS 
Finally, D'Wolf arrived at St. Petersburg in October 1807. 
24 
There he met some of the directors of the company including Benedict 
Cramer, an American banker. He learned then that copies of his bill 
of exchange had arrived before him and had already been paid in a 
cargo of goods sent to the United States. The total profit for the 
venture was $100,000. After three years and eight months, he returned 
to Bristol having travelled around the world. His account of the 
journey states that he continued to engage in Russian commerce. 
Baranov was under the impression that D'Wolf, while in St. Petersburg, 
intended to contract with the company directors for the future pro-
. . . f R • A • 16 v1s1on1ng o uss1an- mer1ca. 
The situation in Siberia was somewhat different from that in 
Russian-America. The company maintained depots and trading posts 
at the major settlements in Siberia, but while it had considerable 
influence and was 2n important source of supply for the imperial 
administrative and military forces, the Russian-American company did 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25 
not exercise a complete monopoly of trade. Rival trading companies 
still existed in Siberia. But from whatever source--overland from 
Western Siberia, local agriculture or overseas from the Baltic--food 
supplies and other goods were rarely adequate for even the sparse 
population. Prices were exorbitant and the quality of products poor. 
The Okhotsk company office had the responsibility to oversee the 
supply of the Eastern Siberian posts and the Russian colonies in 
America. When the transport system failed, as it frequently did, 
the company of necessity turned to the "Boston men" for supplies which 
meant sharing the fur profits. This arrangement suited the American 
merchants, also. As the number of sea otters and fur seals declined, 
they frequently preferred to engage in trade or charter their ships 
to the Russians rather than incur the risks of trading with the 
Indians. After the peak of the fur trade passed, about 1810, the 
American vessels were alert to other trading opportunities in the 
Pacific, e.g., sandalwood from Hawaii and copper from Chile, Ship 
owners gave their captains great latitude in pursuing trade wherever 
success appeared promising. One of these corners of the North Pacific, 
the Russian outposts of Eastern Siberia, began to be visited more 
frequently by American vessels in search of corr.mercial profit. In 
1813, Captain Bennett, for example, added a new twist. He exchanged 
his cargo of supplies at Sitka for fur seals, but then instead of 
sailing for Canton, he took the skins to Okhotsk. When he placed 
them on sale there, the company was forced to buy them back at a much 
higher rate to prevent the furs from falling into the hands of rival 
merchants which would have created competition thought to be dangerous 
by the Russian-American company. 17 
Facts relative to the American actions on the Siberian coast 
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between 1812-1821 are meager and at times contradictory, but the 
Russian reactions to the Americans' enterprise was sufficiently sharp 
to indicate that the Russian officials perceived grave significance 
to the development. In particular, they were apprehensive about 
the plans and projects of two Americans, Peter Dobell and William 
Pigot. In their activities they foresaw the same type of encroachment 
in Russian Siberia that was occurring in Russian-America. Moreover, 
behind the presence of these two Americans, the Tsarist government 
divined the resources and support of John Jacob Astor's American Fur 
Company. 
Few pertinent facts are available relative to Peter Dobell. 
He grew up in Philadelphia after his parents emigrated from Ireland. 
After serving in the army fighting Indians in Western Pennsylvania, 
1,· 
he went to sea and travelled in many countries. 18 In 1798 he first 
came to China and spent seven or eight years there, mostly in the 
19 Canton area, possibly as an agent for Astor. While in Canton he 
performed some sort of significant service for the Russian navigator 
Captain Kruzenstern which later gave Dobell a degree of entry to 
Russian officialdom. 20 Kruzenstern in Nadezhda was in Canton in 
October 1805. During the previous year Nadezhda had visited Kamchatka 
three times. Nikolai Rezanov was a passenger in Nadezhda at that 
time and he arranged the off loading of critically needed supplies 
for the residents of Petropavlovsk. 21 Either from his Russian con-
tacts or from Astor's captains, Dobell learned of Kamchatka's needs, 
for an American brig, ~' owned by John Jacob Astor and commanded 
by Captain "Dubell" was bound in the spring of 1812 from Canton to 
Kamchatka. 22 In August 1812 Peter Dobell arrived in Petropavlovsk 
with two ships with cargoes of supplies and provisions. One of the 
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vessels returned to Manila. Dobell stay~l behind. He travelled in 
Kamchatka, met the Commandant and then sailed by way of the Aleutians 
and Penzhinskii Bay to Okhotsk. 23 From there he travelled overland 
to St. Petersburg. On these journeys he kept a log which he later 
published, but the book proved short on personal details, recapping 
chiefly his observations of Siberia. According to Dobell, Siberia 
had "remote regions with inviting attractions to human industry and 
improvement" which would become one of "the most flourishing countries 
of his Imperial Majesty's dominions" and possessed "nature resources, 
soil, and climate, very superior to what is generally believed." He 
also concluded that Siberia had an insufficient number of inhabitants 
and that transportation was poor and expensive. He regretted that 
the Amur River, which would have provided for a more efficient trans-
port system was still within Chinese territory. 24 While in St. 
Petersburg Dobell became a Russian citizen, joined the merchants 
guild and obtained on good terms the right to trade with visiting 
foreign ships. The Tsarist government during these early years looked 
favorably on such trade. Besides this, Dobell presented to the govern-
ment a broad plan with various provisions for commerce and industry 
in the Pacific. His economic development proposal for Siberia included: 
1. Inauguration of a whaling and fishing industry in the 
North Pacific, 
2. Improvement of the communications in Siberia, 
3. Occupation of the Liu Ch'iu (Ryukyu) Islands, 
4. Arrangement to tranship Chinese goods from Manila 
to Kronstadt 
5. Establishment of regular trade relations between 
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Kamchatka and the Philippine Islands in order to 
assure necessary provisions for the inhabitants of 
Siberia. 25 
To carry out this latter provision of the plan, Debell entered 
Russian service and was named Consul-general to the Philippines in 
1817 or 1818. In response to this plan, Baranov sent the American 
ship Isabella to Manila. The expedition which returned in 1816 was 
completely unsuccessful, bringing back mostly large quantities of rum. 
The Spanish authorities refused to recognize Dobell or any other 
foreign emissary to their colony. At the end of 1817 or 1818, Debell 
returned to Kamchatka bringing trade goods with him. He also made 
an offer to the Commandant of Kamchatka, Rikard, to import various 
provisions from overseas. The local office of the Russian-American 
company informed the directors of this and they lodged a protest 
with the minister of internal affairs. Undeterred by this setback 
Debell prepared to commence a whaling industry with an "agent of an 
American company." However, higher Russian authorities disapproved 
of the whaling agreement. Moreover, the government policy changed 
and trade with all foreign vessels was prohibited. Only because 
... ,._ 
Debell was a Russian citizen was he permitted to return to Manila 
and bring back one last cargo to Kamchatka in 1821, despite the pr-o-
tests of the Russian-American company. The~' still reportediy 
owned by John Jacob Astor and commanded by "Dubell," arrived in the 
Hawaiian Islands from the Northwest Coast (possibly from the Asiatic 
shore) and was scheduled to sail for Manila that same year. 26 
Pertinent facts concerning Pigot 1 s Siberiar1 experiences are 
also scant. In November 1813 Pigot took over command of Astor's vessel 
Forester while the ship was in the Hawaiian Islands. Having acquired 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29 
a load of seal skins along the Northwest coast, Pigot decided to 
dispose of his cargo at Okhotsk, but was forced to put into Kamchatka 
late in 1815. After offloading his furs, Pigot purchased a cargo 
from an agent of Dobell and sent the Forester back to Hawaii while he 
remained to conduct business. An agent of the Russian-American company 
purchased the furs for six times as much as Pigot had paid for them. 
The company headquarters, however, refused to honor the sale and, 
citing an imperial ukaz forbidding the import of seal skins, nrdered 
him to take the skir .:•tt of the country. Pi got made the long over-
land journey to St. Petersburg in an attempt to rectify the sit~ation. 
Unable to obtain a satisfactory solutL,n, he returned to Kamchatka. 
Pigot made an offer which was "zealously supported by Rikord" to con-
duct fishing and whaling along the shores of Kamchatka for a period 
of ten years. From Kamchatka he sailed for the Hawaiian Islands with 
Astor's seal skins aboard the schooner .Q~neral San Martin in October 
1818. For a time, Pigot apparently was doing business for himself. 
In December 1819 he bought the _?an Martin. This schooner was noted 
arriving at Manila in March 1820 in company with the ~' but not 
under the command of Pigot who had been engaged as an agent for the 
Pedler, another of Astor's ships. The Pedler traded in Sitka before 
proceeding to Kamchatka in September 1820. Forsaking further trading 
ventures, Pigot went in San Martin with a company of Americans to 
settle Fannings Island. 27 
What role did Astor play in the Dobell-Pigot Siberian develop-
ment schemes? His interest in the Pacific fur trade was concentrated 
primarily on the Northwest Coast, but his ambitions went far beyond. 
Since 1809, Astor and his agents had been negotiating with Andrei 
Dashkov, the Russian Consul-general and with Count Pahlen, the Russian 
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minister to the United States. The object of the talks was to set 
conditions for cooperation between Astor's Pacific Fur Company and 
the Russian-American company to exclude the other Americans from the 
Northwest Coast. As a consequence of these conversations, Astor 
30 
sent Captain Ebbets in Enterprise in November 1809 with a cargo of 
supplies for Baranov in Sitka. As part of Astor's instructions Ebbets 
was authorized to deliver a portion of the cargo to Okhotsk should 
Baranov find that expedient. So Astor knew as early as 1809 of the 
shortness of supplies in Siberia. Ebbets was able to confirm that the 
prospects for trade with Kamchatka were good and might include an 
exchange for Siberian sables. 28 In 1811 Astor sent his son-in-law 
Bentzon to St. Petersburg to conclude a final agreement. One of the 
terms which Astor proposed was to allow his company to import into 
Russia, duty free, up to 2000 skins of animals trapped in the interior 
of North America, such as black bear and raccoon. Astor proposed to 
receive RussLm goods in return. The Russians accepted all the con-
ditions of Astor's proposal of cooperation except the import of furs 
by Astor into Russia. The directors of the Russian-American company 
suspected the motives behind this proposition and voiced their objections 
to Count Rumyantsev, Russia's foreign minister, arguing that the Tsar 
should not permit "further hampering of Russ:i.an industry by private 
American traders." This difference of opinion between Bentzon and 
the directors of the Russian-American company received prolonged 
examiniation in the upper levels of the imperial government, including 
the Minsters of Finance and Internal Affairs. The import proposal was 
finally firmly rejected by Rumyantsev on the grounds that such a 
measure would constitute a violation of the Russian tariff. 29 
It seems likely, from a review of what is known about the 
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Dobell-Pigot movements in the years 1812-1821, that Astor did not give 
up his interest in opening up Siberia to American trade. The circum-
stances suggest that in 1812 he directed Dobell's two ships to Kamchatka 
with supplies, trusting that the Ruasian settlers there would become 
as dependent on him for provisioning as those in Russian-America. 
Pigot in Fores.ter may not have arrived in Kamchatka in 1815 under 
any specific orders from Astor, but it must have seemed strange to 
the Russians that only three years after the rebuff to Bentzon an 
Astor ship was attempting to import a cargo of furs into Siberia. No 
wonder that P5got spent three fruitless years, 1815-1818, trying to 
sell his cargo. During this period Pigot was able to keep Astor 
further infor~ed regarding Siberian trade. 30 
Whether Astor was specifically aware of the Dobell-Pigot plans 
to establish a Philippine-Siberia supply run or to start a whaling 
and fishing industry in Kamchatkan waters is more problematical. Pigot 
had purchased his own ship in 1819 and Dobell had become a Russian 
citizen a few years earlier. So these projects may not have been 
associated directly with Astor, though he may have assented to support 
them. From the Russian viewpoint though, they were still dealing with 
an "agent of an American company," as Pigot certainly was again during 
the port visit of Pedler to Kamchatka toward the end of 1820. By then 
the Russian reaction against the American endeavors was in full swing. 
Because all of the Dobell-Pigot-Astor activity in Siberia since 
1812 took place outside the framework of the Russian-American company, 
this caused the company to register strenuous complaints to government 
officials. Concerning foreign ships visiting Eastern Siberian ports, 
the company argued that foreigners usually brought in high profit 
luxury items such as alcoholic beverages rather than low-profit, bulky 
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food staples. They also argued that the furs obtained in the Kamchatka-
Okhotsk region would inevitably pass into the hands of foreign competi-
tors with a consequent loss of profits to the company and loss of 
customs duties for the government. As to the fishing and whaling 
enterprises, the company b~ard of directors feared that the foreigners 
would use whaling as a pretext for a permanent settlement in one of 
the company's possessions and would be drawn into trading fnr furs 
with the natives or engaging in fur tr~pping themselves. This, the 
company concluded, would be a direct violation of the exclusive impe-
rial privileges granted to the company and hurt the economy of Kamchatka. 
In February 1820 Count Speranskii, the Governor General of Siberia, 
reported on the subject to Count Nesselrode, the foreign minister. 
While acknowledging the benefits which would accrue from a thriving 
whaling industry, he supported the arguments of the company and pre-
sented the disadvantages he saw in permitting the industry to fall 
into foreign hands: 
1. Everyone knows of the Russian-American Company's com-
plaints about the efforts of American cit~zens to trap and 
trade on their own account, and even to provide the natives 
with fire arms; these complaints are justified, but the 
matter cannot be helped. To try to get the American 
government to prohibit this would be in vain and against 
the spirit of that nation's trading rules. The company 
has only one recourse: to attempt to place its own 
establishments at key points. At the least, the government 
should not favor this foreign-owned trade. But it un-
doubtedly will be favored by the establishment of whaling 
on the eastern shores of Siberia. This would both foster 
and support it. 
2. Although for various ~easons animal trapping in 
Kamchatka and Okhotsk has diminished in significance, pre-
sent and future hopes of the trade still depend on Russian 
hunters. But if foreign establishments are set up on the 
shores, it will undoubtedly pass into foreign hands. In 
these sparsely populated regions it would be impossible to 
maintain close surveillance or to prohibit the import~tion 
of alcoholic beverages, if this trade were permitted. 
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3. For the unity and completeness of its enterprise, the 
Russian-American Company should attempt to establish whale 
fishing, if not with its own employees, then at least with 
its own capital. At present its capital position is not only 
strong, but even excessive, and for this reason its enter-
prises require expansion. But a contract with foreigners 
would impose an insurmountable obstacle to this expansion. 
4. Rikord asserts in his letter that if the foreigners 
wished to carry on whaling in those regions we would lack 
the forces to prevent them. First, the disproportionate 
weakness of our forces is questionable. The timely appear-
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. ance of one well-armed ship would subdue and scatter all of 
these whalers. Second, if they are able to appropriate this 
industry by force, why should we support their force with 
contra~tual rights?31 
Upon the advice of his ministers, the emperor decided not to 
ratify the whaling contract with Dobell and Pigot, but instead to 
direct the Russian-American Company to turn their ~ttention to the 
whaling industry and equip one ship with the necessary gear and 
experienced men. As to commerce, the government of Irkutsk was 
directed to prohibit all foreign merchants from trading or putting 
into the ports of East Siberia. Foreigners were to be forbidden 
to enroll in the merchants' guilds or settle in Kamchatka or Okhotsk. 
Dobell himself, though a Russian subject, was ordered to leave East 
Siberia and prohibited from making either provisioning voyages to 
the Philippines or his projected venture transporting Chinese goods 
to the Baltic. Henceforth, the Russian-American Company must be 
responsible for furnishing supplies to Kamchatka and Okhotsk in 
their own vessels. In sum, the Russian-American Company had reacted 
strongly against the enterprises of Dobell and foreigners in East 
Siberia. At the instigation of the company, the government had 
abruptly changed its policy concerning foreign trade with Siberia. 
N 1 1 h d h .b. d 32 o onger we come, sue tra e was pro ~ ~te • 
At first glance, the Russian reaction to the incursion of a 
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handful of private Americans seems drastic. During the previous 
decade only a comparatively few American vessels had put into Siberian 
ports. But the activities of the Americans in Siberia were not 
viewed by company or government officials in isolation. They were 
well aware of the larger drama unfolding along the Pacific Northwest--
how the few foreign traders on the coast had multiplied to dozens 
~ 
in later years. They observed how the Americans disregarded the 
territorial claims of Russian-America and Spanish California--~mug-
gling, poaching, putting into shore and trading contraband items 
with the Indians anywhere that no permanent settlement was in place. 
How American statesmen proclaimed theil. own continental ambitions for 
the United States and how the people were realizing these claims by 
the relentless westward press to settlement. But most of all the 
Russians observed how the commercial, seaborne thrust of the "Boston 
men" could become the deciding influence in determining the fate of 
the region. Russian naval officers such as Captain Vassilij Golovnin 
were particularly irked at the American encroachments. After his 
voyage tc, inspect the colonies, he recommended in 1819 that Russia 
protect and defend its colonies against foreign penetration. The 
Russian minister to the United States, Pierre de Poletika, also 
reported the intense interest of American citizens and the Congress 
in the settlements of the Pacific Northwest. 33 
Compared to the main events in the Pacific Northwest, the 
plans of Dobell and Pigot would have seemed like the actions of bit 
players except for the fact that they were being acted out in the 
Russian wings. Nor did the Russian authorities overlook the many 
similarities between the Asian side of the North Pacific and the 
American. Eastern Siberia was still very much a frontier colony, 
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sparsely populated with large stretches between the Russian settle-
ments. In extensive regions the natives were not yet under the 
effective administrative cont=ol of Russia. Because of the transporta-
tion and communication difficulties, imperial authorities well realized 
th~t they would have been hard put to prevent the same kind of 
American commercial and territorial encroachment along the Siberian 
coastline. 
Therefore, when the events along the Pacific Northwest 
triggered the imperial ukaz of September 1821, the terms were extended 
to include the Asiatic Northeast coast as well. The Minister of 
Finance, D. A. Gurev, a member of the committee that drew up the 
ukaz, emphasized in a report to the emperor that "it was necessary 
to protect the Eastern shores of Siberia, to shelter our colonies, 
and maintain them in close connection."34 By the first two articles 
of the ukaz, the imperial government decreed such protection. 
1. The pursuits of commerce, whaling, and fishery, and of 
all other industry on all islands, posts, and gulfs, 
including the whole of the north-west coast of Americ&, 
beginning from Behring Straits to the 51° of northern 
latitude, also from the Aleutian Islands to the eastern 
coast of Siberia, as well as along the Kurile Islands from 
Behring Straits to the south cape of the Island of Urup, 
viz., to the 45° 50' north latitude, is exclusively granted 
to Russian subjects. 
2. It is therefore prohibited to all foreign vessels not 
only to land on the coasts and islands belonging to Russia 
as stated above, but also, to approach them within less 
than 100 Italian miles. The transgressor's vessel is 
subject to confiscation along with the whole cargo.35 
If the plans of Dobell and Pigot had not already been enjoined 
a short time previously, this edict would have effectively curtailed 
their activities. The ukaz was not entirely defensive in nature. In 
Asia, Russia was laying claim to vast territories nominally belonging 
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to China and Japan. The latitude 45° SO' north runs from the southern 
tip of Urup island in the Kuriles through the La Perouse Straits to 
a point on the Asiatic mainland far south of the mouth of the Amur 
River. The entire island of Sakhalin and a large portion of the 
Primorye (Maritime) Region, or Coa~t of Tartary, were claimed by 
the ukaz for the first time as Russian possessions. 
Why did the Tsarist government raise the issue of the Siberian 
coast in the 1821 ukaz? F~om a review of the diplomatic correspondence~ 
it is evident that Russia had seriously considered declaring the whole 
northern portion of the Pacific Ocean as a mare clausum. To make such 
a sweeping declaration of jurisdiction, it was necessary to include 
as great an extent of surroun~ing land possessions as possible, 
hence the Asiatic coastal claim. Moreover, as Robert Kerner has 
pointed out, there was a strong connection between Russian expansion 
in America and in the Amur region. When checked by the Treaty of 
Nerchinsk in 1689 from pressing southward, the Russians advanced 
northeastward and eventually to Russian-America. Now, with the 
prospects of being checked on the North American continent, Russia 
was reversing directions and laying the groundwork for expansion 
southward to the Amur. Those officials drafting the ukaz also saw 
an opportunity for an advance into a region promising a more assured 
supply of food for its Pacific outposts. 36 
The American Congress and the New England merchants paid 
scant attention to the provisions of the ukaz dealing with the Asiatic 
Pacific regions. Their ire was aroused solely by the threatened 
expansion of Russia along the Pacific Northwest. In all the diplomatic 
correspondence exchanged between Russia and the United States between 
the issuance of the ukaz in 1821 and the signing of the Russian-American 
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convention in 1824, the situation in eastern Siberia was rarely 
mentioned and then only in general terms. The United States raised 
no objections to the new boundary demarcation in Asia even though it 
became extended by dint of repetition by both sides to 45° North on 
the Asiatic side. 37 No time limits were expressed in the convention 
concerning Northeast Asia. Nor was any list of contraband trade goods 
imposed. 
But John Quincy Adan,s, the American Sec.retary of State, did 
insist that the vessels of the United States, as an independent nation, 
had the right to freely navigate thoRe seas as a part of that independ-
ence. To the United States minister to Russia, Henry Middleton, he 
gave firm instructions. 
The pretensions of the Imperial Government extend to an 
exclusive territorial jurisdiction from the forty-fifth degree 
of north latitude, on the Asiatic coast to the latitude of 
fifty-one north )n the western coast of the American contin-
ent; and they assume the right of interdicting the navigation 
and the fishery of all other nations to the extent of one 
hundred miles from the whole coast. 
The United States can admit no part of these claims. 
Adams went on to compare the isolated Russian factories along 
the Northwest coast to those established by European nations along 
the coast of Africa for the past three centuries. The factories only 
communicated with one another by sea which did not suffice to consider 
the entire coast as being a Russian possession. Although Adams did 
not extend the analogy to Northeast Asia, the same argument largely 
pertained there also. 38 Thus only in general terms did Adams keep 
the waters on both sides of the Pacific in mind. While he apparently 
had no territorial ambitions for the United States in Eastern Asia, 
Adams was strongly concerned about maintaining maritime rights of the 
United States unimpaired. During the subsequent negotiations with 
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Russia, Adams would only concede that in the Pacific Ocean "citizens 
of the United States shall not land in any part of the coast actually 
occupied by Russian settlements, unless by permission •• " Despite 
counter proposals by the Russians also to ban citizens of the United 
States from coasts "belonging to Russia,"39 the first article of 1824 
convention between the United States and Russia stipulated that: 
It is agreed that in any part of the great ocean commonly 
called the Pacific Ocean, or South Sea, the respective 
citizens or subjects of the high contracting powers shall 
be neither disturbed nor restrained either in navig~tion, 
or in fishing, or in the power of resorting to the coasts 
upon points which may not already be occupied for the 
purpose of trading with the natives, saving always the 
restrictions and conditions determined by the following 
articles. 
Since the restrictions and conditions determined in the succeeding 
four drticles of the convention were specifically concerned with the 
Northwest Coast, the only article relevant to the Northeast Coast of 
Asia was the general first article. In this area of the Pacific the 
American proposal had been adopted in its entirety. Only belatedly 
40 did the Russians realize the possible consequences. 
Admiral Mordvinov, director and spokesman for the Russian-
American Company protested that the convention was vague and violated 
the company's monopoly rights. Before ratification the emperor ordered 
a special commission to review the company's complaints. Their report, 
approved by the emperor, tried to rectify the oversight by explaining 
that the condition permitting United States citizens to fish in 
colonial waters and trade with coastal natives should not be taken 
as implying the right to approach the shores of Eastern Siberia and 
the Aleutian and Kurile Islands. To avoid an "incorrect" interpreta-
tion of the convention the Russian envoy to the United States was 
instructed to make a formal explanatory declaration before the treaty 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39 
was sent to the Senate for ratification. Accordingly, Baron Tuyll 
approached Secretary Adams with the Russian clarification regarding 
the convention's application to Siberia and the Aleutians. Adams 
told Baron Tuyll that the convention could only be modified by a 
new convention and the departments concerned with its execution had 
no authority to consider stipulations. Adams advised the Baron to 
wait to present his note until after ratification in order to see how 
the convention worked in practice. ' Because he was probably uninformed 
about previous America~~~omme~ial attempts, Adams assured Tuyll 
that "Our merchants would not go to trouble the Russians on the 
coast of Siberia ••• and it was wisest not to put such fancies into 
their heads." Tuyll reported to his government that he had only 
been able to express the Russian sense of the convention to the Ameri-
can cabinet verbally for to do otherwise would have been to arouse 
prejudicial conjectures. Both governments then proceeded to ratify 
the convention.41 
In reviewing this first chapter of Russian-American contacts 
in Northeast Asia, one must keep in perspective that the two nations 
were at the beginning of a flood tide of friendly relations. The 
conflict of interests on the Northwest Coast tempora;ily caused a 
slight back wash to the tide, but the events in Siberia hardly a 
ripple. Out of necessity the Russians found cooperative efforts 
acceptable. As long as they exercised a degree of control they agreed 
to trade, purchase ships, charter vessels and mount joint hunting 
expeditions with the Americans. B,>:cause Captain D'Wolf fell in with 
Russian plans, his experiences were entirely amicable. Independent 
commercial enterprises proposed by Americans were met, on the other 
hand, by suspicion and opposition. 
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The imperial government, reused by these first threats of 
American encroachment, strove to maintain the security and exclusive 
jurisdiction of its possessions, no matter how tenuous its claims, 
and attempted to forestall all challenges to the company trade 
monopoly, especially on the Siberian mainland. Despite these efforts, 
during the first quarter century the initial steps had already been 
taken to shift the scene of Russian-American interaction from America's 
continent to Russia 1 s. American ships had navigated the North 
Pacific many times over and found their way safely into Asiatic 
Russian ports. The abundance of whales had been noted and reported. 
Americans had traversed Siberia several times and viewed the region 
for themselves. The initial plans had been hatched by Americans to 
exploit the resources and commercial prospects of the region. The 
United States government had refused to curtail the private enterprises 
of its citizens and had shrewdly avoided inhibiting Americans from 
following up in any unsettled areas of Northeast Asia. 
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CHAPTER II 
WHALING IN THE TSAR'S SEAS 
Within two decades a second wave of Americans followed in 
the wake of the fur traders. By the late 1840s, hundreds of American 
whaleships sailed the Tsar's seas and resorted to the Tsar's shores. 
The whaling enterprise at its peak~ which depended primarily on its 
catch in the North Pacific, was far more extensive than that of the 
fur trading pioneers. The numbers engaged in the irdustry, both at 
sea and at home, numbered in the tens of thousands, rather than 
hundreds. The value of one year's whale cargoes exceeded the annual 
imports from China. The segment of the country involved also reached 
beyond Boston and New England to the middle Atlantic coast and to 
San Francisco. As a consequence of this wider spread interest, 
the whalers gained a measure of support and protection from the 
United States government. Two naval expeditions were dispatched to 
the North Pacific ostensibly to make whaling safer and more productive, 
one to seek assurances from Japan that shipwrecked mariners would 
be treated decently and the other to chart the dangers to navigation 
in the seas off Northeast Asia. To the advocates of these two missions, 
such as Aaron Palmer and Senator William Seward, the purposes behind 
the expeditions were more far reaching--to open the area to American 
commerce, to acquire the necessary coaling stations along the sea 
lanes, and to establish a trans-Pacific foothold from which to spread 
American civilization in Asia. 
44 
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Russian officials in Asiatic Russia and the managers of the 
Russian-American Company were annoyed by the presence of so many 
whalers in their waters. News of the American naval expeditions 
disturbed them 111ore. From their ,viewpoint, the entire island 
chain from the Kuriles, to Sakhalin, to the Japanese Islan~s~ and as 
far south as to Ryukus provided not only commercial opportunities 
45 
upon which to base their own Pacific trade empire, but also an offshore 
barrier guarding against foreign encroachment on to the Siberian main-
land. A permanent American presence and possible predominance any-
where along this chain was considered a threat to be counteracted, a 
factor which contributed to the Russian policy toward consolidating 
and expanding its own hold on Northeast Asia. 
The Russians had long known about the presence of large 
numbers of whales in the North Pacific, but had failed to exploit 
their early advantage. Lacking experience in whaling, their single-
minded dedication to fur gathering hampered their fer· abortive attempts 
to become proficient. Included in Baranov's appointment as chief 
manager of the Russian colonies in America were instructions to report 
the number and size of whales washed ashore, the amount of oil and 
bone which might be extracted from them and the best means to catch 
whales in abundance. Whaling became a small, but essential industry 
in Russian-America. The Aleuts had always needed a whale catch for 
food and for greasing their small boats. But only about twenty whale 
hunters were engaged in this pursuit. Mostly the hunting consisted 
of searching for whales that had been washed ashore, though the Aleuts 
did attempt to expand this processbysticking darts in small whales 
close inshore. Despite company offers to pay for each whale caught, 
no one was interested beyond the subsistence hunting. Occasionally 
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the colonies, amidst the plentiful whales, were actually short of 
whale blubber and oil for their own needs. 1 
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In the Siberian waters the Russian-American Company made even 
less of an effort to develop whale fisheries. The government had 
recognized in 1820 the practical advantages of the Dobell-Pigot 
whaling proposal to secure a food supply for the local inhabitants. 
As a consequence, when the foreigners were prevented from proceeding 
with their plan, the compan~ had been directed to initiate whaling 
and fishing around the shores of Kamchatka. The directors made some 
preliminary inq~iries in England and Holland as to the cost of 
equipping a whaling ship, but never followed through. The Russians 
in effect left the entire North Pacific whaling areas, by default, 
to outsiders to exploit. 2 
And the American whalers eventually came in large numbers. 
By the beginning of the 19th century, American vessels had begun to 
frequent the South Pacific. In the 1820s, the American whaling 
activity had moved northward. Usi.ng Honolulu as a base, whalers 
cruised off Northern California and the "off Japan Grounds," the 
vast area between Hawaii and Japan. Before long, whaling activity 
had penetrated into the North Pacific areas. The "golden age" of 
whaling commenced about 1835 and lasted for several decades. American 
whaling assumed its greatest importance and its greatest commercial 
value during this period. The first right whale was taken off Kodiak 
in 1835 by a Nantucket whaler. This signalled a rush of Americans 
to follow suit. By 1841, fifty whalers were hunting the waters 
around the Alaskan peninsula and the eastern Aleutians. The follow-
ing year the Russian-American Company received reports that 200 
whalers were expected that season. In 1843 two ships from New 
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Bedford took, off the coast of Kamchatka, the first bow-head whales 
which proved to have great thickness of blubber and weight of bone. 
The quest for whales took a Sag Harbor whaler through the Bering 
Straits in 1848 where the whales were found to be comparatively tame. 3 
At its peak in 1846, the whaling fleet numbered over 700 
vessels with a capacity of more than 233,000 tons and valued at $21 
million. Of these whalers, nearly all of the large Nantucket and 
New Bedford fleets were engag~d in whaling in the Pacific. Between 
1843 and 1860, on an average, nearly 200 American whalers were in 
the North Pacific region annually. All of this activity did not 
pass unnoticed by the Russians. In fact, they probably exaggerated 
the already large scale of the operations. The governor-general of 
Eastern Siberia, Count Muravev, wrote to the Naval Chief of Staff 
in September 1849: 
this year there were at least 250 whaling ships in our Sea 
of Okhotsk alone. They were all of large tonnage and had 
large crews. I met them constantly during my voyage; often 
there were several ships together. Nevel'skoi and Korsakov 
met them also. My own figure of their number is more 
conservativz than any which I heard from the whalers 
themselves. 
During the decade of the 1850s, the waters of the Sea of Okhotsk 
were especially important to the whaling industry. According to 
Tikhmenev, the Russian-American Company historian, writing in 1861, 
the number of foreign whalers in the Sea of Okhotsk averaged at 
least one hundred vessels yearly during that period. The number of 
whalers increased until "not a single spot in the Okhotsk Sea was 
left unexplored." Most of the whalers concentrated in either the 
northern bays (Penzhinsk, Gizhiginsk and Tauisk) or the southern 
bays (Tugursk and Ul'bansk) near the Shantar Islands. These bays 
had rivers flowing into them which caused an earlier break-up of the 
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ice and the whales gathered there in large numbers to breed. Even 
so, the hunting season only lasted from mid-June to mid-September 
when the storms commenced. 5 
The sight of the Americans profiting from whaling in the 
North Pacific did not upset the officials of the Russian-American 
Company so much as the temerity of the whalers. All the ills that 
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the Russians had predicted might stem from approving the Dobell-Pigot 
plan in 1820 did in fact transpire 25 years later and to a far graater 
extent. The Americans penetrated the coastal waters at will, boldly 
stood into shore and landed wherever they chose. They cut wood to 
sell in Honolulu. They hunted game as they pleased and they rendered 
oil on the beaches which allegedly frightened the fur-bearing animals 
away from their habitat. Soon the whaling crews were engaging in 
trade with the natives, diverting furs from the company monopoly. 
Occasionally ,,~olence broke out between the American shore parties 
and company employees. The Americans ashore were accused of rowdiness, 
destruction of property and a complete disregard for Russian authority 
and regulations. The Americans felt so at home in Siberian waters 
that they gave their own nomenclature to geographical reference points 
and sometimes wintered over on the Sii1erian coast, though this 
proved both arduous and dangerous. 6 
The Russian-American Company repeatedly complained to the 
imperial authorities about the incursions of the American whalers. 
In 1850 the company recommended that whaling in the entire Sea of 
Okhotsk be prohibited. Barring that, the company proposed that naval 
cruisers be based near the Shantar Islands in order to protect those 
places where the whales abound. To the company's energetic protests 
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of the American highhanded activities, the government returned cautious, 
restrained replies. Few protests were forwarded to the United States 
during this period because the names of the vessels and the captains 
usually remained unknown. Moreover, the Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.·had become accustomed to the idea that the United States was 
powerless to restrict its citizens from arbitrary ~ctions off distant 
coasts. The Russian government refused to declare again any part of 
the North Pacific a "closed sea." Article 1 of the Convention of 
1824 being still in force, American citizens were recognized as 
having the right to fish everywhere in the Pacific Ocean including 
the Sea of Okhotsk. Only in territorial waters, customarily within 
a cannon shot or about three miles from shore, did the Tsarist govern-
ment apply restrictions. Commencing in 1853, Russian patrol vessels 
were given the task to see that whaling was not conducted in such 
a manner as to hurt the natives and to maintain order within the 
coastal areas of Russian possessions. 7 
Why did the Russian government not pay more attention to 
the complaints of the Russian-American Company and defend the Siberian 
shores more vigorously against the American whalers? Part of the 
answer is apparent. The empire was preoccupied with European affairs. 
Liberalism and nationalism were sweeping Europe. The Far East 
possessions, despite a resurgence of interest lA the Amur region, 
were a secondary theatre to Russia. The Russian colonies in North 
America were approaching economic collapse. The Russian withdrawal 
from its eastward thrust had already commenced with the sale of 
Fort Ross. Neither the company ships nor the Russian naval contingent 
in the Pacific were of sufficient strength to police the entire North 
Pacific littoral. The expense of gaining such naval power was too 
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formidable to contemplate seriously. In 1848, for exaw.ple, the 
company balked at paying the expenses of outfitting and maintaining 
a single navy vessel to cruise the waters off Russian-America. 8 
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But that still does not completely answer the question of 
why Russia did not protest hotly to the United States through diplo-
matic channels or capture a few American ships to set an example. 
The Russian reluctance to take such steps can be attributed, by 
inference, to their unwillingness to bring attention again to the 
provisions of Article 1 of the 1824 Convention. Russia was willing 
to grant those aspects of Article 1 which dealt with free navigation 
and fishing, but wanted to avoid a renewed discussion of the freedom 
of "resorting to the coasts upon points which may not already be 
occupied for the purpose of trading with the natives." The issue 
had last been raised in 1834 during the negotiations following the 
expiration of the ten-year limitation on Articles 2-5 of the 1824 
Convention.. When Russia refused to consider an extension of these 
articles, ~he United States continued to argue forcefully, based on 
the permanent Article 1, the right of its ships to visit and trade 
at unoccupied points along the Northwest Coast. Henry Middleton~ 
the United States Minister to Russia, in 1824 had presented the 
American stance that with regard to "trade in unoccupied places 
all the shores of the great ocean upon which the parties of this con-
tract have any claim will continue open to them." During the 
protracted diplomatic exchange between Russia and the United States 
which lasted from 1834 until 1838, the focus wag entirely on the 
Northwest Coast. Nevertheless, the United States persistently held 
to its cla"ims to resort to any coastal point of the Pacific not already 
occupied. This claim was justified not only on the mutual and permanent 
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clause of the 1824 Convention, but also on pre-existent rights which 
"existed in perpetuity by the laws of nations." The disagreement 
was never satisfactorily settled. Both nations turned to more 
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urgent issues. A decade later it is not 3urprising that Russia 
avoided reopening this discussion, no matter how annoying the American 
whalers. Tikhmenev suggested that Russia feared also that England 
and France would join in such discussions. 9 
Unlike the paltry enterprises of Debell and Pigot, American 
whaling in the North Pacific had become an imyortant factor of the 
United States' economy. Business interests connected with whaling 
were valued at seventy million dollars, giving employment to 70,000 
per~ons. At its peak thirty-four ports in four Northeastern states 
were engaged in the trade. Ports in New Jersey, Delaware and Cali-
fornia soon joined in. Whale fishing was a source of national 
wealth. The average annual cargo was estimated as worth nine million 
dollars which exceeded the highest annual import from China by two 
million dollars. Moreover, the skills in shipbuilding, navigation 
and seamanship which were developed in the whaling fleets enhanced 
the naval strength of the United States. 10 
The hundreds of vessels plying the waters off Japan and along 
the Siberian coast were in constant danger from ice floes, unpredictable 
weather and uncharted shoals. Their situation was made more difficult 
by being so far from a port where they could refit, repair damages 
and take on supplies. Inevitably shipwrecks occurred. The sailors 
who managed to reach Japanese shores were thrown into jail. Eventually, 
some of those shipwrecked were repatriated through the mediation of 
the Dutch at Nagasaki and news of the severe treatment they endured 
was learned. American resentment of such treatment of American 
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whalers provided the proximate cause for dispatching a naval diplomatic 
expedition to Japan under the command of Commodore Matthew Perry. 11 
A second, underlying motive which influenced Perry's expedi-
tion had a more directly commercial basis. American manufacturers 
and merchants perceived brighter prospects for increased trade with 
Asian nations now that the United States was firmly established on 
the Pacific Coast. Projects to connect the Atlantic and Pacific 
coasts by intercontinental railroads and an Isthmian canal heightened 
American interest in ending the isolation of Japan from international 
trade. To this end, Perry was directed to seek permission for vessels 
of the United States to enter Japanese ports for the sale and barter 
of their cargoes.12 
As direct trade from the west coast of the United States to 
Asia became a familiar thought, one prerequisite was recognized 
as indispensable. Before trans-Pacific steamship routes could be 
implemented efficiently, it would be absolutely necessary to acquire 
strateeically located coaling stations en route. Planning for coal 
resources became an important factor in both naval expeditions and 
was to remain a consideration of American policy throughout the century. 
It is not surprising that among the guidelines furnished Perry was 
the reminder as to the desirability of establishing "a depot for coal, 
if not on one of the principal islands, at least on some small unin-
habited one."13 
In prosecuting the objectives of the mission to Japan, 
Secretary of the Navy Kennedy, realizing that the American naval 
squadron would be operating at a great distance from day-to-day 
direction, invested Perry with "large discretionary powers." As a 
final instruction, Perry was authorized to enlarge the scope of the 
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expedition, if the squadron was able without interfering with the main 
objectives. He was told to explor~ the coasts of Japan and of the 
adjacent continent and islands with a view toward extending commercial 
relations and of securing ports of refuge for American whaling vessels. 
To accomplish this latter purpose, Perry was authorized "to negotiat~ 
treaties of amity and navigation with any and all established and 
independent sovereignties in those regions."14 With these extraordinary 
powers Perry was ready to test out his broad conceptions of an Ameri-
can commercial empire in the Pacific. His orders, which he may have 
had a large hand in writing himself, suited his purpose exactly. 
Perry was being given the opportunity to bring the honor and glory 
to his nation that Captain David Porter had sought back in 1815 when 
he reminded President Madison that the United States "borden: on 
Russia, Japan and China." Porter had urged that the United States 
then send out an exploring expedition to the remote regions of the 
Pacific, to introduce civilization and secure valuable trade. 15 
The history of the U. s. Naval Expedition to Japan has been 
recounted, in detail, in several forms. Two aspects only will be 
extracted from the various documents and narratives of the expedition 
and emphasized here. First, the imperialism of Commodore Perry, 
which was reflected both in his actions in the North Pacific and in 
his later commentary, is of interest as it foreshadowed the late 
nineteenth century imperialism of the United States. Second, the 
sense of Russian and American rivalry engendered during the course 
of the expedition was also a precursor of later events. 
If, as Tyler Dennett has suggested~ the instructions given to 
Commodore Perry mark the "first comprehensive statement of the basis 
of American policy for the Pacific," Perry's contribution came during 
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his months of study and preparation for the expedition. Perry had 
never before been assigned to a Pacific squadron, but he did gather 
together and· read about the experiences of others and he did talk 
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to New Bedford whalers who had been tc the Far East. One of the 
experts that Perry consulted was Aaron Palmer, a New York commission 
merchant, who had been a leading promoter and lobbyist of those 
manufacturers favoring the American expedition. It may well have 
been Palmer who recommended enlarging the scope to include the 
"adjacent continent." Among Palmer's early promotional efforts was 
a geographical, political and commercial memoir addressed in January 
1848 to President Polk on the "present state, productive resources, 
and capabilities for commerce of Siberia, Manchuria and the Asiatic 
Islands of the Northern Pacific Ocean." He not only urged that the 
United States' government foster the commercial navigation and whale 
fishery in the North Pacific, but also recommended that the United 
States should insist on the right of navigating the Amur River and 
its affluents "upon the same footing as the Russians." Speaking of 
the Gilyaks and other nomads along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, Palmer 
made a point that their states were independent i1.1 that "they pay no 
tribute either to the Chinese or Russian governments. 1116 
Through his studying Perry became convinced of the commercial 
importance of the Pacific region and the national necessity for the 
United States to ensure a prominent role there for itself. The concept 
of an extra-continental policy was not only new, but fraught with 
difficulties when taken beyond the talking stage. Projecting a secure 
and permanent American presence across the Pacific had practical con-
sequences to be considered. How could Perry manifest the United 
Statesi destiny in the Far East without resorting to European style 
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imperialism? Samuel E. Morison has termed Perry an "imperialist with 
a difference." Perry may have been different, but not in the results 
he hoped to achieve, only in the methods he proposed to use. 17 
Commodore Perry put his ideas concerning trans-Pacific American 
outposts into action at two places in the Western Pacific, in the 
Ryukus and the ~onin Islands. Both locations seemed suitable for 
being placed under American "surveillance." They would provide 
necessary ports of refuge for whalers and coaling bases for Pacific 
navigation. Both could be treated as oemi-independent, since prior 
claims of sovereignty were mixed. Both could become models of American 
administrative probity and examples of Yankee industry. Each could 
serve as stations from which American missionaries could be sent to 
the "benighted" countries of Asia. To Perry, it seemed necessary 
for the United States to "extend its territorial jurisdiction beyond 
the limits of the western continent" in order to sustain "our maritime 
rights in the East." Although Perry tried to avoid the odious term 
"colony" for such outposts, he rationalized their acquisition as 
justified by the commercial benefits and the advance of civilization 
and the industrial arts. Perry acted promptly to establish a semblance 
of American authority over these island groups because "some other 
powers, less scrupulous, may step in and seize upon the advantages 
which should justly belong to us." The power he chiefly had in mind 
R • 18 was uss~a. 
Perry well knew that the United States would meet competition 
in achieving its Pacific destiny. Before embarking on the expedition, 
Perry had examined carefully the repeated efforts of other nations 
to break down the Japanese barriers. He knew from his studies that 
Russia had made a number of attempts to establish relations with Japan 
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commencing 60 years before when Lt. Laxman sailed from Okhotsk to 
Hakodate to open talks. Laxman failed as did the subsequent peaceful 
missions of Rezanov (1804) and Golovnin (1811). Nor had the show of 
force employed by Khostov and Davidov (1807) changed the Japanese 
resolve for isolation. Perry may not have been aware of the most 
r.ecent uns·uccessful Russian try to open trade. A Russian-American 
Company ship Kniaz Menshikov in August 1852 entered the port of 
Shimoda to return seven Japanese castaways and open talks, but like 
all previous missions was ordered to depart before accomplishing its 
object. 19 
After his departure, Perry was informed by the Secretary of 
the Navy that the Russian government was sending a naval force to 
Japan. As early as 1843 the Tsarist government had considered sending 
such a naval expedition to China and Japan under the command of 
Admiral Putyatin, but had held back because of the cost involved. 
Once the American expedition was imminent, the long-proposed expedition 
was reactivated to prevent the United States from obtaining a pre-
eminent relationship with Japan. In August 1853, the Russian squadron 
arrived off Nagasaki a step behind Perry's ships which had made their 
first visit to Tokyo Bay in July. For a year thereafter, Perry and 
Putyatin maneuvered in a Pacific "pas de deux," although Perry much 
preferred to act alone. Thus, when Putyatin proposed that the forces 
combine to cooperate in attaining their ends more easily, Perry 
positively, but courteously declined, believing that cooperation might 
benefit Russia, but would not advance the cause of the United States. 
To the Secretary of the Navy he declared himself considerably :nnoyed 
by the "mysterious movements" of the Russian ships of war. He was 
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even more annoyed when he learned that, contrary to Perry's orders, 
the Russian Admiral had been permitted to purchase 20 tons of American 
controlled coal in Shanghai in order to facilitate his fleet reaching 
Nagasaki. It was to circumvent just this sort of thing, that Perry 
had collected all the coal he could lay his hands on and placed it 
in the U. s. Naval stores in Shanghai. Putyatin requested a second 
order of coal in vain. 20 
Leaving his proposals with the Japanese officials, Perry 
departed Tokyo Bay after ten days, intending to return for his answer 
in the spring. Putyatin continued his discussions and received some 
encouraging words, but no treaty. The Japanese, not above playing one 
foreigner against another, told Putyatin that Russia was considered 
"as a defense against other countries" and that should Japan finally 
permit trade, "it will be first to your country."21 But circumstances 
and American diplow~cy interfered with tbis promise. Due to the lack 
of suitable ships and the onset of the Crimean War: Putyatin was 
unable to reopen negotiations until November 1854. Meanwhile, Perry 
stole a march on the Russians by hastening his squadron back to Japan 
in February 1854 and signed the first treaty with Japan i~ March which 
earned him the distinction of "opening up Japan." 
A few month~:' after the announcement of the treaty, a Dr. Von 
Siebold published a pamphlet claiming that Russia should receive the 
credit for opening Japan to trade. Von Siebold, a knowledgeable Dutch 
authority on Japan, had been banished from Japan because he was 
thought to be a Russian spy. For this reason Perry had refused his 
offer to join the American expedition. His claims on behalf of 
Russia undoubtedly increased Perry's suspicions of that nation's 
motives. 22 In every direction that Perry steamed in the North Pacific 
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he felt that Russian presence. He intended to turn Naha in the Ryukus 
into an American port of refuge, but found that the Russian squadron 
had also vi~ited and exercised an armed force ashore. In examining 
the various claims to the Bonin Islands, he again discovered that 
Russia was a prior contender there, also. When the American squadron 
visited Hakodate, one of the newly opened treaty ports in Northern 
Japan, Perry became aware that Russia had recently "annexed" the 
Amur region. 23 
At the outset of his voyage, Perry, as might be expected, 
was strongly opposed to "annexationist England." However, in the 
course of the expedition, his attitude changed. The British had 
extended him several courtesies and freely acknowledged his lead in 
opening Japan. In Russia, on the other hand, Perry perceived a 
potential rival, one which "might aim to be a great maritime. power, 
and to rule mistress of the Pacific." His narrative of the expedition 
is replete with similar warnings. Noting that Russia had already 
seized some of the Kurile Islands which belonged to Japan, ~e thought 
it not in "the i.tterest of any part of the commercial world that 
Russia should ever own Japan," although "Russia has, doubtless, long 
seen the importance to her of its acquisition." Russia was suspected 
of secret purposes, of rendering aid to Japan as an ally, with the 
intention at the proper time of absorbing all of Japan. By fortifying 
the "annexed" territory at the mouth of the Amur, Russia had excited 
"suspicions of ulterior designs. 1124 
Although the Perry expedition never proceeded on to the Asiatic 
mainland, the possibility that it might had hastened Russia 1 s occupation 
along the Amur and on Sakhalin. The uncertainty as to where Perry 
intended to establish American outposts had heightened the sense of 
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Russian-American competition. To Perry, who already bemoaned the 
large areas of Asia already under European sway, the Russian acquisi-
tion of the Amur must have seemed like another opportunity lost for 
gaining a foothold in Northeast Asia. Based on these experiences, 
Perry made his own prophecy concerning the future rivalry with Russia: 
It requires no sage to predict events so strongly fore-
shadowed to us all; still "Westward" will "the course of 
empire take its way." But the last act of the drama is yet 
to be unfolded; and notwithstanding the reasoning of 
political empirics, Westward, Northward and Southward, 
to me it seems that the people of America will, in some 
form or other, extend their dominion and their power, 
until they shall have brought within their mighty embrace 
the Islands of the great Pacific, and placed the Saxon 
race upon the eastern shores of Asia. And I think, too, 
that eastward and southward will her great rival in 
future aggrandizement (Russia) stretch forth her power 
to the coasts of China and Siam: and thus the Saxon and 
the Cossack will meet once more, in strife or in 
friendship, on another field. Will it be in friendship? 
I fear not! The antagonistic exponents of freedom and 
absolutism must meet at last, and then will be fought 
that mighty battle on which the world will look with 
breathless interest; for on its issue will depend the 
freedom or the slavery of the world,--despotism or 
rational liberty must be the f.ate of civilized man. 
I think I see in the distance the giants that are growing 
up for that fierce and final encounter; in the progress 
of events that battle must sooner or later inevitably be 
fought. 25 
The United States Surveying Expedition to the North Pacific 
had different objectivesfrom Perry's expedition to Japan. As its name 
implies, the aims of the North Pacific expedition were scientific 
exploration and reconnaissance, not diplomacy. The expedition was 
instructed to survey the areas navigated by whalers in the vicinity 
of the Japanese archipelago and the waters north to the Bering Straits 
in order to lessen the hazards of whale fishing by constructing more 
accurate charts of shoals, headlands, and protected anchorages. The 
expedition was also charged with charting trans-Pacific routes over 
which merchant ships could navigate safely and quickly between San 
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Francisco and Asia. Nor was the possibility of locating a strategic 
coaling station along the track overlooked. 26 
Senator William Seward was the chief proponent of the North 
Pacific Survey Expedition. In a major speech to the Senate in July 
1852, it was he who cited the growth and importance of the American 
whaling industry, while deploring the large number of disasters at 
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sea. He pointed out that eleven ships had been lost in the year 1851 
alone. Elaborating on this original theme, Seward went on to give 
expression to his vision of the United States expanding into the Pacific. 
He foresaw "the reunion of the two civilizations, which, having parted 
on the plains of Asia four thousand years ago, and having travelled 
ever afterwards in opposite directions around the world, now meet 
again on the coasts and islands of the Pacific Ocean." The ordinary 
whalers and survey ships were seen by Seward, then, as an opening 
wedge into the region which he forecast would become the "chief theatre 
of events in the world's great hereafter."27 
Five naval ships were commissioned for the expedition, but 
only the movements of the two which surveyed in Russian Far Eastern 
waters during the summer of 1855 are of concern here. The 700-ton 
sloop Vincennes served as flagship for Lt. John Rodgers. The John 
Hancock, a small steamer, was under the command of Lt. Henry Stevens. 
The last port-of-call before commencing the final stage of the survey 
in June 1855 was Hakodate, one of the two Japanese treaty ports opened 
by Perry. Word of this provision in the treaty had already circulated 
among American whalers by the time the expedition arrived. The 
whaling ships were making arrangements to resort to Hakodate in large 
numbers as a convenient place to re-fit and re-provision. 28 
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From Hakodate, Lt. Stevens in Hancock was ordered to proceed 
westward through the Tsugaru straits and thence northward along the 
west coast of Hokkaido. After passing through the La Perouse straits 
into the Sea of Okhotsk, L,~ was directed to survP.y the northern 
coast of the sea first. Then, he was to penetrate southward to the 
vicinity of the Amur estuary and beyond to Castries in the Gulf of 
Tartary, if possible. Some doubt still lingered whether Sakhalin 
was an island or attached to the mainlanu, making the passage from 
the Sea of Okhotsk to the Gulf of Tartary impossible. The locations 
of several places ashore on Kamchatka and Sakhalin were provided to 
Stevens in his orders as potential sources of coal deposits, and he 
was advised that other localities could "doubtless be ascertained 
from the Russians."29 
Like the Perry expedition, the Russians were aware of the 
upcoming survey. Governor General Muravev had offered to detail 
two officers to assist the exploration of northern waters, but Rodgers 
was not able to avail himself of their services. In appreciation of 
the gesture, Rodgers forwarded a set of charts made by the coastal 
survey and requested in return a chart of the entrance to the Amur 
River. In politely refusing, Muravev claimed that the Amur chart 
was "yet so incorrect that I do not think it deserves to get a place 
in your valuable work." The policy of Russian Siberian officials 
was to welcome the American expedition cordially, but to withhold 
detailed information on the Amur estuary on the grounds that navig~­
tion in the vicinity was difficult and dangerous and that the whole 
coastline down to the Korean frontier belonged to Russia. Muravev 
was concerned that, if his plans to occupy the Amur region were not 
successful soon, then either the English or the Americans ~JDnld 
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promptly seize the Amur. Although he believed, as early as the 
spring of 1852, that Russian possession of the "land of the Gilyaks" 
was being consolidated, he worried about armed foreign vessels in 
the Gulf of Tartary and the American expedition to Japan. Muravev 
still considered the Americans to be friends and not yet in the same 
category as the English "enemies." However, his evaluation of the 
"Palmer project" led him to take a cautious approach to the American 
expedition. 30 
Rodgers, who had Palmer's writings with him on the expedition, 
expressed similar admiration of the Amur in his instructions to 
Stevens: 
The Amur is· one of the great rivers of the world. It is 
the largest stream which empties into the vast Pacific. It 
is a great highway of natures making from the shores of the 
Pacific to the centre of Asia and at some future day a vast 
commerce will doubtless be borne upon its waters. A town 
at its mouth seems the Russian sister of San Francisco 
Having received his objectives--to survey the coast of the Sea of 
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Okhotsk, search for coal fields, and explore the mouth of the Amur--
Lt. Stevens departed Hak~nate in late June 1855. Toward the end of 
July the Hancock we.s steaming along the western coast of Kamchatka, 
a mile or so off land whenever visibility permitted. The ship fre-
quently anchored to allow shore parties to gather botanical specimens 
and to hunt or fish. According to Ensign Habersham, the first landing 
on the soil of "despotic Russia" took place on July 26. A few days 
later coal was found and a week was spent loading 45 tons of coal on 
board. Particular examinations were made in those bays frequented 
by whalers. While at anchor a number of native settlements were 
visited. Stevens allowed one-half the crew ashore at any one time 
to take on water and to engage in trade with the natives for food and 
furs. It was noted that the natives had already acquired a few American 
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slang expressions from the whalers. Arriving at Ayan, the Hancock 
sailed through a fleet of seven American whalers. The reception in 
Ayan was amicable, although the town was largely deserted because of 
a recent raid by the English and French. This was the only evidence 
of the Crime:an war that the expe-·ition encountered. Habersham did 
report that he met two "old acquaintances--membe-r·s of that humorous 
tribe of restless Americans who live in all parts of the world, 
turning over their nimble six pences or attempting to establish new 
forms of government over dilapidated states." These acquaintances 
h~d already engaged in trade with the Russians and had set up a 
warehouse. During the stay in Ayan, the Hancock crew watched the 
whalers chasing their prey right into the harbor. More whaleships 
were observed near the next anchorage in the Shantar Islands. Haber-
sham was told that once some two hundred. whalers had gathered there. 
One of the attractions, aside from the whales, was the rich vegetation 
ashore, particularly timber for masts and spars. St~vens took the 
opportunity of cutting 10 cords of wood to supplement his dwindling 
coal supply.32 
As the end of the safe navigation season approached, Stevens 
tried to enter the Amur River. Near the entrance of the river the 
Hancock approached the American merchant ship Palmetto out of San 
Francisco with stores. The Palmetto had been attempting to enter the 
mouth of the Amur for ten days with the aid of a pilot and Russian 
naval boats. On board the Palm~tto Stevens caught a glimpse of a 
chart of the straits, much to the annoyance of the Russians. When 
Stevens asked for a copy, a Russian officer told him that the chart 
was secret and c~uld not be handed over to him. More delay was 
encountered in attempting to receive permission to enter the Amur 
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from Admiral Zavoika, the Chief of Russian Naval Forces in the Amur. 
When the weather began to worsen, Stevens deceided to leave the 
gulf without accomplishing all of his mission. He did ascertain in 
conversation with Russian naval officers that there was a passage 
through the Gulf of Tartary and that Sakhalin was indeed an island. 
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In his final report to KcJdgers, Stevens recommended that the Amur 
River be revis'i.ted and given a good examination with "regard to the 
resources of the country and the wants of the people." He considered 
that the region w0uld become a useful link in American trade with 
Japan and China. Through want of laborers, Stevens postulated that 
the Russians would depend on goods from America, no matter how fertile 
the soil in the Amur region. San Francisco, he thought, would be 
particularly interested in the commercial possibilities. Stevens 
also suggested stationing a United States' Consular Agent in the 
Russian port of Ayan to assist the large number of whalers that called 
there. 33 
Rodgers reserved for the Vincennes the most hazardous phase 
of the survey, the exploration through the Bering Straits into the 
Arctic Ocean. From Hakodate the Vincennes sailed along the Kurile 
Islands and after a port call at Petropavlovsk headed for the Bering 
Straits in early August. Before proceeding through the straits, 
Rodgers had the ship pull into shore on the Asiatic side. The ship 
was met by a large party of natives from a local Chukchi village. 
The natives proved to be friendly, so Rodgers "with a good deal of 
anxiety" decided to leave a twelve-man party ashore to make scientific 
measurements. In reporting to the Secretary of Navy, Rodgers carefully 
added that the Chukchi were "a race still unconquered and untributary."34 
The shore party safely remained at their Siberian observation post 
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nearly a month until the Vincennes returned for them. 
Much survey work remained to be done after the ships of Rodgers' 
expedition returned to San Francisco. The whalers still were more 
familiar with the North Pacific than the data on the charts would 
show, and the trans-Pacific routes needed to be plotted in greater 
detail, but the appropriations were exhausted. The achievements of 
the Perry expedition, except for the commercial opportunities opened 
in Japan, were also left to wither. The Pierce administration never 
followed up with a permanent American "point of refuge" on Okinawa 
or a coaling station in the Bonins. Japan annexeu both island chains 
formally in 1872 and 1875, respectively. Perry and Rodgers and those 
who advocated their expeditions were ahead of their times. The 
westward reach halted temporarily while the United States faced 
its internal cirsis. Even the number of whalers along the Siberian 
coast dwindled. By 1868 there were only 68 whaling vessels in the 
North Pacific. After 20 years of high activity, the lure of the 
whale was fading. The second wave of Americans to Northeast Asia 
receded gradually and naturally, leaving behind both a reminder that 
any Russian-American contest had only been deferred and a promise 
of a new region, the Amur basin, to be developed. 35 
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CHAPTER III 
THE AMUR: MISSISSIPPI OF NORTHERN ASIA 
Aaron Palmer, the first to call attention of Americans to 
the promise of the Amur region, termed the Amur the "most valuable 
river in Northern Asia; the highway of nature that directly connects 
the central steppes of A:;ia with the rest of the world." He was 
convinced that "a settlement at or near its embrochure would open a 
new and most profitable trade with Manchuria, Central Asia, Siberia, 
the Japanese Islands, Corea, etc." He envisioned "no insurmountable 
obstacles to direct communication being opened between the Pacific 
and the Baltic, and with the Caspian and Black Seas, by route of 
this river and the navigable waters of Siberia." Unlike the common 
conceptions of Siberia, Palmer describP.d the river basin in terms of 
fertile land, supporting immense herds of animals, producing a wide 
variety of minerals and teeming with wild life. 1 By 1855 a ship 
of Rogers expedition had confirmed the location of the mouth of the 
river and American merchantmen from San Francisco were already off-
loading cargo for Nikolaevsk. Commodore Perry may well have had the 
Amur region in mind when he predicted i.n 1856 "that America will 
place the Saxon race on the eastern shores of Asia."2 The region 
seemed singularly suited to draw American interest--fertile, but as 
yet undeveloped; temperate climate; sparsely populated with people 
who should welcome the benefits of civilization; and most important, 
69 
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not yet under any well-defined sovereignty. By the time that Americans 
seriously began to grasp the potential of the Amur region, however, 
Russia was already making strenuous efforts to place the territory 
under its firm control. 
As befitted a frontier zone, the geographical limits of the 
Amur region were inexactly defined by the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 
1689, and remained so until the mid-nineteenth century. By common 
usage, the region roughly embraced the territory north of the Amur 
up to and including the southern watershed of the Yablonnoj and 
Stannovoj mountain ranges and then eastward to the Sea of Okhotsk 
at about the Uda River. According to the treaty provisions, the 
region was an integral part of the Chinese Empire, forming the 
outer reaches of Manchuria (north of Heilungkiang Province). In 
reality, the Amur served as a largely unoc~upied buffer separating 
the empires of Russia and China. The various groups of natives 
were mostly left undisturbed and ungoverned. Chinese frontier 
posts were widely spaced along the right bank of the Amur. Only 
a few Manchurian merchants penetrated into the region to trade for 
sable and ginseng. Overland trade between the empires was trans-
acted at Kiakhta to the west in Mongolia. A second largely 
unoccupied and ungoverned region lay to the east of Manchuria proper, 
between Kirin Province and the Pacific. This territory, later named 
the Maritime Region, included the land from the right bank of the 
Ussuri River to the ocean. 
The Russians were long aware of the potential importance of 
these regions, both as a base for growing the food supplies needed 
for Eastern Siberia and as an access route to the Pacific. They 
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were only deterred from advancing their boundaries southward to the 
Amur by two factors. First, throughout the eighteenth century the 
Chinese Empire was militarily stronger in Manchuria than the opposite 
Russian forces in Eastern Siberia. Second, the Russian government 
did not wish any border dispute with China to interrupt the valuable 
flow of trade overland through Kiakhta. The Tsarist government might 
well have besn satisfied to coatiDue the ill-defined status of the 
Amur border regions had not events, suddenly in 1842, upset the 
balance of influence and trade in the Chinese Empire. In that year 
the British defeated the Chinese in the Opium War, widening the rift 
in China's policy of exclusion from the maritime powers. Hong Kong 
was ceded to Great Britain, five treaty ports were opened to trade 
and low, regular tariffs were established for imports. The Sino-
American Treaty of Wanghia was concluded in 1844, followed by similar 
treaties with other maritime nations. To Russia, this appeared as 
an encroachment on their heretofore priviledged trading position, 
as in fact it soon proved to be. The Russian merchants, still 
saddled with archaic trading restrictions, were consistently under-
sold by their maritime rivals. With only a dwindling supply of furs 
to exchange for an increasing Russian demand for Chinese tea, the 
Russian merchants were forced to offer manufactured goods in direct 
competition with European and American products. The Russian govern-
ment realized that in order to compete they needed to increase their 
land ports-of-entry, come into more direct contact with the millions 
of potential customers iu North China through the navigational 
possibilities of the Amur and its Manchurian tributaries, and obtain 
the same "treaty port" commercial concessions previously granted to 
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other nations. 
The appointment of Count Nikolai Muravev as Governor-general 
of Eastern Siberia in 1847 signalled a shift to a more aggressive 
"eastern" policy. The advocates of a forward Asiatic policy were 
opposed by a faction led by Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, 
but the expansionists gradually gained the support of the emperor. 
In the subsequent 13 years, Russia acquired substantial additional 
territory for the empire without provoking war with China. Through 
the daring execution, deft timing and the skillful diplomacy of a 
handful of leaders, Russia gained the strategic Amur and Maritime 
regions which would become the bastion of Asiatic Russia and the 
jumping off place during the next attempt to further their Pacific 
empire forty years later. 
Muravev, himself, provided the rationale for this change in 
policy. In 1853 he made a proposal to the tsar which slowly gained 
acceptance within the imperial government and became the basis for 
its Pacific policy for the remainder of the century. Muravev urged, 
now that the Americans had advanced across the continent to the Pacific, 
that Russia recognize the inevitability of the "North American States" 
spreading over all the North American continent. As a consequence 
of this advance, Russia should yield its own North American posses-
sions gracefully and peacefully. In exchange for this free hand 
in North America, Muravev thought that the United States could be 
expected to help fend off Great Britain, while Russia redirected 
its efforts to extend its rule over the whole Asian littoral of the 
Pacific Ocean. The friendly partnership of the United States and 
Russia was expected to result in a sharing of predominance over the 
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North Pacific, each from its own continent. Muravev's plan proved 
sound and workable in all respects save one. Muravev did not foresee 
that the Americans would not be content to remain in North America. 
They wanted to extend the area of partnership to the development of 
all Northeast Asia. Soon it would be necessary to fend off the 
Americans as well. 3 
Moving cautiously to expand southward, Russia first engaged 
in a series of explorations to gather inforroation about the Amur 
buffer zone and the people who inhabited these regions. The Russian-
American Company was directed to mount these expeditions, although 
the government paid most of the expenses and furnished personnel 
from the active services. In this manner, as Okun states, the govern-
ment found it useful "to cloak that expansion behind private initia-
tive."4 Lieutenant Orlov was sent overland from Ayan in 1849 to 
establish trade relations with the Gilyaks near the Amur. The Russian 
authorities conveniently considered that the "Gilyaks and their 
kinsmen apparently do not recognize the sovereignty of China." The 
following year Orlov returned to found a small settlement on the 
Sea of Okhotsk just to the north of the mouth of the Amur River. 
The Gilyaks were now becoming fast friends with the Russians. Some 
were recruited into the Russian service. And when they became upset 
about the appearance of foreign ships (probably American whalers) 
in the Gulf of Tartary, Orlov was able to assure them that Russia 
would defend them. Concurrently with Orlov's overland expeditions, 
Captain Nevelskoj had been energetically exploring from the sea 
approaches. In 1849 he was able to report categorically that the 
Amur estuary was navigable with some precautions and that Sakhalin 
was an island not a peninsula. Nevelskoj raised the Russian flag in 
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1850 for the first time on the lower reaches of the Amur at the site 
of Nikolaevsk. Nevelskoj announced to the native tribesmen and 
commanded that all foreigners be shown the following proclamation: 
In the name of the Russian Government all foreign vessels 
sailing in the Gulf of Tartary are hereby notified that 
inasmuch as the shore of this gulf and t~e whole Amur 
region down to the Korean frontier as well as Sakhalin 
Island constitute Russian possessions, neither unauthor-
ized dispositions nor injuries to the inhabitants can be 
tolerated here. 
Nicholas I supported Nevelskoj's actions and over-rode Nesselrode's 
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objections by declaring "where the Russian flag has flown it must not 
be lowered again." The permanent occupation o£ the Amur region had 
begun. Russian ships in those waters were instructed to inform any 
foreign ship encountered that any attempt to occupy any point in 
the region would not be tolerated. Despite the many American whalers 
which visited the nearby Shantar Island area, Muravev was mainly 
fearful that England would gain a foothold in Northeast Asia before 
the Russians could consolidate their position. When, in 1848 an 
Englishman named Austin, for example, attempted to raft down the 
Amur, Muravev had him arrested and returned to St. Petersburg. By 
contrast, later American expeditions to the area met a cautious, 
but cordial reception.5 
The United States had a hint about the Russian move into the 
Amur region at least by the end of 1851. Neill Brown, the American 
minister to St. Petersburg, reported that a reliable source had in-
formed him that Russia had acquired the Amur delta by treaty from 
China. In Brown's opinion this was just "another step towards the 
acquisition of territory which has been the ruling passion of Russia 
for more than a century." American whalers who sailed the Okhotsk 
Sea undoubtedly also brought back the news of the Russian occupation 
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of the Amur estuary. By 1853 Alexander Bodisko, the Russian Minister 
in Washington, was able to report to his government that at least 
some Americans seemed anxious for Russia to seize both banks of the 
Amur and to open commerce from there with the United States. 6 
The Russian occupation was extehded to the Maritime region 
in 1853. Settlements were established at Castries Bay and Imperator-
skij Bay handreds of miles south of the Amur estuary on the Gulf 
of Tartary as well as at Mariinsk on the right bank of the lower 
Amur. Reconnaissance expeditions had also been exploring Sakhalin 
Island because of its strategic location guarding the Amur estuary 
and because of reported coal deposits there. News of the Perry 
expedition to Japan gave added impetus to the Russian scramble to 
establish a prior presence in the whole region and on Sakhalin in 
particular. In February 1853 the Rut3sian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
expressed its concern to Bodisko that Perry's expedition to Japan 
had designs on Sakhalin Island. Bodisko was advised that Russia 
could not permit that and the United States should be told that 
Russia would regard such a move "as contrary to the friendly relations 
which excel between the two countries." To forestall the Americans, 
Nevelskoj received the imperial instructions for the Russian-American 
Company to occupy points on Sakhalin in July 1853. By October the 
first Russian fort was being constructed at Aniwa Bay on the southern 
end of the island despite the presence of both Ainus and Japanese. 
Nevelskoj was directed not to harass the Japanese, but not to allow 
any foreign settlements on Sakhalin either. 7 
This four-year (1849-1853) flurry of occupation, which gave 
Russia nominal possession of huge tracts of the previous buffer zone 
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with China, was carried out by a relatively few hardy frontiersmen. 
Most of the posts were manned by less than 10 men, though 100 had been 
allotted to all of Sekhalin. While company officers such as Nevel-
skoj and Orlov led the expeditions, they were financed and directed 
by the government. Perhaps because of the small size of the detach-
ments, for a few years the Chinese government was kept largely in 
the dark about these border developments. Perry had earlier intelli-
gence on the annexation of the Amur than the Chinese. But the scale 
of activity required to tie the Transbajkal region in with the Amur 
estuary would alert the Chinese authorities at their strongholds 
along the river. Approval for this step was granted when it became 
apparent that Britain and France were preparing for war against 
Russia. The Russian government was seriously concerned about its 
exposed Pacific possessions. Early in 1854, therefore, the Tsarist 
government permitted Muravev to undertake this last step, a ship 
and raft expedition down the whole length of the river to reinforce 
and reprovision the ports on the Pacific coast.8 
The Crimean War, once declared, furthered Russia's ambitions 
in the Far East in many ways. Heretofore, the Russians had acted 
in utmost secrecy or, if confronted, h~d made a pretense that their 
posts at the mouth of the Amur were simply to defend the waterway 
from foreign encroachment. In actuality, the only pre-war encroach-
ment came from American whalers, not from the feared British. Then 
with the onset of hostilities, Muravev had a ready-made excuse, not 
only for overtly reinforcing the garrisons on the coast, but for 
establishing cossack settlements along the whole left bank of the 
Amur to secure the line of transport and supply. Henceforth the 
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operations became more openly a government affair directed from 
Irkutsk. In April 1854, Muravev sent a note to the Chinese govern-
ment boldly informing it of the intention to take Russian troops 
down the Amur to the Pacific. Although this first contingent was 
probably only a thousand men, the Chinese were helpless to oppose 
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the move. Since the time that the Manchus had succeeded to the throne, 
Manchuria proper had been drained of military manpower and govern-
mental structure to meet the demands of ruling China. During this 
period, because the ~mnchu dynasty was faced with the serious Taiping 
rebellion, it was unable to release reinforcements to protect the 
northern border regions. In the late spring of 1855, Muravev led 
an even larger expedition down the· Amur consisting of some 7000 
,military men and settlers. Rus3ia 1 s hold on the lower Amur was now 
too strong for China alone to dislodge. 9 
Moreover, the imperial policy was firming toward supporting 
Muravev's design for permanent possession. The Crimean War dramati-
cally demonstrated the vulnerability of Russia's Pacific possessions. 
The strategic value of the Amur transportation route ~sing the Amur 
was proved in actual operations. Though only a minor engagement 5 
compared to the battles on the Crimea, Russia did enjoy a signal 
victory at Petropavlovsk. Thanks to reinforcements sent to them by 
Muravev down the Amur, the Russians were able to drive off an attack-
ing allied fleet in 1854. 10 
The onset of the Crimean War brought with it conflicting 
claims for American support and sympathy. Each side sought to enlist 
the benevolent neutrality, if not the outright participation of the 
United States, in its cause. During the war, the United States' 
government, while proclaiming its strict neutrality, actually 
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befriended Russia in many small ways. And American public opinion 
was, by and large, pro-Russian, or at least gave voice to Anglophobia. 
Nevertheless, a large segment of the American press and journals, 
often reflecting Western European publications, thought that the 
United States should side with England and France against "Asiatic 
despotism." Americans were being asked to examine the merits of the 
combatants and to make a choice. The ensuing journalistic debate 
first raised issues which were to grow in proportion during the rest 
of the century and form the initial arguments questioning the under-
lying value of the traditional friendship with Russia.ll 
Despite the press reaction, the Crimean War usherzd in a 
period of unprecedented official cooperation between the United States 
and Russia, particularly in the Pacific region. While the war was 
only in the threatening stage, the Russian foreign office enquired 
of Bodisko, concerning the extent of American neutrality. In his 
reply he s~ggested a policy which Russia repeatedly applied--appeal 
to the self-interest of the United States by offering commercial 
favors. The prospect of supplanting British merchants in the lucra-
tive Russian market was dangled before the American traders. Import 
duties were lowered on American goods entering Russia such as cotton 
and sugar, which had previously been carried in Engtish ships. 
Yankees were to be encouraged by these inducements to risk trading 
with Russia and, if an incident occurred with the English blockading 
fleet, the United States might be drawn into the conflict on the 
side of Russia. This move was countered by England's agreement to 
recognize, for the first time, that the neutral flag protected all 
cargo except contraband, a position that the United States had long 
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maintained. However, only in the Pacific, where it was impossible 
for the English and·French to blockade the whole Russian coastline 
effectively, were Americans able to take full advantage of the trad-
ing opportunities. 12 
The American-Russian Commercial Company was one of the first 
to take advantage of the wartime opportunities. The company had 
been formed by a group of San Francisco businessmen and political 
figures in 1852 to buy Alaskan ice for resale in the United States. 
Encouraged by the initial success of the enterprise, the president 
of the company, Beverley C. Sanders, decided to journey to St. 
Petersburg to seek a long-term contract covering a wider range of 
products. Before sailing, he consulted with Bodisko in Washington 
and had an interview with President Pierce. He was also afforded 
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an official courier's passport by Secretary of State William Marcy. 
Cloaked in a semi-official status, Sanders arrived at the Russian 
capitol in March 1854 in company with Thomas Seymour, the new American 
minister. Sanders was fully aware that this was an opportune time 
to conduct business. Since the Russians were anxious to express 
.. 
their friendship for the United States, Sanders easily gained access 
to government officials and the directors of the Russian-American 
Company. In these conversations Sanders insisted on a twenty-year 
exclusive contract to market all of Alaska's exports except furs, 
i.e., not only ice, but coal, lumber and fish. Granting such generous 
privileges to an American company was not only a reversal of previous 
policies, but the contract terms also extended far beyond the life 
of the Russian-American Company's charter itself. For this reason, 
the commercial agreement was granted only through the special 
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dispensation of the Tsar. As late as 1850, the Russian government, 
while again permitting some American trade in Siberia, had specifically 
refused to permit American vessels to trade in Ala3ka. The Russian 
acquiescence can only be explained by their desperate need to supply 
13 Russian-America and Asiatic Russia by neutral ships during the war. 
Foreseeing that England and France might join in the hostili-
ties against them, Russia had long worried about the vulnerability 
of its possessions in America. To forestall any future attack, 
the Russian vice consul and agent of the Russian-American Company 
in San Francisco, Peter Kostromitov, devised a ruse to sell the 
colony to the American-Russian Company. When terms of the fictitious 
sale were sent to the new Russian charg~ d'affaires, Edward de 
Stoeckl, he asked for advice from Marcy and Senator Gwin of California. 
All agreed that the deception could not be maintained and might 
embroil the United States. As it turned out, the "sale" was unneces-
sary. The Russian-American Company was able to reach an agreement 
with the Hudson's Bay Company not to attack each others colonial 
possessions. The only logical reason for England granting such a 
one-sided concession was probably a concern that Russia might well 
cede the territory to the United States. Despite the agreement, the 
ships of the Russian-American Company were still in danger should 
they attempt to supply the colonies. 14 
Upon his departure from St. Petersburg, Sanders wrote a 
letter to Grand Duke Constantine which reflected his view of Russian-
American relations: 
These two nations ought to be good friends and allies. There 
neither exists nor can arise any questions of policy ••• 
to disturb the friendly relations which have hitherto marked 
their intercourse with each other. Russia wants nothing 
America owns or desires to possess; and America does not 
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covet anything which Russia has or desires to acquire; 
hence the two nations can go on to the fulfillment of 
their respective destinies without entertaining the 
slightest jealousy of each others prosperity and 
greatnecls. 
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After his return, Sanders turned energetically to helping the Russians. 
He ordered constructed a 450-ton steamer, the Astoria, and purchased 
a 287-ton bark, the Cyane. Both were turned over to the Russian-
American Company, but retained their neutral status by having a 
United States' registration and by being manned by an American crew. 
These two ships kept the Al~skan outposts supplied during the war. 
Although the record is far from complete, the quantity and variety 
of trade with Asiatic Russian ports also increased under Sanders' 
direction. In December 1854 he shipped a cargo of provisions from 
New York to Petropavlovsk in the Levantor. The William Penn left 
San Francisco in March 1855 with flour and gunpowder for Siberia. 
In September 1855 the Palmetto of the American-Russian Company was 
sightedbyCaptain Rodgers trying to enter the Amur River with needed 
supplies for the Russians. 15 
The American-Russian Commercial Company was not the only 
American company trading at Siberian ports. Since 1835, when William 
Boardman of Boston had petitioned the Russian government and been 
granted permission to trade in Kamchatka, American merchants had 
resumed visiting in Asiatic Russian ports. By 1843 they dominated 
the trade of Kamchatka and by the end of the Crimean War the Russian-
American Company brought their commercial operations on the Amur to 
a close because they were unable to stand up to the competition of 
American goods at Nikolaevsk. 16 
Nor did America~ whalers and merchantmen keep completely clear 
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of the war zones. In the spring of 1855, Muravev had ordered the 
evacuation of the entire Petropavlovsk garrison before another 
Anglo-F~cnch assault could be mounted. The evacuees crowded onto 
two Russian warships and two chartered American transports. They 
sailed from Avacha Bay to the Amur River and were nearly captured 
by an English squadron. Rear-Admiral Zavoiko who commanded the 
Russian convoy had warning from American whalers that the Allied 
forces were converging around Sakhalin. 17 
Both sides in the Crimean War realized that privateering 
would be an effective weapon for Russia to use, if they received 
help from the Americans. When sounded out, Marcy expressed the 
opinion that if he were in Russia's place, he would fit out every 
available ship against the enemy's commerce. And as far as his 
countrymen were concerned, Marcy believed that they had the right 
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to do whatever they like--as long as it took place in foreign ports. 
Stoeckl took the hint and abandoned all thoughts of arming privateers 
in American ports as too risky. Whatever else, he wanted to cultivate 
American good will. He also discarded a plan for Americans to take 
their vessels to Russian-America to arm and take out Russian citizen-
ships, even though he was convinced that "many a freebooter along 
the Pacific coast" would be willing. The privateering plans were 
revived in early 1855 by Senator Gwin and Sanders, both of whom urged 
that privateers based in San Francisco could sweep the allied ships 
from the Pacific. All that was needed, according to them, was money 
and a few Russian officers to command the ships. Again the Russian 
foreign ministry turned down the proposals. Not wishing to compromise 
their good relations, the only place Nesselrode would consider that 
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armed corsairs would be legal was Eastern Siberia and anyone who 
wanted to could go there.l8 
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Among the breaches of strict neutrality was the United States' 
attitude toward the Russian government building the warship Amerika 
in New York. Secretary Marcy was aware of the true owners, but did 
not interfere as long as the letter of the law was followed. The 
steamer-corvette sailed under American flag to the Pacific by way 
of Cape Horn. At Rio de Janeiro it was intercepted by an English 
warship and only the action of an American naval officer prevented 
capture. The Amerika arrived safely at the Amur in 1856 and was to 
see extended diplomatic service as the flagship of Admiral Putyatin 
and General Muravev. The Amerika was to be the first of a small 
fleet of steamships built in the United States for use by Russia 
on the Amur after the war.l9 
In dealing with Japan, the representatives of the United 
States also entered into a period of cooperation with the Russians, 
rather than the competitiveness displayed by Commodore Perry. Dis-
aster had struck Admiral Putyatin's expedition in December 1854 as 
he was negotiating the Russian treaty with Japan. An earthquake at 
Shimoda caused a tidal wave which severely damaged his flagship 
Diana, the only ship remaining of his squadron. When the Diana 
eventually sank, Putyatin was stranded in the midst of the Crimean 
War. The Americans rendered assistance. Captain McCluney and Com-
mander Adams arrived in Japan in January 1855 with the ratified 
Japanese-American treaty. Their offer to transport the Russian 
party to Shanghai was not accepted, but they were able to provide 
a service. Through Adams, Putyatin was able to send a copy of the 
treaty he had negotiated with Japan to St. Petersburg via Washington. 
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Again, when the United States surveying expedition arrived in May 
1855, Captain Rodgers offered friendly assistance to the shipwrecked 
Russians. Finally the American schooner Caroline E. Foote carried 
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a large contingent of the Russian crew safely to Kamchatka in April. 
The contingent eventually found passage in William Penn from Kamchatka 
to Castries Bay. 20 
The Russians reciprocated these kind acts in the following 
year. Captain Poset returned with the ratified Japanese-Russian 
treaty in November 1856. At Shimada he found Townsend Harris, the 
first American consul general and minister to Japan who was attempt-
ing to negotiate a commercial treaty with Japan and was badly in 
need of western company. In addition to the exchanges of gifts 
and friendly assistance, the representatives commenced fruitful 
diplomatic cooperation in dealing with Japan. They kept each other 
informed of negotiations in progress and collaborated on policy. 
When the Russian consul settled in Hakodate rather than Shimada, 
Harris struggled to success on his own, concluding a commercial 
treaty in July 1858. Putyatin signed a similar treaty with Japan 
a month later. 21 
During the Crimean War, the United States was the only major 
nation in the world which freely acknowledged a friendship for 
Russia. After the conclusion of peace, the Russian government made 
a series of related diplomatic moves, ostensibly to return the friGuJ-
ship demonstrated by the Americans in the Pacific area, but which 
actually served to ensure American unwitting collaboration with 
Russian designs in the Amur and Maritime regions. The Russian partial 
occupation of these regions had been explained to the Chinese authorities 
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as a v1artime, defensive measure. After the war, it was necessary 
to negotiate the permanent cession of these lands, but Russia wanted 
the Amur issue to be kept separate from negotiations the Western 
powers were then carrying on with China to liberalize trade. To 
avo1d embro1ling the Russo-Ch1nese bilateral negot1a~1ons 1n the 
larger diplomatic maneuvers, Russia sought to treat the Amur occupa-
tion as a fait accompli. The Russian government also held out to 
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the United States the enticement of jointly devsloping the commercial 
prospects of the Amur basin. At the end of the war, American mer-
chants made enquiries as to the chances of trade on the Amur and 
Sakhalin Island. One of these merchants, Perry McDonough Collins, 
in conversation with Stoeckl was led to believe that "the friendly 
power of Russia now holGs ready and willing to further American 
enterprise and energy." The Russian foreign ntinister Gorchakov 
confirmed, that although no American consul could for the time being 
be admitted, the Americans would find a warm welcome. 22 
Collins, a San Francisco businessman, had been thinking along 
lines similar to Palmer. By 1855 he had determined in his own mind 
that the Amur River was "the destined channel by which American 
commercial enterprise was to penetrate the obscure depths of Northern 
Asia, and open a new world to trade and civilization." When Collins 
learned that the Russians had taken possession of the Amur country 
and formed a settlement at the mouth of the river, he decided to 
investigate the river personally. Like Ledyard, he chose to cross 
Siberia from West to East. Unlike Ledyard, he decided not to go 
without credentials, so he proceeded first to Washington and conferred 
with President Pierce, Secretary of State Marcy and Russian Minister 
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Stoeckl. The latter offered him encouragement concerning his reception 
in Russia. In March 1856 he was appointed Commercial Agent of the 
United States for the Amur River and arrived at Kronstadt in May. 
Collins' presence in Russia placed the authorities in a somewhat 
awkward position. The Amur territory was not yet officially ceded 
to Russia, so the matter of accepting a foreign consul in the region 
created an anomalous situation. And if a United States' consul 
were recognized, representatives of other powers, such as Great 
Britain, would have to be allowed in. At the time, the third Russian 
expedition was still proceeding down the river. By the end of the 
year, though, the Russian occupation was an accomplished fact. 
The Manchu authorities no longer posed any threat to the left bank 
of the river. The Amur was no longer an internal river of China. 
Muravev sol,red the dilemma posed by Collins' presence by treating 
him with every courtesy and show of cooperation, but he did delay 
his departure from Moscow until December 1856. Thereafter, Collins 
travelled with Muravev himself or one of his officers. He was held 
up in Irkutsk and Chita until May 1857, when he was at last permitted 
to travel down the Amur to its mouth, arriving in July 1857. He 
then proceeded back to San Francisco by way of Hakodate, Petropavlovsk, 
and the Sandwich Islands. 23 
Collins' reports to Washington both during and after his 
journey could not have been better designed to reveal that the interest 
of the United States lay with supporting Russia in its occupation of 
the Amur region. Whether deliberately misled by the Russian authorities 
or betrayed by too active an imagination, Collins painted a picture 
of a future American commercial empire spreading deep into the 
interior of Northern Asia. A few excerpts from his reports illustrate 
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this point. On the eve of his departure from Moscow, Collins was 
confident: 
that the entering wedge, which is now for the first time 
about to be driven into the heart of Manchooria, will in 
good time produce all the good results to our country which 
I have anticipated, and may eventually prove of vast 
importance to our commerce. At all events our cnuntry will 
be first in the knowledge of this hitherto "terra incognita." 
That the waters of Lake Baikal can be connected with the 
Amoor I think there is no doubt, and thus open the very 
heart of Siberia to our Pacific commerce. 
From Irkutsk Collins reported that he told Muravev: 
that the opening of a direct commerce between Siberia and 
the United States, by way of the Amoor, would develop 
an immense amount of commerce now latent, would stimulate 
all branches of industry, and finally make that vast 
country known to the world. 
Collins also supported further Russian expansion at Chinese expense: 
The probability is that Russia will find it necessary 
in order to give peace and security to the trade on 
this important river, from her Siberian possessions 
into the ocean, to follow our example in the acquisition 
of Louisiana; for the whole of Manchooria is as necessary 
to the undisturbed commerce of the Amoor as Louisiana 
was to our use of the Mississippi; consequently, in my 
opinion, nothing short of the Chinese wall will be a 
sufficient boundary on the south ••• it would be very 
advantageous to us, if this should take place; these 
immense countries would then be open to our commerce 
and enterprise, and a great city would spring up at the 
south of the Amoor, unlocking to us a country of vast 
extent and untold wealth. 
Concerning Muravev, Collins reported: 
He is very anxious to open up the commerce of the 
country through this river, and, as stated in another 
part of this report, has prevailed upon his government 
to grant free trade for a term of years on the Pacific 
coasts. 
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Finally, Collins recommended that the United States create a "commercial 
system for Asiatic Russia" so that the "navigable waters of the Amur 
24 can be penetrated from our own Pacific seaports." 
In the course of his travels, Collins was encouraged by 
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evidence that the commercial development that he dreamed of was 
already taking place. At Nikolaevsk, where Collins estimated the 
whole trade of the Siberian sea coast would concentrate, he found 
five American commercial houses already in operation. During 1856 
and 18573 a number of cargoes had already been unloaded. On his 
return voyage Collins noted the establishment of two American commer-
cial houses each at Hakodate and Petropavlovsk. 
With glowing reports from Collins, their commercial agent, 
and enthusiastic support from congressional members, the United 
States' administration was more than willing to continue to accept 
the Russian offer to march together in the negotiations with China. 
Senator Gwin and Representative Scott of California were among those 
who were beguil8d by the new field of commercial enterprise. Based 
on Collins' reports, they believed that the Amur gave Californians 
"a ready and facile access to the very center of northern Asia." 
They foresaw the Amur becoming "the Mississippi of northern Asia." 
No matter how remote the Amur basin, a comparison to the prosperous 
development of the Mississippi could evoke support. The New York 
Herald reported that the Amur was second only in importance to the 
Mississippi and that "the whole Amoor basin is as necessary to Russia 
as was the Mississippi Valley to us." Leaders on the West 
Coast pictured the Amur as directly across the Pacific, opposite 
their ports. These commercial prospects gave added incentive to 
connecting the Pacific coast by railroad with the rest of the United 
25 States. 
The United States, in general, sympathized with Russian 
expansion and looked with disfavor on English attempts to stem these 
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advances. This had been one of the deciding reasons whi~h had kept 
the United States friendly to Russia during the Crimean War. The 
United States saw a parallel with its own efforts to expand in the 
western hemisphere being checked by Britain. In the Pacific, for 
example, the Pierce administration had been optimistic, in 1854, 
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that the Hawaiian Islands would request to be annexed by the United 
States. Both England and France were bitterly opposed. When Secre-
tary Marcy so~nded out the Russians, however, he received a positive 
response. Russia was only too happy to encourage any move that 
might create active antagonism between the United States and Great 
Britain. 26 Thus when English statesmen and English publications 
inveighed against the dominion Russia was attempting in Northern 
Asia, the United States foresaw no adverse impact on its national 
interest in Russia occupying the Amur. English carping was passed 
off as the usual jealousy which they exprecsed at any nation expand-
ing other than the British empire. Besides, Russian expansion promised 
America an inside track t~ commercial development in the region. 
The United States much preferred to compete in the North Pacific 
with what was considered to be a relatively weak sea power, than 
with the English merchant fleet. A better balance of power in 
Asia was thought to help the United States. Most Americans found 
nothing reprehensible about the continental expansion of Russia. 
Opening the Amur to inland navigation, gaining access to the sea, 
settling and cultivating the land--thes~ were aims that the United 
States found compatible with its own continental experience. 
Americans at the time felt few foreboding3 abc~t Russia dominating 
the China market. Rather, they felt confident that Russia would 
provide them with the edge to do just that. 
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Several years afterwards, a New York Times editorial summed 
up the prevailing American opinion: 
She (Russia) availed herself of a war with France and 
England to quietly and unobservably acquire on the Amoor 
a territory worth as much as six times as much as was 
lost by the expenses of the war • • • • The great dream 
of modern Russia ••• has been a St. Petersburg on the 
Pacific • • • which would not be ice-bound six months in 
the year •••• It would of course be inde.licate and 
discourteous to interfere with Russia's own little 
Chinese maneuvers • • • • It is by no means to the disad-
vantage of American commerce or manufacturers that the 
advance has been made long even before the Pacific 
shall have become the Mediterranean of the future. 27 
William Reed was appointed to be the American minister pleni-
potentiary to China in April 1857. Before departing on his mission, 
he studied ail the material he could find on China and submitted 
his views to the Secre~ary of State. Among the many diplomatic 
issues which he expected to confront in China, the subject of the 
"Russo-Chinese connexion in the North" was more important than 
generally imagined. Reed wanted "candid revelations of the real 
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state of things between them (Russia) and China." An earlier warning 
had been voiced by Humphrey Marshall, a previous United States 
Commissioner to China. During the Taiping rebellion, Marshall was 
alarmed at reports that Russia was preparing to render military 
assistance to China. Marshall was concerned that such assistance 
might lead to a Russian protectorate over China which would uullify 
United States interests in the future, including American fishing 
in the North Pacific. His recommendation was unequivocal: 
I think, then, that almost any sacrifice should be made 
by the United States to keep Russia from spreading her 
Pacific boundary, and to avoid her coming directly to 
an interference in Chinese domestic affairs. 
Like Marshall before him, Reed did not want Russia to gain undue 
advantage: 
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if a distinction be taken in favour of Russia in 
consequence of her conterminous relations to China, 
it occurs to me that the relation of our Pacific coast 
and commerce is quite as close as that of the deserts and 
caravan intercourse of Asiatic Russia. No one can look 
at the map of the world without being impressed by the 
peculiar geographical relations of the United States and 
Russia to the Chinese Empire. 
Moreover, Reed had gleaned the intelligence that the picture of 
Russia as the friend and protector of China might not be entirely 
accurate, instead, "that difficulties, if not actual hostilities, 
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have occurred between the Russians and Chinese so that in the exist-
ing war a new and unexpectP.d belligerent party may be added." Reed 
considered the "whole subject of the Russian navigation of the Amour 
by steam and her naval stations very interesting" and that in the 
threatened acquisition of Chinese territory "Russia may have her 
designs as well. "28 
Fortuitously for Russia, the Foreign Ministry had advised 
Stoeckl in February 1857 how to counter just such issues if they 
were raised in Washington. The Russian position was: 
The consolidation of our position at the estuary of the 
Amur River is in no way a conquest. According to our pLe-
vious treaties with the Chinese government we have long 
established rights to the estuary of the river and, if 
until now, we have not found it necessary to proclaim this 
publicly, it has not made our rights less obvious. Count 
Putyatin, whose mission is of an entirely peaceful character, 
is commissioned only to come to an agreement with the Chinese 
government on several secondary points connected with this 
question, which demands the best possible solution. Open-
ing free navigation over the Amur River is for us an utter 
necessity which cannot be contested.29 
When Secretary of State Lewis Cass issued detailed guidance to 
Reed for the conduct of his mission, the subject of the Amur occupa-
tion or possible Russo-Chinese hostilities was not specifically 
mentioned. Rather, Reed's instructions contained a clear call to 
cooperate with the Russian envoy: 
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You are authorized, therefore, to communicate with him as 
far as rracticable upon all subjects of mutual concern, 
and should his disposition prove favorable, as it is 
believed it will, his cooperation may be highly advan-
tageous in promoting the objects of your mission. This 
cooperation is to be expected, moreover, with the 
greater confidence, because there is nothing in the 
policy of the United States with respect to China which 
is not quite consistent with the pacific relations whic~0 
are understood to exist between that empire and Russia. 
The Russian-American cooperation in dealing with the Chinese 
Empire was sealed when Thomas Seymour, the American minister in St. 
Petersburg was instructed to show a copy of Reed's instructions to 
Foreign Minister Gorchakov. Seymour was able to report back that 
Gorchakov was very pleased and that the Tsar had told the Russian 
envoy, Admiral Putyatin, "to give his warmest support to the United 
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States' envoy and to cooperate with him in the fullest manner." Cass 
also asked about the state of Russo-Chinese relations. Again, Sey-
~ 
mour was able to reply reassuringly, advising that in his view the 
relations were amicable. About the alleged Russian occupation, 
Seymour was unable to give additional details, but gave as his 
opinion: 
That Russia is strengthening her power in that direction 
is no doubt true--1 am quite certain, however, from what 
has often been said to me on the subject of the Russian 
possessions on the Amur, that Russia desires the Amur may 
be open to trade with the United States, and that every 
reasonable encouragement will be given to our citizens to 
come there, and unite with the Russians in laying the 
foundation of a future profitable commerce between the 
two countries by exchange of commodities across the 
Pacific. 
This opinion was bolstered by a subsequent conversation held with 
Count Muravev, who told Seymour that Russia had opened up the Amur 
region to foreign trade and that three duty-free ports had been 
designated--Castries Bay, Mariinsk, and Nikolaevsk. Muravev also 
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lightly inserted the Russian claim to the Maritime Region, which had 
only been partially occupied, and was then being reinforced. When this 
n~ws reached Washington in the spring of 1858, together with reports 
from Perry Collins about the American prospects for commercial gain 
along the Amur, the United States' policy of leaving the Amur to 
the Russians was firmly set.31 
But while the Russian occupation was an accomplished fact, 
China had not yet officially relinquished its claims. This was the 
primary goal which Admiral Putyatin was directed to accomplish. The 
Admiral had a very delicate assignment when he joi.ned the representa-
tives of the other powers making demands on China. He hoped to cooper-
ate and benefit by their joint negotiations for commercial advantage, 
but secretly he needed to treat with China on the Amur question 
bilaterally. Putyatin particularly fostered friendly relations with 
Reed, with whom the stage for mutual cooperation had alre~dy been 
arranged. The two got along famously, exchanging views, conferring 
about notes to be sent to the Chinese, and using each otherD ships 
and courier services when convenient. Putyatin spoke excellent 
English, but flattered the Americans by letting them phrase his notes 
into proper English. Reed considered Putyatin "at least half an 
American." The Amur question was never raised between them. To all 
outside observers, the two seemed to represent a common front of 
neutrality and peaceful intentions toward China. Putyatin's flagship 
was even constructed in the United States and named Amerika. 32 
Undercover, Putyatin played another game. In February, the 
four powers agreed to send similar notes to China as a last concilia-
tory gesture. The contents of these notes were freely exchanged 
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among the representatives before transmission to Peking. However, 
unknown to the other envoys, Putyatin added a supplementary document, 
revealing for the first time the extent of Russia's territorial 
claims against China--the left bank of the Amur and the right bank 
of the Ussuri where Russian towns and military posts were already 
established. Unbeknown, Putyatin also invoked the backing of the 
other powers for these claims. This was given added weight, in the 
case of the Americans, because Reed agreed to send the Russian note 
to Shanghai in the U. S. frigate Mississippi. Being a gentleman and 
unsuspicious, Reed did not tamper with Putyatin's mail. 33 
The Chinese authorities correctly assessed that the American 
barbarians and the Russian had a common purpose. The Chinese perceived 
that the two would take advantage of the strife, hoping to reap 
benefits and that their objective would be to mediate and placate. 
Putyatin's tactics of identifying with the Americans worked. In 
March, an imperial edict directed the Manchurian authorities to 
commence boundary negotiations in the North: 
As to the Russian barbarians, they have had friendly rela-
tions with China for years, but never traded on the sea-
coast. guddenly now there are these (Russian) documents 
in Manchu, Chinese, and barbarian characters presented 
appended to the American barbarian papers • • • • We have 
notified Urga and Heilungkiang to send word to that 
country's Senate Yamen to come to an agreement with them 
on the matter of their request for a boundary survey • • 
The American barbarians, even though in self-vindication 
they make it clear that they were not involved in the fall 
of Canton, support the demands in their papers.34 
The Russian foreign ministry meanwhile, in early 1858, had 
decided that Putyatin's mission was too complex. Gorchakov decided 
that, henceforth, Muravev would be entrusted with negotiations on the 
Amur trontier, while Putyatin would concentrate solely on obtaining 
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the same privileges from China as the other nations obtained. From 
then on, Putyatin could concentrate on obtaining the goodwill of 
China so that they would cede the Amur as a reward. He not only 
joined Reed in mediating for the Chinese in trying to meet the British 
and French demands, but also offered Russian military equipment and 
instructions to bolster the Chinese defenses. In all this complicated 
diplomatic mane~~ering Putyatin was successful in keeping the Amur 
issue out of the general Chinese negotiations. Only once did the 
Chinese ask American representatives to intercede with Russia about 
the Amur frontier. According to S. Wells Williams, one of the 
interpreters with Reed, the Chinese in May 1858 alluded to the 
difficulties of the inhabitants of the ceded district, but: 
everything said by a Chinese must be taken with allowance. 
The weak always resort to cunning and deceit, and I don't 
believe this assertion. If Russia wishes to take all the 
territory in Manchuria lying North of the Saghalien (Amur) 
the matter of dispute concerning an old territory can be as 
easily brought up as it was in the American war with 
Mexico in 1846 or the Russian with Turkey. However, this 
river is by far the most proper outlet for the trade as it 
is for the drainage of Eastern Siberia, and it is of no use 
to the Chinese in comparison to the facilities it affords 
the Russians. 
Williams may not have even informed Reed about the conversation, for 
Reed made no report of any Chinese appeal. The personal views of 
Williams probably closely reflected the official opinion of the United 
States. 35 
Meanwhile, Muravev with his new diplomatic authority was 
negotiating at Aigun with the Chinese military commander at Heilungkiang. 
Muravev was successful in overawing the Chinese negotiator and forcing 
a treaty to be signed in late May 1858 which ceded to Russia most of 
its demands. Asiqe from the territorial question, one provision had 
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an important bearing on American dreams of commerically developing 
the Amur River basin. The treaties provided for free navigation of 
all frontier rivers, but for Russian and Chinese vessels only. For 
all the bright prospects reported by Collins, Muravev had no inten-
tion of America monopolizing the trade along the Amur. Not until 
August 1858 did Reed learn of the Aigun treaty and then only from 
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an unofficial source. An American schooner which had arrived at 
Shanghai from the Russian settlements on the Amur brought him the 
news. There is no evidence that Reed ever received a candid account-
ing of the Aigun negotiations from any Russian envoy, or that he 
demanded one, before he himself departed China in December. Perhaps 
he was too preoccupied with negotiating the Treaty of Tientsin and 
the subsequent tariff issues with the Chinese to question the Russians 
bluntly. Nor does it seem that he passed his information on to his 
fellow British or French diplomats. Nevertheless, the Boston Daily 
Advertiser credited Reed for giving the United States a favorable 
position on the Amur since "the accession of Russia in that quarter 
must eventually open to our commerce the whole of northeastern Asia."36 
When the Chinese imperial court rejected the terms of the 
Aigun treaty, the Russian government persisted, directing in June 
1859 that Count Ignatev, their new envoy, reopen boundary negotiations 
in Peking. The new American minister, John Ward, also arrived in 
Pe~ing that same summer to exchange ratifications of the Treaty of 
Tientsin. The Chinese immediately suspected the two countries to 
be in collusion and that the "Russian barbarians are taking advantage 
of the American barbarians coming to Peking to follow their lead." 
The Chinese thwarted every effort of the Russian and American delegations 
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from meeting and freely communicating with each other in Peking. 
Later, when the Anglo-French forces were preparing to attack China, 
Ward was instructed to cooperate with the Russian minister in any 
proper efforts to bring the approaching conflict to an amicable 
conclusion. In Shanghai, in June 1860, Ignatev and Ward were finally 
able to communicate openly and assure one another that the intentions 
of the Russian government were identical with the policies of the 
United States. They addressed joint notes to the Chinese Supreme 
Council expressing friendship and their willingness to render the 
Chinese any service consistent with a position of entire neutrality. 
After the Anglo-French forces occupied Peking, Ignatev did serve the 
Chinese as a successful mediator. In return, Ignatev was able to 
negotiate the Russian Treaty of Peking in November, by which the 
Chinese again granted all the territorial demands of Russia. Al-
though the Anglo-French military operations provided the chief 
incentive in forcing the Chinese to make such concessions, Russia's 
diplomatic triumph was, in some measure, the result of American 
tacit cooperation and lack of interference in Russian expansion. At 
no time did the United States seek or receive, in return for its 
cooperation and goodwill, any binding agreement from Russia guarantee-
ing commercial access to the Amur region. 37 
In the short run, neither the dreams of Collins or Muravev 
were completely fulfilled. Russia did not inwediately become a major 
Pacific power. In 1872 Vladivostok, near Korea in the Southern Mari-
time region, became the principal port and fortress of Asiatic Russia, 
but the Russian Pacific fleet declined in strength. Russian ships 
still depended on Japanese ports when Vladivostok became frozen for 
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four months of the year. Economically, the development of the Amur-
Maritime provinces proved to be a slow process. Trade with China did 
not compete with seaborne commerce. Nor did the Amur really serve 
as an adequate food base for many decades. Climate and disease 
prevented sufficient crops to be harvested to feed even the few 
settlers in the region and grain was imported in large quantities 
from America. The possession of the newly acquired territories long 
proved a financial burden to the state. 38 
When Collins returned to St. Petersburg at the end of 1858, 
he was still enthusiastic enough to persuade the American minister, 
Francis Pickens, that an Amur "Op""n Door" was at hand, which would 
unlock the commerce of Asia. But a more realistic picture was being 
reported by Harrison Chase, who had been appointed as Vice-Consul 
at Nikolaevsk when Collins left. Chase was an agent of the William 
Boardman Company, the first American trading company to set up 
business on the Amur. They were established before Collins' descent 
of the river. Chase himself was a competent observer who knew the 
Russian language and was well acquainted. He served previously at 
Petropavlovsk and Casties Bay during the Crimean War. From his 
vantage point, Chase concluded that the trade "has not been so 
particularly satisfactory and encouraging to Americans as from some 
cause generally expected in the United States." He cited numerous 
reasons. Trade was limited to six or seven months of the year by 
weathero Growth of trade was slow. The sparse population could 
only afford the necessities. The lack of laborers slowed agriculture 
and held up the development of natural resources, hence no export 
trade. Stringent port regulations, local ordinances and the monopoly 
exercised by the Amur Company up river hindered commerce. The 
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expected commerce with Northern China did not open up and the lack 
of steam transport prevented goods from being transshipped along the 
Amur. To emphasize the bleakness of the prospects, Chase quoted 
a statement made by Muravev in May 1859: 
No foreigners have a right to trade on the river above 
Sophisk and can only pass through the country as travellers. 
Foreigners are not allowed to have Russian agents up the 
river or in the interior. 
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Having achieved its diplomatic ends, Russia closed the door to Ameri-
can interests except at coastal seaports. The Amur, as a result, 
was not destined to become the "Mississippi of Northern Asia."39 
The disillusionment over the earlier grandiose schemes did 
not completely dampen American interest in Northeast Asia. Collins 
continued on with other plans. By 1859, the number of American 
commercial houses at Nikolaevsk had increased to seven. Collins' 
book about his travels down the Amur, which was published in 1860, 
added to the interest in the region among his fellow countrymen. 
Writing about opening trade with the region drained by the Amur, 
Hunt's Magazine predicted that "development of this great commerce 
must produce as great a revolution in the commercial world as did 
the discovery of the passage to India." Several years later, Hunt's 
Magazine was more cautious and wrote about more practical aspects 
of the trade, concluding that advantages would depend upon the "sagacity 
attd nerve" of the American merchants. Harper's noted that the Amur 
region would become the home of a "settled and industrious population 
whose geographical position will necessarily bring them into intimate 
relations with our own Pacific shores." A New York Times editorial 
described the Amur prospects as one of "the grandest schemes of 
American enterprise in the paths of commerce and civilization" which 
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"must rapidly assume proportions of immense importance, not only to 
Russia, but to the United States. ,AO 
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The decade of the 1850s had been a period of almost uniformly 
good relations between Russia and the United States, but it had also 
been marked by rapid changes which required adjustments on America's 
part to a larger role in the Pacific. During the Crimean War, the 
United States had actively assisted Russia in the Pacific. A f~w 
years later, American emissaries were deeply involved with European, 
particularly Russian, diplomats trying to persuade China to open her 
commerce. As the United States turned more and more to a Pacific 
front, the distance acroes the North Pacific loomed less great. 
The geography of Northeast Asia, too, had become more familiar and 
less forbidding. The virtues of the Amur had been extolled ~>uffi­
ciently so that prospects of sharing the riches of the region seemed 
both natural and attractive. Californians, especially, saw the West 
Coast linked closely to the regions directly across the Pacific from 
them. As early as 1856, Americans could read predictions of a 
"continuous line of railway and ocean-steam navigation, reaching 
round the globe and turning the commerce of the East through the 
heart of America o.nd Russia. 1141 
Confronted with the new situation of the 1850s and the 
possibilities offered, Americans were of several minds as to what 
the future portended for them in Northeast Asia. The New York Times 
was already focussing attention southward on Manchuria as "peculiarly 
a market for the heavy manufacturers of the American mills" and 
predicting that "Americans will doubtless possess themselves of the 
better share of the internal comme't"ce" secured there. In speaking of 
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"Our Empire on the Pacific," Hunt's Magazine predicted that the polit-
ical influence of California would not be confined to "this side of 
the Pacific," but is "destined to reanimate the slumbering nations 
of Eastern Asia." According to the New York Herald, the "young 
eagle" was not satisfied just to "gird the Western World," but is 
"already taking wing still westward over the Pacific Ocean." When 
"West meets East" the treasures of Asia will be poured into the lap 
of the American Republic in return for the "principles of liberty 
and civilization." Across the Pacific "the United States will one 
day take the (Russian) bear behind, the thus dispatch him." The 
Southern Literary Messenger thought otherwise. It agreed that the 
United States was changing front from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
and would "soon be closely connected with China," but did not believe 
that the United States could check the progress of Russia for control 
of China any more than the Anglo-Saxon race could be curbed in the 
Western Hemisphere. "At no distant period ••• the world will divide 
into two immense empires. What then?"4Z 
As the success of the Russian advance into the Amur and 
Maritime regions became more apparent later in the decade, some 
American observers became less sanguine that the "star of empire" 
always moved westward. They became more willing, as Muravev had hoped, 
to concede almost unlimited sway to Russia on its own continent. 
From Sto Petersburg, Minister Pickens warned that Russia was sending 
large contingents of settlers to the Amur from whence Russia could 
exert "great power over all the North China." The New York Times, 
in a series of editorials, went further. Asia was "as certainly the 
theatre of Russian manifest destiny, as is America for the people of 
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the United States." It was only a matter of time before the Anglo-
Saxon race established sovereignty of the Western Hemisphere and 
the Sclavonic races "material supremacy in the Eastern." What would 
happen when the two great expansive powers advanced "at the same 
102 
pace toward the same field, the Pacific world?" The New York Times 
speculated that an encounter and a conflict would occur with 
"sovereignty of the globe as the ultimate prize of the competition.rr43 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONNECTING THE CONTINENTS 
The events of the American Civil War had little direct bearing 
on the relations of the United States and Russia in Northeast Asia. 
Indirectlythough, the cordial relations that were engendered in the 
course of the war made a significant impact on each nation's posture 
and strategy in the North Pacific. The immediate post-war years 
marked the height of Russian-American friendship. The wartime spirit 
of cooperation led to a joint attempt to link Asia and North America 
by telegraph line. And that same sense of friendship and obligation 
to one another greatly facilitated the sale of Russian-America to 
the United States. From this period emerged also a whole litany con-
cerning the "lasting and traditional" friendship between the two 
peoples which was frequently invoked in later years, but which 
reflected only an ephemeral community of interests, not a permanent 
foundation capable of offsetting any real challenges to national 
self-interest. 
The attitude of Russia toward the United States during the 
war h::1s been described by revisionists as a "mythical" friendship. 
That is not an entirely correct characterization. Russia did perform 
friendly acts toward America and the United States was properly 
grateful. Not surprisingly, these acts also accorded with Russia's 
self-interest. The only myth created was by those who exaggeratedly 
attributed Russia's actions to altruistic motives. Nor was it 
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surprising that Russian officials never disclaimed any credit for 
these actions, unselfish or otherwise. 
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One of Russia's policies,which was taken as a friendly act, 
was its adamant refusal to join with other European powers in any 
plan of enforced mediation in the Civil War. This was a distinct 
service to the federal government. Simply by wishing the federal 
government well during the conflict and studiously avoiding any 
intervention, Russia proved a "steadfast friend." The fact that the 
interests of Russia and the North coincided does not diminish the 
importance of the Russian position. Nor were the sentiments and 
motives of Russia altogether hidden. Russia was seriously concerned 
about continuing the strength and unity of the United States as an 
offset against other European powers and did not hesitate to say 
so. The Union was considered by Russia to be an "element essential 
to the universal political equilibrium." The emperor himself declared 
that he was very anxious that the "United States, as a nation, should 
suffer no diminution of power or influence." Prince Gorchakov, the 
foreign minister, likewise acknowledged that "we desire, above all 
things, the maintenance of the American Union as an indivisible na-
tion." The Russian refusal to intervene in the internal affairs of 
the United States was in its own best interests, but proved a boon 
to the Lincoln administration. Left unspoken was Russia's equal 
reluctance to set any precedent for intervention while other European 
powers were threatening to interfere in the Polish insurrection. 1 
The second, more dramatic and more public act, was Russia's 
decisio~ to dispatch two squadrons of ships to United States' ports 
in 1863. This was perceived by the American public as an open 
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manifestation of friendship and a virtual alliance against any out-
side powers intervening in the course of the Civil War. Based on 
his research of the Russian archives, Frank Golder has effectively 
explained the real purpose behind the unexpected visits of the 
Russian ships. The Russian authorities were apprehensive about 
109 
their fleet being bottled up in Baltic and Black Sea ports in the 
event of European involvement arising out of the Polish insurrection. 
Not wanting to repeat the experiences of the Crimean War, Russia 
forestalled the possibility by ordering their fleet to America. 
From there the Russian ships could pose a threat to French and English 
shipping, should war ensue.2 
As early as January 1862, Admiral Popov, commanding Russia's 
Pacific squadron, had been directed by Grand Duke Constantine to be 
prepared to destroy enemy commerce in the Pacific in case of war 
between Russia and a stronger sea power. The disposition of Popov's 
ships was left up to him. He faced much less chance of being bottled 
up in the North Pacific, but he chose San Francisco as more desirable 
than any of Russia's own stations. Popov was familiar with San 
Francisco from previous visits and he was assured of a warm welcome 
from his friends thereo Many leading San Francisco civic and business 
leaders already had commercial interests in Russia through the 
American-Russian Trading Company and a nascent Pacific-based whaling 
industry. Popov rightly anticipated better provisioning, repair 
and communications facilities in San Francisco than elsewhere in 
the North Pacific and, most importantly, permission to enter and 
leave port as he chose. 3 
Rear Admiral Popov arrived in San Francisco with his squadron 
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of six ships October 12, 1863 where he was warmly and enthusiastically 
received. In the absence of detailed contrary instructions, Popov 
came near to breaking strict neutrality and becoming the active ally 
of the federal government. During the winter of 1863-1864, San 
Francisco was left without the protection of any U. S. man-of-war. 
When rumors were reported that Confederate cruisers were planning 
to attack, Popov readied his ships for action to assist the unguarded 
city "in all measures which may be deemed necessary by the local 
authorities to repel any attempt against the security of the place." 
When Popov's plans were reviewed by Gorchakov and Stoeckl they were 
disapproved and he was urged to maintain the strictest neutrality.4 
Russian spokesmen at the time never claimed that the Russian 
ships had been sent as an overt gesture in support of the federal 
government, only that the fleet was there "for no unfriendly purpose." 
Nor did they disclaim such motives when public opinion in the North 
assumed that Russia had acted solely out of friendship. Russia did 
not reject American gratitude and was prepared to accept credit for 
performing a distinct service to the North. But not all observers 
accepted this "myth," even at the outset. The Harpers New Monthly 
Magazine noted quite accurately that: 
In the present position of European politics the presence 
of these vessels in our ports has a special significance. 
During the late Crimean war the Russian fleet was closely 
shut up at Cronstadt and in the Black Sea, and was unable 
to render any effective service. The Russians have now 
quite an effective naval force in the open seas.5 
And when Senator Charles Sumner asked "Why is that fleet gathered 
there?" he answered himself: 
My theory is that when it left the Baltic, war with 
France was regarded as quite possible, and it was deter-
mined not to be sealed up at Kronstadt.6 
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In general, though, the American public and the government, 
according to the reminiscences of Frederick W. Seward, Assistant 
Secretary of State to his father, felt intuitively that help would 
come from Russia, if needed.7 Nevertheless, it is extremely doubtful 
that the members of Lincoln's administration were completely deceived 
as to Russia's actual motives and policies during the war. However, 
fostering an illusion of disinterested amity on Russia's part proved 
beneficial to the United States in the short term. In the long run, 
one young observer of the Washington scene may have been influenced 
by the differences between the perceptions and realities of this 
Civil War tradition of Russian friendship, John Hay was a personal 
secretary to Lincoln. Thirty years later as Secretary of State, 
he was habitually distrustful of Russian motives, frequently harping 
on Russian "mendacity." 
The temporary concert of national interests between Russia 
and the United States overrode, for the time being, any antipathy 
either may have held toward a nation with diametrically opposite 
political institutions. Both sides, in their diplomatic exchanges, 
sought diligently to rationalize the differences in their forms of 
government. Usually this took the form of emphasizing the many 
parallels in their current state of development and recognizing that 
diversity in approaches were only human. Both were described as 
young, vigorous and improving empires which were expanding continentally. 
Each was carrying the light of civilization to heathen lands. Each 
found itself occasionally resisted by other jealous states. Each 
had recently emancipated those in bondage. Each had successfully 
put down an internal insurrection. And more importantly, Russia 
and the United States were still considered geographically remote 
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from each other, "placed at the extremities of the two worlds," 
and therefore would "never come into rivalry or conflict." Despite 
such assurances, Secretary of State Seward, reflecting some of the 
thoughts of the previous decade, recognized full well that the tracks 
of empire would eventually meet. As he instructed Cassius Clay, the 
U. s. Minister to Russia, early in Lincoln's administration, the two 
nations "may remain good friends until, each having made a circuit 
of half the globe in opposite directions, they shall meet and greet 
each other in the region where civilization first began. "8 As a 
consummate expansionist, Seward envisioned that the meeting would 
take place when the American empire touched Asia. To this end, 
even in the midst uf the Civil War, he actively encouraged a project 
linking the continents by telegraph. 
During his second trip to Russia in 1859, the fertile mind 
of Perry Collins, the San Francisco businessman who had previously 
rafted down the Amur River, conceived a project for connecting North 
America with Asia and Europe by telegraphic line. His plan visualized 
a telegraphic link between San Francisco and Nikolaevsk by way of 
the Bering Strait. The recent failure of the trans-Atlantic tele-
graphic cable gave impetus to his plan. Samuel F. B. Morse: when 
consulted, foresaw no insurmountable difficulties in the proposed 
project. Hiram Sibley, President of the Western Union Company, which 
had just extended its telegraphic system to the West Coast in October 
1861, reported that his "men are pressing me hard to let them go on 
to Behring's strait next summer." To support Collins' proposal, 
Senator Latham of California submitted a bill calling for the United 
States to aid and assist in a survey, under the authority of the 
Russian government of the waters, coasts and islands of the North 
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Pacific in order to determinethe best route for the telegraph.9 
The first American approach to the Imperial Government was 
rebuffed. In 1861 when Cassius Clay asked Prince Gorchakov for the 
cooperation of the Russian government in constructing such a telegraph 
line, he was advised that Russia intended to build such a line itself. 
The following year Seward again instructed the United States minister 
to Russia, Simon Cameron, to exert his efforts in favor of the tele-
graphic enterprise which would "doubtless be effective in enlarging 
the commerce between the two countries and the two continents." 
In this instance Gorchakov went so far as to reply that the Collins' 
project was under consideration, and that a "telegraphic connection 
between the two nations was decidedly favored." 10 
By mid-1863 the climate had improved further and rapid 
progress was made toward an agreement. Clay, again back at his post 
in St. Petersburg, on May 13 submitted, upon request, his views on 
the telegraphic project to the Russian Asiatic Committee. A week 
later he was able to report to Washington that General Ignatiev, the 
Chief of the Asiatic Department, was favorably inclined to grant 
most of what Collins had requested. On May 27, 1863 the Tsar con-
firmed the decision of the Asiatic Committee to approve a charter 
conditional only upon proof that the Russian-American Telegraph 
Company actually had been formed, that shares for at least one-half 
the cost of construction had been sold and the final plans for the 
lines direction produced. 11 
The original Collins' proposal requested that the telegraph 
company be awarded full possession of all territories along the tele-
graph's right-of-way and exclusive control of the native tribes not 
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under the direct authority of the Russian government. If granted, 
this would have meant virtual sovereignty by an American company 
over long stretches of Asiatic Russia. The grant, when finally 
approved, greatly modified these stipulations. The company was 
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not allowed to exercise any right or pm·;ers in the Russian dominions 
or to subordinate the natives to their control. The negotiations, 
however, left little doubt that the American entrepreneurs had 
preferred to carve out their own independent domain in Siberia. The 
Russian grant did warn that the stations near Bering Strait ought 
to be constructed in such a manner as to be able to defend themselves 
against natives in case of attack and recommended that the company 
hire armed Russian guards for protection. Apparently, the Chukchi 
natives were still relatively untamed. The grant further stipulated 
that all workmen on duty along the projected line be Russian subjects, 
but rejected the idea of establishing villages along the line peopled 
with "exiled culprits. 1112 
Even so modified, it is somewhat difficult to understand why 
the Russian government, after mulling over the ColJ.ins' proposal for 
two years, suddenly consented. Why, when Russia was still so sensi-
tive to the incursion of American merchants and whalers along the 
coasts of Asiatic Russia and Russian America, should the government 
permit American influence inland? Russia acknowledged that the 
principal benefits would accrue to the commercial cities of Europe 
and the United States and not to Russia itself. 
Perhaps it was not coincidental that renewed interest in the 
American telegraphic proposal began during the period when Russia 
was contemplating the dire prospects of European intervention into 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
llS 
the Polish insurrection. Acquiescing to a commercial project in 
which the federal government believed strongly enough to push forward, 
despite the ongoing Civil War, must have seemed another means of 
cementing cordial relations with the United States at a crucial 
moment. Perhaps the Russian officials were convinced that such a 
gigantic undertaking would never be executed. Once the Polish 
question subsided, their enthusiasm for the telegraph project did 
wane. When Collins and Sibley returned to St. Petersburg in October 
1864 with the required proofs as to the establishment and financial 
status of the Russian-American Telegraph Company, they again ran 
into delays and a new set of conditions. Some of these new proposi-
tions limited the franchises of the earlier grant, but most 
importantly reduced the profit margin allowed to the company. Since 
the enterprise was already well underway and much capital had been 
invested, Sibley and Collins reluctantly agreed to the revised 
agreement and did not cancel the project, as perhaps the Russian 
government was hoping. 13 
If the Russian aim was to secure better relations with the 
United States, they succeeded. This act served as yet another reminder 
of Russian friendship. President Lincoln was able to report in his 
third annual message to congress that "satisfactory arrangements 
have been made with the Emperor of Russia, which, it is believed, 
will result in a continuous line of telegraph through that empire 
from our Pacific Coasto 11 Seward, noting the "liberality and friend-
ship" which Russia and Great Britain had manifested toward the United 
States, thought that no other enterprise "within the scope of our 
foreign relations more directly important than the preservation of 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
peace and friendship with those two great and enlightened powers." 
The New York Chamber of Commerce commended the Russian "spirit of 
wise liberality."l4 
To Perry McDonough Collins belongs all the credit for first 
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envisioning the u~ion of the continents by telegraph and for tenaciously 
negotiating with Russian officialdom. In the words of Seward, the 
"country could not have a more enlightened, assiduous and faithful 
representative" than Collins. But equal credit redounds to Seward 
who immediately recognized that the telegraphic project would 
further his dreams of an American Pacific empire. As a consequence, 
Seward provided diplomatic support to the project at every stage, 
and was instrumental in securing congressional support for the con-
tracts and surveys necessary to begin construction. In May 1864 
Seward propounded to the Senate Committee on Commerce in detail the 
feasibility of the proposed t~legraphic line, its usefulness and 
its claim to government patronage. He pointed out that, domestically, 
telegraphic communications had stimulated an active and profitable 
system of commerce. From this he conjured up a vision of an 
America-centered, worldwide commercial empire in which: 
the merchant or the manufacturer, the miller, the farmer, 
the miner, or the fisherman, of Halifax, Quebec, Portland, 
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, Memphis, 
St. Paul, Little Rock, Denver, Salt Lake City, Carson City, 
Los Angelos, San Francisco, Sacramento, Portland, with the 
aid of a transoceanic telegraph, would be in daily, and, in 
case of need, in hourly correspondence with producers and 
consumers on the Amoor, where the fur trade of Asia is 
gathered up; with Sofinsk, the depot for the overland 
traffic between Russia and Japan, and the mineral treas-
ures of Nerchinsk; with Kiakhta, the centre of the 
international commerce of Russia and China; with Irkoutsk, 
Moscow, St. Petersburg; with all the cities of western 
Europe, including ConstantinoSle; with the cities of 
Alexandria, Cai~o, and Suez.l 
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Seward also had expectations beyond the immediate telegraphic 
project which he believed would follow as a matter of course. He 
foresaw the telegraphic enterprise as another wedge for the entry of 
the United States into the development of Northeast Asia, particularly 
the Amur basin, and from there, to all of Asia. As he predicted 
to the Senate, by their cooperation in Collins' design, 
Russia actually invites us to put forth our national energy 
from every point within our borders where industry of any 
kind dwells, and especially from our northwestern and 
western States, and to apply that energy in the great 
work of renewing and restoring the long languishing 
civilization of the regions where our race first impressed 
its dominion upon the globe appointed for its residence.l6 
With the enthusiastic support of Seward the Congress passed 
a bill in July 1864 granting the proposed telegraphic line a right of 
way within territory of the United States, the assistance of the Navy 
and the protection of troops. Colonel Charles S. Bulkley was appointed 
engineer-in-chief. By the summer of 1865 he had organized three 
exploring parties to survey the routes of the line. The Asiatic 
Russian segment stretched approximately 1800 miles through bleakest 
Siberia from Nikolaevsk on the Amur River to the Bering Strait. The 
responsibility for finding a suitable route through this trackless 
wilderness was assigned to ten men, a Russian and nine Americans, one 
of whom was George Kennan. By spring, when travel bogged down in many 
regions of Siberia, the entire route had been traversed. The party 
commenced the work of constructing station houses along the way and 
warehouses to store the large quantities of material due to arrive 
during the summer. Additional foremen also arrived to superintend 
the actual construction. The next year was spent distributing the 
company supplies of insulators, wire and brackets, as well as cutting 
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thousands of trees for telegraph posts. For this work, 600 Yakutsk 
laborers were hired. By the spring of 1867 the work had progressed 
so well that those in charge confidently expected to have the line 
completed before 1870. Then in May, from an American whaler, they 
heard the news that Cyrus Field had not only successfully laid a 
trans-Atlantic telegraph cable, but had actually lifted and repaired 
his earlier attempt. Soon word was received to cease work, sell 
what material they could and return home. 17 
George Kennan's chronicle of his two and one-half years in 
Siberia was first published in 1870 and was never out of print for 
the next forty years. Numbers of Americans seemed interested in 
reading about the wilds of Northeast Asia and, through the eyes of 
George Kennan, getting a glimpse of a new frontier. For the first 
time Americans had a first-hand view of the interior of Asiatic 
Russia, the spectacular geography, the forbidding weather, and the 
colorful natives. Heretofore, the knowledge of Siberia had been 
limited to the coastlines visited by whalers and Navy surveyors 
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l' or to the more established roads and waterways. In Kennan's portrayal 
one reads about a hardy band of American pioneers overcoming all 
the hardships and dangers of a vast wilderness area. They trekked 
beyond the few settlements and ventured into the lands inhabited only 
by the wandering Chukchi and Koryaks, whom Kennan compared to the 
North American Indians. Already in the isolated settlements Kennan 
noted signs that American "culture" had penetrated--natives who 
swore in American and sang "Oh~ Susannah," and had pictures from 
Harper's Weekly adorning the walls of native yurts. From Kennan 
Americans gained impressions of American ships frequenting the coastal 
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waters of Siberia and American merchants monopolizing the trade. 18 
The Yankees, one was led to believe, cannot only deal with 
the natives in their own element, but also can develop this remote 
territory through American ingenuity and organization. The telegraphic 
project was prosecuted with all the vigor which capital and intelli-
gent labor could secure. It was cancelled only after an expenditure 
of three million dollars, not through any failure in the enterprise, 
b~t because another telegraph route proved to be more economical. 
The continents of Asia and North America were, nevertheless, drawn 
closer together in men's minds. Asiatic Russia was not nearly so 
remote. Western Union offered to continue the project solely on 
the North American side if Russia would undertake the entire Asian 
segment up to Bering Strait, but the Russian government did not 
avail itself of this offer. Russia was even then, at the moment 
of cancelling the project, disengaging completely from the North 
American continent. 19 
Underlying the sale of Russian-America to the United States 
was the widely held belief among Russian leaders that the United 
States would eventually seize the territory anyway, so why not sell 
it peacefully and gain something from the transaction. The friendly 
relations between the two nations during and immedi~tely after the 
Civil War certainly facilitated the negotiations and overcame the 
reluctance toward the transaction in each nation, but it was the 
growing realization by Russia that Russian-America could no longer 
be held intact as a colony against American pressure without the 
unacceptable expenditures of funds and military effort which decided 
the issue. At the time of the 1824 Convention, a few Russian naval 
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officers and officials of the Russian-American Company had advocated 
just such an expansionist course. They had urged that Russia extend 
its holdings in California to block t~e predicted onrush of the 
Americans before their move was well underway. Their proposals were 
overruled and by the terms of the convention Russia began its retreat 
from North America. Now, some forty years later, a growing number 
of Russian officials assessed that the American continental expansion 
to the Pacific coast and the rapid settlement thereon would lead 
to acquisition of the entire North American continent by the United 
States, including Russian-America. They were convinced of America's 
"manifest destiny." Perhaps they were more convinced than the average 
American. To those Russians who followed Muravev's blueprint, the 
solution seemed obvious--eliminate this source of future friction 
with the United States, while ridding Russia of an indefensible 
liability. They did not urge a retreat from the Pacific. On the 
contrary, they recommended that Russia concentrate its efforts on 
the newly acquired Amur and Maritime Regions. To them, this was 
the best strategy for strengthening Russia's power in Asia. 
The most influential of those convinced of the Muravev con-
cept was Grand Duke Constantine, younger brother of the Tsar and 
General-Admiral of the Russian Navy. He became the real promoter 
of the sale of the Russian-American colonies as early as 1857. He 
argued that "we must not deceive ourselves and must foresee that 
the United States,aiming constantly to round out their possessions 
and desiring to dominate undi'Tidedly the whole of North America will 
take the aforementioned colonies from us and we shall not be able 
to regain them." Therefore, Constantine proposed that the colonies 
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be sold to the United States, "solving in a friendly fashion and in 
a way that would be profitable to us a problem which will otherwise 
be solved in a way disadvantageous to us and in addition by conquest." 
Otherwise, not only will the Russian-American Company trade be harmed, 
but "all Russian trade in America." Russia he urged "must endeavor 
• to hold those extremities which bring her real benefit. 1120 
Baron Wrangell, who had served as governor of Russian-America 
and was a stockholder in the company.7 well knew the value of the 
territory, if its natural resources could be developed without "fears 
of the future." Nevertheless, he too urged that Russia turn over 
the colony to the Americans since such a cession was "anticipatory 
21 prudence." 
Admiral Popov, who commanded the Russian fleet in the Pacific, 
was not only a confidant of the Grand Duke, but was well acquainted 
with the situation in the North Pacific. From his visits he had 
a personal glimpse of the American appetite for expansion. He was 
convinced that Americans truly believed in the Monroe Doctrine 
and that their "manifest destiny" would lead to eventual seizure of 
Russian-A~erica. As a consequence, he also recommended that Russia 
focus its energies in developing the nearer and more promising Korea 
and Amur regions of Asia, while ceding the colonies on the North 
American mainland and the Aleutians, because "geographically all 
thes:= are American." Popov did not include the colonies on the Kurile 
islands, which had earlier been tentatively considered for sale, 
and he specifically urged retention by Russia of the Commander Islands 
"so as not to have the Yankees too near us."22 
From his vantage point in Washington, Stoeckl was urging a 
similar course of action. During the Crimean War he had been involved 
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in the abortive attempt to make a fictitious sale of Russian-America 
to the United States. Since that time, Senator William McKendree 
Gwin of California had made several unofficial overtures to him 
concerning a bona fide sale, which Stoeckl relayed o~. Senator 
Gwin's interest in acquiring Alaska was but one facet of his plans 
for an American commercial empire stretching out from his California 
and embracing the millions of people who inhabited China and Japan, 
and the "hosts Russia will soon have planted in her possessions on 
the Amoor River." The encouragement of friendly relations with 
Russia became the basis for Gwin's Pacific policy. Stoeckl was 
equally anxious to promote friendly relations, because the monopoly 
exercised by the Russian-American Company was an embarrassment. 
While he was busy trying to promote good relations, the company 
122 
was creating needless friction with the United States. American 
commercial and fishing interests were excluded from Russian-America, 
while Russian ships and commercial agents were welcomed to San 
Francisco. Stoeckl was particularly alarmed when he heard rumors 
that a large body of Mormons intended to settle in Russian-America. 
He recognized that the colonizing power of America would be difficult 
to forestall. The Mormons did not test the situation, but reports 
of gold being found in Russian-America threatened an actual st&mpede 
of American prospectors to the region. In his reports Stoeckl 
spoke of the "aggressions" of the Americans. Only the current small 
value of Russian-America, according to him, made it "safe from 
American filibusters." After the sale, in an effort to answer critics 
in Russia, Stoeckl was even more explicit. He described how Americans 
considered the continent "their patrimony" and how the "rapacious" 
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American filibusters "swarm in the Pacific" causing "depredations on 
our coasts." Stoeckl likewise thought the best solution for Russia 
was to solidify its hold on Asia: 
It is upon our Asiatic coast that our interests lie and 
it is upon this point that we should concentrate our energy. 
There we are upon our own soil and we have the products of 
a vast and rich province to exploit. We shall take our part 
in the extraordinary activity which is developing in the 
Pacific; our establishments will rival in prosperity those 
of other nations and, with the solicitude which our August 
Master has devoted to the countries bordering on the Amour, 
we are destined to gain, in this great Ocean, the high 
consideration which belongs to Russia. 23 
Prince Gorchakov, who received all of these recommendations 
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for Russia to divest itself of its North American colonies, gradually 
became convinced. He was cautious not to antagonize England care-
lessly and he wanted the initiative to come from the United States, 
so at first he avoided a decision by setting a commission to study 
1 
the problem. Then the Civil War permitted him to sidestep the issue 
for awhile. Meanwhile, the government withheld approval for a new 
charter for the Russian-American Company when it expired at the end 
of 1861. Finally, in December 1866, when Stoeckl was back in St. 
Petersburg, Constantine brought the issue to a head at a council 
meeting attended by the Tsar. Stoeckl was ordered to return to 
Washington to open negotiations and to accept no less than 5 million 
dollars for Russian-America. 
The reluctance of Gorchakov may have been partially overcome 
by the euphoria created by the Fox mission only a few months before. 
During the summer of 1866, Gus~·avus Fox, the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, was sent with a squadron of three naval warships to 
Russia to deliver a resolution passed by Congress congratulating Tsar 
Alexander II upon his providential escape from assassination. For 
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six weeks the mission travelled to various cities in Russia receiving 
deputations, memorials, banquets, toasts, orations, medals, gifts 
and honorary citizenships. Fox met with the imperial family, court 
officials, naval officers, civic leaders and merchant groups. 
Expressions of unstinting friendship were mutually exchanged. The 
friendship of Russia and America was variously described as: 
fraternal, disinterested, not founded on selfishness, permanent, 
sincere, unchanged for ages, not artificial or chimerical, lofty 
and pure, indissoluble, a union of two worlds. In one of the last 
speeches, Gorchakov spoke about the "manifestations of sympathy 
between the two countries." At the time Gorchakov considered: 
It is a fact the most interesting of our epoch, a fact 
which creates between two nations--I will say rather 
between two continents--germs of reciprocal good-will 
and friendship which will bear fruit, which create 
traditions, and which tend to consolidate between them 
relations founded upon the true spirit of Christian 
civilizations. This understanding does not rest on 
geographical proximity--the gulf of oceans separates 
us.24 
Three months later he was setting in motion the continental aspirations 
of both nations, but drastically narrowing the gulf between. 
Not all Russian officials favored the sale. Baron Osten-Saken, 
of the Asiatic Department, when he learned of the proposed sale of 
Russian-America, raised some pertinent objections. He pointed out 
that the sale \vould destroy the three-power equilibrium on the north-
west coast of North America and that Russia would be subject to 
renewed fears 5 misunderstandings, disadvantages and further seizures 
from a "new next-door neighbor in the person of the United States 
of North America." In Osten-Saken's view, it was preferable to have 
the Americans blocked off by the intervening English colonies rather 
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than separated from Asiatic Russia by narrow bodies of water. Antici-
pating that the Americans would not stop at the water's edge, he 
questioned whether Russia was "in a position to oppose them (the 
Americans) with any counter-action in the Eastern Siberian Territories." 
The immediate temptation for an American advance into Eastern Siberia 
was at h~nd, the Russian-American Telegraph project. Osten-Saken 
believed that the United States, once Russian-America was theirs, 
would have a strong motive for gaining exclusive possession of the 
important line which would interconnect America with Japan and 
China "along the chain of volcanic islands connecting America with 
Kamchatka, Kamchatka with Sakhalin, etc. 1125 
In later years Osten-Saken gained high position in Russia's 
foreign office, but in 1866 his influence did not match his vision. 
If the high council which decided to sell held any such ~ualms, 
they were calmed by the simultaneous determination to strengthen 
Russia's hold on Asiatic Russia. Minister Clay, in judging Russian 
opinion concerning the sale of Russian-America, acknowledged that 
some were jealous of foreigners and traditionally opposed to ceding 
any territory, but that the prevailing group "look upon it with favor 
because we are to be near their eastern possessions, and they regard 
us perpetual friends, in hopes that it may ultimately lead to the 
expulsion from the great Pacific of nations whose power in the east 
is justly feared."26 
Once Stoeckl returned to Washington, he and Seward quickly 
agreed on March 30, 1867 to terms of the sale of the Russian colonies 
to the United States. The Senate ratified the treaty ten days later 
by an overwhelming vote of 37-2, following the lead of Senator 
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Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The 
United States was notified of the Russian ratification of the treaty 
in mid-May and in October the territory of Alaska was officially 
transferred. The only hitch in the smooth proceedings occurred 
during the summer of 1868 when the House of Representatives debated 
for a long time whether to appropriate the money for the purchase. 
Public opinion, as reflected in newspaper editorials and 
congressional debates, was generally favorable to the purchase in 
all sections of the United States, once the public became more 
knowledgeable of Alaska and its potential economic worth. Backers 
of the treaty were also aided by a strong pro-Russian sentiment. 
Many, who were at best lukewarm advocates of the purchase, neverthe-
less supported it, in order not to offend Russia. Most of the argu-
ments favoring the sale stressed the economic and commercial advantages--
mineral resources, furs, fish, timber and ice. Considered equally 
important was the opportunity to cement good relations with Russia 
and show American gratitude. 27 
Two other American motives behind the sale were more muted, 
p~rhaps to avoid arousing the vocal group which objected that the 
acquisition was just another misguided attempt to follow the doctrine 
of "manifest destiny." Seward, the architect of the treaty, ardently 
believed in the eventual expansion of the United States across all 
of North America. As early as 1860 in St. Paul, he had prophesied: 
Standing here and looking far off into the northwest, I 
see the Russian as he busily occupies himself in establish-
ing seaports and towns and fortifications, on the verge of 
this continent, as the outposts of St. Petersburg, and I 
can say, "Go on, and build up your outposts all along the 
coast up even to the Arctic ocean--they will yet become 
the outposts of my own country--monuments of the civiliza-
tion of the United States in the northwest. 28 
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An indication of the importance he attached to the purchase 
occurred in 1864 in the midst of the Civil War. Seward arranged to 
invite Grand Duke Constantine to visit the United States on a 
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mission "beneficial to us, and by no means unprofitable to Russia." 
Although the chief Russian proponent of selling Russian-America could 
not come at that time, Seward's eagerness was apparent. Yet, when 
the treaty was forwarded to the Senate, he avoided any hint of 
jingoism, citing mainly examples of the bonds of friendship between 
Russia and America and how the treaty would prevent the growth of 
difficulties arising out of the fisheries in the Russian possessions.29 
In one of his arguments in his lengthy and decisive address 
to the Senate advocating that the treaty be ratified, Sumner returned 
to the theme of extending the dominion of the United States. Sumner 
urged that accession of territory obtained peacefully and honestly 
would stimulate pride in the country and an increased consciousness 
of strength. He particularly favored the extension of republican 
institutions and the dismissal of "one other monarch from the 
continent." A number of newspapers expressed pleasure that the 
United States expansion had thwarted the plans of Great Britain and 
thrown British Columbia in jeopardy. But in an uncharacteristically 
sharp comment, the Philadelphia North American and Gazette rejoiced 
that the universal "lust of dominion displayed by Russia" was stayed 
by the treaty which "freed this continent from her designs" and 
that "Russian ambition has disappeared from the American continent."30 
Speaking thirty years after the purchase of Alaska, Theodore 
Roosevelt enlarged on this sentiment without too careful a regard 
for the facts surrounding the transfer of territory: 
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The English-speaking people have never gone back before 
the Slav, and the Slav has nev·er gone back before them 
save once. Three-quarters of a century ago the 
Russians meant that Northwestern American should be 
Russian, and our Monroe Doctrine was formulated as 
much against them as against the other reactionaries 
of continental Europe. Now the American has dis-
possessed the Russian • • • the American--the man of the 
effete English-speaking races-~has driven the Slav 
from the eastern coast of the North Pacific.31 
Having "driven" the Russians from Alaska, did the United 
128 
States have as an additional motive for the purchase, the possibility 
of using Alaska, and particularly the Aleutians, as a strategic 
stepping stone for further expansion into Northern Asia? The 
answer is a qualified yes. Seward himself had long predicted that 
the Pacific would become the chief theater of events in the world 
and that there lay America's destiny. "Certainly no one expects," 
he said as early as 1853, "the nations of Asia to be awakened by any 
other influences than our own." Openly and officially at least, 
Seward was discreetly silent on this point, seeking to allay any 
Russian fears on this score during the period of treaty negotiations 
and ratification. He may well have expressed himself privately 
concerning the strategic value of Alaska for future American 
enterprise in the North Pacific during his vigorous efforts to 
garner support for the purchase. A number of newspapers and politicians 
either echoed similar views or became convinced that Alaska, in 
addition to its other values, was likely to become the northern 
gateway to Asia.32 
Sumner pointed out the advantages of uniting the "East of 
Asia with the West of America" noting that the great circle navigation 
route from San Francisco to Hong Kong by way of the Aleutians was far 
shorter than by way of Hono'.lulu. Advocates of a Northern Pacific 
Railroad were quick to observe that the route to Asia through Puget 
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Sound was shorter still. Once the concept of the west coast rail-
road terminals had been equated with trans-Pacific commerce, all 
sections of the United States could visualize a commercial interest 
of their own. Newspapers advocating one or the other of the routes 
across North America argued which would be the better "Asiatic route 
across the continent."33 
Editorial comment from every section remarked on the impor-
tance of Alaska to expanding the trade with East Asia. The ports 
and harbors of Alaska, it was explained, would make excellent coaling 
stations and provide a "commanding naval base." The Philadelphia 
Inguirer thought that "possession of this territory will give us the 
command of the Pacific." The New York Times opined that the main 
importance of the acquisition of Alaska was "upon our future trade 
with Japan, China and the other countries of Eastern Asia • • • • 
It seems inevitable that all such commerce should be American."34 
The heated debates in the House of Representatives in 
mid-1868, presented another forum in which those favoring the payment 
of the 7.2 million dollars looked to American "commercial and naval 
supremacy in the Pacific." Congressman Maynard of Tennessee did not 
think that any obstacle should be placed in the "westward course of 
empire." To Congressman Johnson of California the "Aleutian range 
• • • stretches far away to Japan, as if America were extending a 
friendly hand in trade to Asia." But the most vociferous exponent 
of the trans-Pacific advantages to accrue to the United States by 
possession of Alaska was Congressman Banks of Massachusetts. He, 
too, thought that the Pacific would be the "theater of the triumph 
of civilization in the future" and that Alaska was the key. Noting 
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that the new territory brought America to within seventy or eighty 
miles of the Asiatic coast, he claimed that this new possession 
"gives us control of the Arctic" and makes the "Behring Sea sub-
stantially an American Sea." Furthermore, he foresaw a time "when 
Americans are in absolute possession of the commerce, trade and 
fisheries • of the north Pacific • • • and the Russians excluded 
therefrom altogether."35 
A close reading of these American newspaper editorials and 
congressional debates might have led Russian authorities to question 
the wisdom of selling Russian-America. Some Americans, at least, 
did not view the acquisition of Alaska as being only a step in 
completing the North American dominion. Rather, they perceived the 
new possession as a strategic entry point to Asia. The commercial 
rivalry which had led to conflict on the northwestern coast of North 
America was resolved, but the threat of renewing the rivalry in 
Northeast Asia became more of a reality. The Republic of the West 
and the Empire of the East, expanding in opposite directions were 
indeed destined to meet, but henceforth it would be on Asian soil. 
Observing the situation from St. Petersburg, Minister Clay 
was aware of Russia's resolve to strengthen its position in Asia 
and was having some second thoughts about the Russian activities 
there. Previously he had been completely convinced that it was 
Russia's proper destiny to "civilize" Asia: 
The world should not regard her progress into Asia with 
distrust, but gratification. The new life must come 
from the West and Russia is the only nation which can 
give it. 
Now, he saw that such moves might have an adverse effect on American 
interests. He reported that "our friends the Russians are gradually 
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taking possession of all the islands inclosing the Sea of Okhotsk, 
which is now the best whaling ground in the Pacific." He called 
attention to Russia colonizing in "Northern China and the isles of 
Japan" iu preparation for future political and commercial moves 
against "those great centers of population and wealth." 36 
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Clay still visualized Northeast Asia as the gateway to the 
riches of Japan and China, but he was becoming convinced that Russia 
was not going to invite the United States to participate join~ly 
in the venture. Despite the dreams of Americans like Perry Collins, 
Russia intended to develop the Amur Basin without a partner. His 
suspicions were confirmed in May 1868 when Chase, the commercial 
agent at Nikolaevsk, advised him that four years earlier he had seen 
secret instructions from Grand Duke Constantine to naval and civil 
officials in Eastern Siberia to "drive the Americans from their 
coasts."37 
To offset the strategic advantage that Clay thought Russia 
was gaining, he recommended that the United States act vigilantly 
to acquire bases for "future power and security." He thought it 
important for future "commercial and political" relations with East 
Asia that the United States have "some formidable stand-point in 
the seas bordering on Japan and China, where our armies and navies 
may rest secure." Specifically, Clay suggested that the United 
States investigate the island of Nanki (Port Hamilton) belonging 
to Korea or Kunashiri belonging to Japan. It is doubtful whether 
anyone in the State Department gave any serious heed to Clay's 
recommendations, but his reports should have dampened any speculation 
that American commerce of influence was likely to gain access to 
China through Asiatic Russia. 38 
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One island over which Russia sought to gain sole control was 
Sakhalin, because of its strategic position off the Amur estuary. 
Aside from its location, Sakhalin had little to attract attention 
except coal deposits. In 1860 the American consul at Yokohama, 
E. E. Rice, obtained permission from the Russian government to mine 
coal on Sakhalin and under the direction of an American merchant at 
CastrieBay, Otto Esche, small-scale mining of coal was attempted. 
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By 1867 the demand for coal was growing. The Pacific Mail-Steamer 
Company proposed to finance a larger development on Sakhalin. The 
Americans formed a joint stock company including Clay, who petitioned 
the Russian government for a 20-year exclusive right to mine coal 
on the whole island or, barring that, on that portion of the island 
lying between 49° and 50° North latitude. After some preliminary 
indications from lesser officials that the American request would 
be granted, Gorctiakov reJected the pet1t1on 1n 1369 on the basis that 
he was opposed to monopolies on Sakhalin. In reality, another 
possibility which was being discussed within the Russian government 
worked against the American request. Officials in St. Petersburg 
planned on turning Sakhalin into a huge penal colony where convict 
labor would mine the coal. Such a scheme would rid the rest of 
Siberia of convicts and the guards would simultaneously afford 
military protection to the island. 39 
Besides, Russia was having difficulty enough settling the 
Sakhalin boundary question with Japan without the presence of an 
extensive American enterprise on the island. Shortly after the 
Crimean War, Russia had commenced a reoccupation of the center of the 
island, gradually moving military detachments and settlements southward 
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toward the Japanese fishing villages. For years the Russians pressured 
Japan to cede them the entire island. The Japanese government 
turned for support to the United States. When Seward was on a 
private visit to Japan in 1869, his views were sought. He advised 
Japan to offer to buy Sakhalin, but unlike the case of Alaska, 
Russia considered Sakhalin a defensive necessity, not a liability. 
Again in 1370, Japan asked the United States to mediate the boundary 
dispute, but Russia refused the American offer. Finally, in 1875, 
Russia and Japan signed a treaty resolving the territorial issue for 
thirty years. Japan relinquished all claims to Sakhalin to Russia. 
In return, Russia ceded all of the Kurile Islands to Japan. Strategi-
cally, Russia had chosen to strengthen its defense of the Asiatic 
mainland rather than retain its possessions seaward. No longer could 
Russia maintain even a vestige of a claim to the Sea of Okhotsk 
being a mare clausum. This turning away from the inhospitable North 
presaged the eventual southward swing for Russian expansion. The 
shift of its Far Eastern naval base from Nikolaevsk to Vladivostok 
in 1872 was yet another step, but Russia still did not enjoy a 
year long ice-free port on the Pacific and did not immediately gain 
uncontested control of its North Siberian coastline.40 
As Baron Osten-Sacken had predicted, the acquisition of 
Alaska had not prevented the Americans from continuing to enter 
Siberian waters. Although decreased from its peak years, substantial 
numbers of American whalers still hunted in the Tsar's seas. Attempts 
by Russia to equip its own whaleships were not successful economically 
and the single Russian cruiser could do little to interdict the 
American whaling fleet, now operating principally out of San Francisco. 
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Nor could the Russian government establish colonies of Russian settlers 
in all the remote bays frequented by the Americans. It was alleged 
that the Americans also poached fur-bearing animals, consorted with 
natives, sold them contraband vodka in exchange for furs and spread 
epidemics of smallpox and syphilis. Worst, fromtheRussian viewpoint, 
the Americans felt themselves so much the masters along the coast 
that their charts and atlases showed the Chukotsk land as independent 
f R . 41 0 USS1a. 
The most profitable American venture turned out to be a 
renewal of seal hunting. After a prolonged prohibition on hunting, 
seals were again plentiful on the Commander Islands, just off the 
Kamchatkan mainland. In 1871 an American company, Hutchison, Cole 
and Philips, gained a 20-year hunting lease on the islands in return 
for generous payments to the Russian treasury. The company started 
out taking 10-15,000 pelts annually, but by 1880 nearly 50,000 were 
acquired yearly. Although the venture proved profitable for both 
the Russian treasury and the natives, as well as the company, the 
government began to have second thoughts as the scope of the American 
exploitation grew and the islands came more under American subordina-
tion. As Admiral Popov had feared, the Americans in the Commander 
Islands were far too near. Captain Hooper, commanding a large Ameri-
can ship patrolling the islands in 1879, reportedly claimed that 
"It is not necessary for the Russian government to take active 
measures, but it is sufficient only to permit the customs cruiser 
of the United States to oversee the industry and the cow~erce along 
the Northeast coast of Siberia." Notwithstanding this generous offer, 
the imperial government in 1882 promulgated stricter rules regulating 
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access to Russian shores. Henceforth, permission would have to be 
received at Vladivostok from the governor-general of Eastern Siberia 
before any hunting or commercial enterprise could be conducted along 
the Siberian coasts. Otherwise, ships and cargoes would be con-
fiscated. This ruling led to an upswing in Russian-American incidents 
which reached diplomatic levels for resolution. 42 
As Russia exerted its claim to sole possession of the Siberian 
mainland and extended its sway to nearby Sakhalin, it must have become 
apparent to American entrepreneurs that the left bank of Amur River 
was temporarily closed to the United States. Despite the earlier 
optimism of Collins, Clay and Seward, Russia was not going to allow 
American participation in the development of the Amur basin. Russia 
held exclusive control of this northern gateway to China and Japan 
and showed no disposition to share its strategic position, despite 
vague promises in the past. The very proximity of Russian-held 
and fortified territory to the commercially important nations to the 
South began to cause disquiet. The United States minister to China 
thought that Russia's policy in her intercourse and dealings with 
China was "mysterious and past finding out." He reported that Russia 
"is suspected by most people of a desire for further territorial 
encroachments." The United States found itself with no forward area 
strongholds in the region, a weak and aging navy, and no means to 
counter any further thrust of Russia. The German minister to Washing-
ton sensed this mood of unease as he observed in 1874 that: 
the Secretary of State never speaks of P..ussia, when one 
talks concerning Japan. Because the United States regards 
Japan as an appendage of America. And although the Yankee 
feels strongly enough to be able to hope that sooner or later 
he will be in a position to paralyze the influence of all 
European powers in Japan, the Asiatic proximity of Russia 
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yet fills him with a secret fear, and the colonization of 
the Amur region as well as the Russian settlements on 
Sakhalin island are well suited to darken for every 
American politician of the future the heaven of his 
Japanese hopes.43 
Henceforth, the buffer territories of Korea and Manchuria would take 
on added significance. In early 1876 reports appeared in English-
language newspapers in China concerning encroachments by Russia 
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south of the Amur boundary. George Seward, the United States minister 
to China, forwarded these rumors of a Russian military settlement 
in Manchuria to Washington. He used the occasion to speak of the 
region at some length. He thought Manchuria "might become the seat 
of an Empire" if its great resources could be developed. The 
Chinese, according to Seward, were becoming interested in controlling 
Manchuria more thoroughly, but may have been too slow to recognize 
the danger of control passing to that "great northern E·.1ropean 
Asiatic state." "How eagerly would the statesmen and capitalists of 
America seize upon this opportunity to develop such a region" 
anticipated Seward.44 
However, after nearly 20 years of strenuous activity in North-
east Asia, both private and governmental, neither Russia nor the 
United States seemed to have the necessary immediate energy or will 
to sustain any further drive for empire in Asia and the North Pacific. 
The ambitions of both had suffered temporary frustration and, after 
the 1860s, a period of relative stagnation followed, as each nation 
turned attention more to other sectors. The visions of Pacific 
empire, though held in abeyance, remained alive. Russia's advance 
southward along the Asian littoral came to a halt, but would be 
renewed. Russia's plans to contain the Americans solely within North 
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America were only partially successful, but would be continued. The 
efforts of the United States to connect the continents across the 
Pacific had been disappointed, but the concept would be revived. 
Americans had been discouraged in their expectations of a partnership 
with Russia to develop the Amur region and an opportunity to gain 
access to the rest of Asia, but American hopes for Northeest Asia 
would flower again. 
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CHAPTER V 
KOREAN PROLOGUE 
The United States showed scant interest in the Hermit Kingdom 
until after the Civil War.~ Yet the opening of diplomatic relations 
with the Kingdom of Korea was to have far reaching consequences. As 
a secluded nation, closed to all but the token suzerainity of China, 
Korea promised little of economic value and posed no military threat 
whatsoever to its neighbors. Once opened to foreign diplomatic, 
commercial, missionary and military influences, the Korean scene 
changed drastically. Korea was to be the fulcrum in Asiatic affairs. 
The king of Korea became a puppet with too many outsiders striving 
to manipulate the strings. Neither China, Russia, or Japan--the 
three most concerned protagonists--could stand idly by and watch 
either of the others gain control. A weak, neutral Korea could be 
left in peace, but a Korea under the protectorship of a great power 
represented a strategic threat to the others. Moreover, Japan soon 
had a considerable commercial stake in Korea, which from its 1876 
treaty with Japan onward provided an increasing amount of food and 
fiber to Japan. The British empire with its worldwide responsibilities 
played a supportive role in China's interests. England, concerned 
about the Russian empire's expansion southward all across Asia, from 
the Middle East to Central Asia to China's northeastern provinces, 
was alert to counter any move, real or imagined, by Russia against 
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Manchuria or Korea. The uneasy balance which surrounded the Land of 
Morning Cal~ was irrevocably altered when the United States in 1882 
became the first occidental nation to negotiate a treaty successfully. 
During the next several decades Korea became the site of fierce 
diplomatic intrigues to control the government and the battleground 
for two major wars. Political fortunes changed rapidly in Korea 
as first China, then Japan, and then Russia gained the position of 
primary influence. Inevitably, the United States, despite early, 
vigorous efforts to stay absolutely neutral in the power struggles, 
was drawn in. Attention will be directed at only those aspects of 
Korean affairs which tended to affect the attitudes of Russia and 
the United States towards one another.l 
The American experience in Korea during the years before the 
Sino-Japanese War represented a marked change from the United States' 
involvement in the previous China treaty-making process of the 1850s. 
The first change was the degree of participation in Korean internal 
affairs and the influence wielded temporarily by the handful of 
Americans in the field. American missionaries became well-established 
in the countryside, American entrepreneurs clamored for concessions. 
American diplomats had the ear of the king and other Americans acted 
as his advisers in the customs and foreign service. Military 
instructors were requested from the United States to strengthen the 
Korean army. The Navy saw an opportunity to lease a strategically 
located Korean island to serve as a naval base from which to protect 
growing American interests in Northeast Asia. Had not Washington curbed 
their enthusiasm with cautious directives, their attempt to foster 
an independent Korea with its territorial integrity internationally 
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guaranteed, might have succeeded. 
The relationship of the United States toward Russia over the 
events in Korea was also marked by a distinct change from the close 
cooperation experienced during the 1850s. Then, American negotiators 
in China had worked in close harmony with their Russian counterparts, 
both sides acting under government-to-government understandings. 
The United States had lent its moral support to the Russian seizure 
of the Amur and Maritime regions from China. In Korea, the Americans 
acted independently and often at cross purposes to Russia. They 
were just as suspicious and alarmed about Russian attempts to control 
Korea as they were of attempts by China, England or Japan--probably 
more so. Neither in Seoul nor in Washington was there ever any 
suggestion of cooperating with Russia in the joint development or 
occupation of Korea. 
By the terms of the Treaty of Peking, Russia had already 
gained in 1860 a common boundary with the northeast corner of Korea 
at the Tumen River. One of the Russian objectives in acquiring the 
Amur territory had been to increase trade with China and its outlying 
districts. In the subsequent years Russia made repeated attempts to 
stimulate such trade, but was, in the main, thwarted by the Chinese 
authorities who feared further Russian advances. Only along the 
Korean border were the Russians somewhat successful. Without the 
benefit of a formal commercial agreement, Koreans supplied the Russian 
settlers around Vladivostok with badly needed foodstuffs. Also,many 
Koreans crossed the border to work for the Russians, thus easing 
the shortage of laborers during the construction of the naval base. 
This gave Russianofficialsinformation about Korea and a means of 
contacting their opposite numbers. Attempts by Russia to open 
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official ties to Korea spurred a rash of allegations concerning 
Russian pressure on Korean territory. Most of these and later similar 
allegations claimed that Russia was about to seize, barter for or 
purchase the northeast province of Korea, the principal prize being 
the ice-free Port Lazarev. The first attempt supposedly occurred 
in 1866 when a Russian man-of-war appeared in Broughton Bay demanding 
the right of trade and residence for Russian merchants. If the 
demands were not satisfied, Russian troops, reportedly, would 
enforce them. This and later reports were given credence at the 
time and widely circulated in Japan and China. 2 To a great extent 
the possibility of Russia forcibly opening the Kingdom of Korea 
created an atmosphere which eased the eventual peaceful overtures of 
the United States. The opening of Korea was not the competitive 
race such as Commodore Perry had engaged in with Admiral Putyatin. 
Nevertheless, the mere presence of Russia to the north aided American 
negotiations. 
The first attempts by the United States turned out to be 
not so peaceful, however once commenced, they were persistent and 
determined. The efforts began in late 1866 when Rear Admiral Bell, 
commanding the Asiatic squadron, received word that an American 
schooner, the General Sherman, had been wrecked on the Korean coast 
and that the vessel had been burned by Koreans with the loss of 
the entire crew. Bell recommended to the Navy Department that an 
American force be sent to capture Seoul and to demand satisfaction 
from Korea. At the same time in Washington Seward learned of a 
French expedition which had been sent to punish Korea for the massacre 
of nine French missionaries. Seward proposed to the French minister 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145 
that the United States and France join in retaliatory action against 
Korea, but France declined. Meanwhile, Commander Shufeldt in Wachusetts 
had been sent to investigate the incident in 1867. This was followed 
up the next year by Commander Febiger in Shenandoah. From information 
gathered during these ship visits, it became apparent that the crew 
of the General Sherman had probably been the aggressors and been 
killed in a melee ashore. 3 
This incident did lead the United States into taking a more 
active lead to ensure the safety of mariners along the Korean coast. 
George Seward, the United States consul-general at Shanghai, in 
writing to his Uncle William, proposed that a diplomatic mission 
be sent to Korea to open negotiations. He did not anticipate that 
a commercial treaty was of "sufficient object ••• to render it 
advisable to use force or even the show of force." But he did point 
out that American vessels already frequented the waters surrounding 
the Korean peninsula which juts between China, Japan and Siberia 
where American commerce was bound to increase. According to G. 
Seward, Admiral Rowan was eager to have the Asiatic squadron cooperate 
with any diplomatic mission to Korea. 4 
Although Secretary Seward approved of sending the mission, 
it was unaccountably postponed for two years. The proposal was 
initiated again by Rear Admiral John Rodgers in 1870. The new 
Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, decided that the negotiations 
should be carried out by the American minister at Peking, Frederick 
Low. It was hoped that Low could enlist the good will of China in 
the American cause. Low and Rodgers settled on the use of the same 
tactics which had worked so well for Perry. They agreed to leave 
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Korean waters after announcing the purpose of the visit and return 
a month later for a reply. In accordance with the request of the 
State Department, the expedition was "sufficiently formidable to 
make an impression on the native authorities." Five navy vessels, 
including the flagship Colorado, carrying eighty-five guns and more 
than twelve hundred men provided the "display of force adequate to 
support the dignity" of the United States.s 
Despite the show of strength, the mission failed. Arriving 
at anchorage off the west coast of Korea, Low informed the minor 
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Korean officials who first came aboard about the nature of his mission. 
He also thought that he had received assurances that the Americans 
could safely survey up the river. However, while so engaged, the 
survey party was fired upon from the Korean forts guarding the river 
entrance. Low and Rodgers decided to preserve the prestige of the 
United States by demanding an apology within ten days. When no 
apology was tendered by the Korean government, Rodgers sent a 
retaliatory expedition ashore. The sailor and marine shore party 
assaulted and captured five Korean forts, took 481 pieces of artillery, 
killed approximately 240 Korean soldiers and then withdrew. Find-
ing it impossible to conclude a peaceful treaty, and judging that 
the forces available were insufficient to reach the Korean capital 
without great risk, the fleet returned to Chefoo. The navy report 
on the expedition took some comfort in that the "punishment which 
was inflicted upon our treacherous assailants ••• has not failed 
to make an impression upon the people of the Chinese coast." But 
the mission failed completely in its major objective. "Our little 
war," as the New York Times editorialized, left "little to be proud 
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of." Low concluded that neither conciliatory negotiations nor 
demonstrations of force would accomplish any practical results in 
Korea. Only a sizeable invasion force, capable of insuring success 
without undue risk, could open up Korea. The United States was not 
yet ready for such drastic action. Instead, Rodgers was cautioned 
against any attempt at the conquest of Korea. There the matter 
rested for several years. 6 
Washington learned in 1874 that the young king of Korea 
had assumed power in the country and had deposed the regent who had 
been acting for the past fifteen years. It was hoped that the new 
regime would be more favorably disposed to foreigners. Two years 
later, Japan succeeded in concluding a treaty of amity and commerce 
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with Korea. This encouraged the United States to renew its overtures. 
Senator Sargent of California introduced a joint resolution in 1878 
which would authorize the president to appoint a commissioner to 
arrange a treaty similar to Japan's. Aside from the usual arguments 
concerning commerce, civilization and secure navigation, Sargent 
raised an important new point, representing a departure in American 
thinking. The United States, he said, "should seek to extend them 
(Korea) the protection which arises from our recognition as a safe-
guard against the aggression of Russia." Curiously, he also claimed 
that "America is the nearest to Corea of all the nations having 
European civilization except Japan." Reflecting the growing concern 
in Washington about Russia's designs south of the Amur, Sargent 
hoped that a friendly Korea would prove an American lodgement on 
mainland Asia and a bulwark protecting Japan: 
The addition of Corea to the number of the strong, armed 
powers in friendship with the United States will increase 
our influence on that continent, besides strengthening 
Japan. Such strength is necessary, unless the advance of 
Russia southward on the eastern shore is to be unchecked. 
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The Russian question is a formidable Asiatic question. 
That there is a danger of the Russians taking Corea 
is obvious by a glance at the map showing the relation 
which the Yellow Sea bears to the frozen country of 
the Amoor; and Russia in possession of Corea is a stand-
ing menace to Japan.7 
The joint resolution was never adopted, but the Navy Depart-
ment had been listening. Sargent was the chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Naval Affairs. Late in 1878 Commodore Shufeldt, a 
close friend of the senator's: sailed in Ticonderoga on a commercial 
and diplomatic mission to various eastern countries. Among his 
"\.nstructions wa::; the requirement to open "peaceful" negotiations 
with Korea. It was hoped that Japan's good offices could be used 
to facilitate the negotiations, but attempts to initiate talks by 
this means failed. While Shufeldt awaited in Nagasaki during the 
summer of 1880 for replies from Korea, another possible avenue 
of communication opened up. Li Hung-chang, the viceroy of Chihli 
province, invited Shufeldt to visit him at Tientsin. Shufeldt, 
believing that the Japanese were not exerting themselves in behalf 
of his mission, readily accepted Li's invitation. Li had two 
apparent motives in approaching Shufeldt. First, he wanted to 
prevent the United States and Japan from joining together in recog-
nizing Korea's independence from China's sovereignty. Li offered 
to use his influence with the government of Korea so that it would 
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accede to the friendly request of the United States to open negotia-
tions for a treaty. He was foiled in his aim though. China became 
the intermediary through which America gained access to Korea, but 
the United States never relinquished its claim to be dealing with an 
independent Korea. The second thing which motivated Li was a fear 
that war between Russia and China was imminent. He sought Shufeldt's 
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opinion concerning the relative strengths of the Russian Pacific 
fleet and the Chinese navy. Li also expressed the hope ~hat Shufeldt 
would be permitted to assist in the reorganization of the Chinese 
navy. 8 
The cause of Li's concern lay in the occupation by Russia 
of the Kuldja region in Chinese Turkestan. When Chin~ moved to 
reoccupy the territory, Russia dispatched a fleet to the Far East. 
China considered this a "hostile and menacing naval demonstration 
in its own waters in time of peace." Another concern to China was 
a report in April 1880 of Russian mission composed chiefly of 
cavalrymen which had entered Korea's northeast province to propose 
a treaty. F~·om conversations held in November 1880 with the Chinese 
minister in St. Petersburg, John Foster, the United States minister, 
gathered that a conflict between Russia and China "was almost in-
evitable and not far distant." Foster was also told that if China 
was driven by the unjust demands of Russia into the maintenance of 
its honor and independence, that China could with justice appeal 
to friendly nations for sympathy. Li's offer to intercede for the 
United States in Korea was an attempt to elicit the friendly help of 
America in case war with Russia could not be averted. Although the 
cavalry advance of Russia into Korea never materialized, the threat 
had a more lasting effect on Chinese policy than the actual punitive 
American raid on Korea ten years earlier. 9 
Shufeldt returned to Washington in late 1880, but not for 
long. Secretary of State Blaine endorsed Shufeldt 1 3 new approach 
to Korea through China. To further the plan, he ordered Shufeldt back 
to Peking to aid in organizing the Chinese navy, if requested, and 
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to await Korea's response to Li. By this time though, the atmosphere 
had changed. There no longer was any sense of urgency. Russia 
and China had resolved their differences. Much of the disputed 
territory had been restored to China. Shufeldt considered that the 
agreement with Russia lessened Li's enthusiasm to act as intermediary 
with Korea. 1° Finally, however, word was received that Korea was 
willing to discuss terms of a treaty. Most of the negotiations took 
place in Tientsin under the sponsorship of Li. Nearly a year after 
Shuff:ldt's return to Asia, the documents were formally signed in 
Korea in May 1882. To Shufeldt his long and arduous task was worth 
the effort, for he believed strongly that the "Pacific Ocean is to 
become at no distant day the commercial domain of America." He 
was also convinced that Korea needed a treaty with the United States 
as an "absolute necessity as a matter of protection against the 
aggression of surrounding powers. 1111 It now remained for American 
diplomats to provide such protection. 
Although Shufeldt garnered little immediate personal recogni-
tion for his accomplishment, no one could fault his comprehensive 
treaty. Within a short period it became the model for the other 
nations interested in a treaty with Korea, including Russia. By 
its terms the United States gained diplomatic and consular representa-
tion, American citizens were permitted to trade at the open ports 
at fixed rates of tariff, shipwrecked mariners were assured of good 
treatment, and the United States was granted most-favored-nation 
privileges. 
From the very beginning of American representation in Seoul, 
Lucius Foote, the first minister of any western power, became deeply 
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involved in Korean affairs. Secretary Frelinghuysen had instructed 
Foote to emphasize that the United States had no ulterior designs on 
Korea and that the kingdom was to be treated as an independent and 
sovereign power. This supportive policy, as actively pursued by 
Foote and his successors, made a profoundly favorable impression 
on Korea's king. Five months after his arrival, Foote was granted 
a private, informal audience with the king who asked Foote's advice 
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on a number of issues. They discussed the forthcoming Korean treaties 
with England and Germany and the United States was urged to request 
that Russia and France open similar treaty talks. Of more significance, 
the United States was invited, through Foote, to appoint an '~merican 
gentleman" to act as advisor to the Korean Office of Foreign 
Affairs and to provide military instructors to train a modern Korean 
army. 12 This invitation was repeated over the next several yea~s. 
The caution, inefficiency and delays at the State Department negated 
the effortR of the Americans in Korea to prop up a weak government. 
Frelinghuysen had expected that the problems facing Foote 
would stem primarily from the relations of Korea with China and 
Japan. And, indeed, these relationships were complex and critical. 
By 1885 the situation grew more complicated when the rivalry of 
England and Russia spilled over into Korea and threatened its 
territorial integrity. Foote had by then resigned his post because 
its rank had been downgraded. During the England-Russia contest of 
wills, Ensign George Foulk assumed the responsibilities as American 
chargl. This remarkable young officer started as the naval attach~ 
in Seoul and he, too, gained the confidence of the king. Unlike in 
earlier periods, American representatives in China and Korea were 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
concerned about Russian expansion in Asia. No longer were they 
singlemindedly in support of Russia as a civilizing force anc as 
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a gateway to commercial enterprise. Their sympathies often sided 
with China or Japan. Having gained the credit for opening Korea, 
Americans felt some responsibility for its survival as an independent 
nation. Foulk and his successors grew increasingly critical of 
Russian expansion, viewing it with suspicions which became more 
deeply ingrained with each repetition. To some extent this distrust 
of Russian motives was influenced by what Americans read in the 
English-language periodicals published in the Orient. These over-
whelmingly attacked Russia for its purported aggression. Some of 
these stories were also picked up and reprinted in the American 
press. 
Most of the speculation concerning Russia's next annexation 
continued to be centered on the northeast coast of Korea. Observers 
were convinced that Russia would never be satisfied until it had 
secured an ice-free port for itself. At the time of the Kuldja 
incident the American minister to China warned, for example, that 
Russia woald not disperse its la=ge Pacific fleet "without making 
some demonstration in Korea, either to open the country or to gain 
possession of Port Lazare££." Nor, once Korea was open, was Russia 
content simply to follow the lead of the United States. Russia saw 
no ultimate advantage in a commercial treaty permitting trade through 
a few selected seaports. She wanted to regulate trade along the 
Korea-Siberian land frontier. This desire was n~t understood by the 
western powers. Instead, it was interpreted as another instance in 
which Russia "preferred to make her owri way without the knowledge or 
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the interference of the other powers." Behind the cloak of secrecy 
it was imagined that Russia was attempting to rectify the boundary 
line with Korea to make it more satisfactory to Russia. 13 
Another commonly held belief was that in the advance of 
Russian power in Asia, she never failed "to find her advantage in 
the perplexities and misfortunes of the Asiatic powers." Thus, 
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when China became embroiled in a controversy with France in early 
1885, the American minister to Peking reported the rumor that Russia 
intended to occupy the island of Quelpart (Cheju) off the southern 
tip of the Korean peninsula. This rumor was later repeated in the 
New York Times. Russian forces never set foot on Quelpart. 14 
By mid-1885 Russia had been drawn into a real intrigue over 
Korea by a German national, von Mollendorf, who served as Advisor 
to the Korean Foreign Office. Von Mollendorf owed his position to 
Li Hung Chang. He was acting as China's man in the Korean government. 
In anticipation of getting American advisers the king, trying to 
assert his independence, had dismissed both von Mollendorf and the 
Chinese military advisers from Korean service. When neither Shufeldt 
nor any other American advisers arrived, the king was forced to 
restore von Mollendorf to his position. Perhaps feeling his situation 
tenuous, von Mollendorf turned to other sponsorship. The king himself 
may have played a role in the subsequent schemes, though he denied 
it later. Russia had concluded a standard treaty with Korea in 
June 1884. However, unknown to most in the Korean government, von 
Mollendorf began conducting secret negotiations by which Russia was 
to furnish one hundred military instructors for the Korean army. 
In return for protecting Korea "against all attacks," Russia was 
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allegedly to receive the "loan" of Port Lazarev. 
Concurrently, Russia and England were engaged in a struggle 
over conLrol of Afghanistan. This struggle spread to Korea when, 
in April 1885, Great Britain seized Port Hamilton, another small 
island off the southern tip of Korea. Whether the occupation of 
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Port Hamilton was a response to the von Mollendorf secret negotiations 
or a general precaution in anticipation of a war with Russia has 
not been confirmed. Ensign Foulk first learned of the scheme in 
May when von Mollendorf told him that negotiations with Russia had 
commenced several months previously, but that certainly "Russia 
would not make any occupation of Korean territory."16 The Korean 
government received its first official word of the von Mollendorf 
negotiations upon the arrival of Alexis de Speyer, Secretary of the 
Russian legation at Tokyo. This officer informed Foulk that if 
England retained Port Hamilton, then Russia would acquire "ten 
times as much territory" from Korea. Foulk was plunged into the 
center of this crisis, not only in his diplomatic role, but also 
as the king's confidential adviser. In the latter capacity Foulk 
became privy to the conversations de Speyer held with Korean officials. 
From them he learned of de Speyer's threats: 
If you do not accept the American Army instructors, there 
would be no loss; but if you do not take the Russian 
officers, you must lose a great deal •••• If you 
break with America in this, there is no loss, but if you 
do with Russia, trouble lies directly before your eyes.l7 
With both England and Russia threatening the autonomy of his 
country, the king again relayed through Foulk another request for 
American military instructors. Foulk, fearing that Anglo-Russian 
hostilities might break out on Korean soil, suggested to the Chinese 
and Japanese representatives that they postpone the withdrawal of 
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their troops from Korea. When Secretary of State Bayard learned of 
Foulk's activities on behalf of Korea, he cautioned Foulk to take 
a more passive role: 
Seoul is the centre of conflicting and almost hostile 
intrigues involving the interests of China, Japan, 
Russia, and England •••• It is clearly the interest 
of the United States to hold aloof from all this and do 
nothing nor be drawn into anything which would look 
like taking sides with any of the contestants.l8 
Ofall the outside powers, Foulk was most concerned about Russia. He 
was convinced that the von Mollendorf-de Speyer scheme was aimed at 
nothing less than "establishing Korea as a protectorate of Russia." 
Whatever the scope of their plans, they failed for the time being. 
Von Mollendorf was again dismissed from his post and de Speyer re-
turned to Tokyo. Although St. Petersburg disclaimed any intention 
of acquiring a part of Korea, the New York Times detected in the 
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incident a "suggestion of Russia's irresponsible mania for aggrandize-
ment" and an example of the "Muscovite stealthiness of approach."19 
The next Russian charg~, S. Waeber, took a more pleasant and 
conciliatory attitude than de Speyer. Nevertheless, he persisted 
for several years in trying to arrange a new treaty which would 
have effectively extended Russian influence deep into the northeast 
province of Korea. In late 1886 the terms of the proposed treaty 
were shown to Foulk by the king who once again sought his advice. 
The Russian draft called for a free trading post to be established 
deep inside Korea, about 75 miles from the Tumen River border. 
The proposition immediately raised suspicions concerning the Russian 
aims. The Korean counter-proposal, as suggested by Foulk, was to 
grant Russia a trading post, but on the seacoast in the vicinity of 
the Tumen River. The king, however, despairing of material aid from 
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America, may once again have turned to the Russians for protection 
against Chinese overlordship.20 
The Chinese representative at Seoul, Yuan Shih-kai, had 
gradually been gathering in the reins of power. He had been follow-
ing Waeber's negotiations closely. Before they came to fruition 
Yuan claimed to have knowledge of an agreement, bearing the king's 
approval, which in effect would "turn Korea bodily over to Russian 
protection." This document may well have been a forgery designed 
as a pretext for overt Chinese intervention in Korea. England had 
long urged China to incorporate Korea within its empire. Authentic 
or not, the document nearly triggered a war between China and Russia, 
until Li Hung Chang's cooler head prevailed. Li conferred with the 
/ Russian charge at Peking to resolve the future relations of the two 
nations in Korea. By the terms of their agreement of October 1886, 
both obligated themselves to abstain from encroachment on the 
integrity of Korea. This agreement became the basis for Russian 
policy until after the Sino-Japanese war. 21 Despite the peaceful 
solution, Russia was again portrayed as an aggressor, as when the 
New York Times mistakenly reported that the occupation of Port 
Lazarev by Russia was a "menace to Corea too evident to be ignored."22 
In 1888 Russia's temporary "hands-off" policy toward Korea 
was restated by a joint study conducted by the Governor-General of 
Amur and the Head of the Asiatic Department. They concluded that 
Korea could not serve as a profitable trade market for Russia, but 
might have important strategic advantages, being on the flank of 
Manchuria. However, they recommended no extension of territory, 
because of the difficulties of defending Korea so far from the centers 
where Russia disposed of its fighting forces. The study also 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
emphasized the vulnerability of the Maritime region, should Korea 
be turned into a Chinese province. The United States, judged the 
report, was the only foreign power which had been unwilling to 
encourage the designs of China. Therefore, Russia should not oppose 
the sending of American military instructors to Korea. 23 Such a 
reasonable and restrained posture on the part of Russia, if it had 
been relayed to the United States, might well have allayed American 
suspicions and formed the basis for Russian-American cooperation in 
Korea. 
Subsequently, the Russo-Korean supplemental trade agreement 
was concluded amicably. Russia settled for a trading post at the 
Tmaen River and not deep into Korea. Despite the comparatively 
undemanding terms of the new commercial treaty, the New York Times 
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predicted that the peninsula was "undoubtedly next on the road in 
Russia's southern advance from Vladivostok."24 This opinion lingered 
without any direct cause. Nothing happened specifically in Korea to 
mar Russo-Americ.an relations for a number of years, yet a degree of 
skepticism concerning Russian ambitions remained. Most American 
observers in Asia would probably have agreed with Minister Augustine 
Heard: 
The intentions of Russia may be perfectly harmless • 
but we may be permitted to infer the future from the past, 
and to imagine that she would not regret the pushing of her 
boundary line further South. But her time has not yet 
come. She is not ready yet. 
As late as 1893 Minister Heard held to his views that Russia would 
find a suitable opportunity one day to "swoop down on the north of 
Korea" to find an ice- free harbor. 25 
The United States itself was not entirely devoid of territorial 
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aspirations. By early 1887 Great Britain was prepared to relinquish 
Port Hamilton. The American charg~ at Seoul, William Rockhill, 
thoughtthat Korea was not strong enough to hold the islands by 
itself and that neither China nor Japan could take them without 
provoking the other. To him the obvious solution was to lease the 
islands to a "friendly and entirely disinterested power," the United 
States. He pointed out that the Secretary of the Navy in his Annual 
Report for 1884 had recommended that Port Hamilton be leased as a 
coaling station for the fleet on station in northern Asian waters. 26 
The subject came up briefly again after Benjamin Harrison took 
office in 1889. He and Blaine, once more the Secretary of State, 
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adopted a more active foreign policy than the previous administration. 
Horace Allen, an American missionary-doctor in Korea since 1884, 
had become another confidant of the king. In 1887 Allen resigned 
his missionary appointment to act as secretary to Korea's new 
legation in Washington. In conversation with Allen, Blaine expressed 
a willingness "to pursue an active policy in Korea and ••• perhaps 
ask for a United States coaling station at Port Hamilton thus giving 
the Koreans genuine backing" against the Chinese and the Russians. 27 
Although nothing came of this interest, it provoked garbled stories, 
as Minister Heard attested: 
Lately the newsmongers have been very active, and one 
of their stories was to the effect that the American 
minister was negotiating for the cession of Port Hamilton, 
which was to be subsequently transferred to Russia.28 
The Asiatic squadron was dependent for receiving coal and 
other supplies from ports fully under the control of foreign nations. 
Such ports as Yokohama and Chefoo might well be denied to American 
ships in time of war. Yet the presence of American citizens in Korea 
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increased the need for the squadron to be able to operate freely off 
Northeast Asia. In assessing the requirement to keep a gunboat on 
station in Korean waters, the navy accounted for 56 citizens of the 
United States residing in Korea in 1892, considerably more than 
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those of any other western nation. 29 Aside from the legation staff, 
missionaries had established a school, a hospital and an orphanage. 
Several Americans served in prominent positions in the Korean govern-
ment. Others were engaged in commerce and acquiring concessions. 
Earlier pessimism about the prospects for trade with Korea had 
changed to guarded optimism, largely through the efforts of Dr. 
Allen. While in Washington during the years 1887-1889, he actively 
promoted commercial development in Korea. He kindled the enthusiasm 
of politicians and entrepreneurs in a variety of projects--gold 
mining, railroads, lighting and waterworks. Most of these plans 
never materialized, because the stories of political unrest in· 
Korea discouraged the businessmen from risking their capital for 
investments. Nevertheless, a growing number of influential Americans 
perceived the economic potential offered by Korea once that nation 
achieved political stability. They were also, no doubt, aware 
that one of the forces undermining such stability was the threat of 
Russia expanding into all or part of Korea. 
As a result of the opening of Korea, the focus of American 
attention in Asia was shifting perceptibly northward. Deliberately 
or not, England and France, preoccupied in expanding their own 
spheres in Burma and Indo-China, seemed to leave the field in Korea, 
and later in Manchuria, to the United States to compete with the 
Asiatic powers and, of course, face Russia. Among some Americans 
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there was a proprietary concern for Korea as a client state. Observ-
ing the Russian actions during the Kuldja Affair of 1880, the von 
Mollendorf-de Speyer secret negoti~tions of 1885, and the Russian 
demands for a free trading zone in northeast Korea in 1886, left 
a legacy of suspicions behind. Rightly or wrongly, the Americans 
viewed the Russian intentions in Asia with increasing distrust. 
Attempts had already been made deliberately to exclude American 
merchants and whalers from Russian Siberia. Now the concept of 
Russo-American cooperation in Asia was being eroded further. Neither 
nation saw any community of interests with the other in Korea. 
Russia showed every indication of "going it alone." The United 
States hoped that an independent Korea would be another link from 
which to promote its interests in Japan and China and a buffer to 
stop the southward advance of Russia. Nor did American newspaper 
accounts give Russia the benefit of the doubt based on a past 
tradition of friendship. Instead, they repeatedly printed false 
rumors of Russian aggression. In Washington these reported Russian 
intrigues may have seemed far away and inconsequential in the overall 
context of Asiatic politics, but the record would be recalled when 
the next round of Russian ambitions in the Far East manifested itself. 
One of those who would recall was William W. Rockhill who was on 
the scene from 1884 to 1888, first as secretary to the American 
legation in Peking and then cts charge' at Seoul. As an "old Asia 
hand" he would find it difficult to advise that the United States 
remain aloof to further Russian advances. 
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CHAPTER VI 
"LET A RAILWAY BE BUILT ACROSS SIBERIA • • • " 
The international scramble for position in Northeast Asia, 
which started with the opening of Korea, might well have stabilized 
after the Sino-Russian accord of 1886 had not Russia then embarked 
on a far-reaching new Far East policy of its own. Reacting to the 
prevailing tension along its long, common frontier with China, 
Russia decided to strengthen its position in Asiatic Russia many 
fold by constructing a trans-Siberian railroad. Russia's comprehensive 
policy, centered on its Siberian rail system, evolved grarlually 
over the years 1886-1894 and then governed Russia's subsequent 
actions in the region over the next decade. As details of Russia's 
ambitious program unfolded and became known, the other powers with 
national interests in Northeast Asia were forced to adjust their 
own policies. The railroad would take years to complete, but once 
accomplished, Russia would be able to project its power in Asia far 
more effectively and truly become a formidable power in the Pacific. 
The impending threat caused China to look closer to its northern 
defenses and probably precipitated Japan into instigating the Sino-
Japanese war before this Russian power could become a significant 
factor. 
In the United States no such coherent, official policy was 
formulated until the railroad was nearing completion. While the 
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United States government was slow in recognizing the importance of 
the approaching shift in power in Northeast Asia, individual Americans 
appreciated the commercial prospects of the Siberian railroad from 
its inception. Many newspaper editors, financiers, diplomats, 
politicians and railroad men saw new opportunities for hitching 
American enterprise onto the Russian project. They clung to the 
belief that Russia both needed and welcomed American participation 
in its internal development. American interest in Siberia was 
heightened because, during the years preceding the Sino-Japanese 
war, there occurred the earliest realizations that the North American 
continent was rapidly filling up and that a new frontier must be 
sought. Isolated earlier warnings that American interests in 
Northeast Asia might eventually collide with Russian goals there 
were generally ignored in hopes of a new accommodation. 
Russia's Far East possessions had languished for years. Far 
from becoming a replication of the Mississippi Valley prosperity, 
the Amur basin had remained, three decades after occupation, largely 
undeveloped and underpopulated. Despite a vigorous colonization 
policy, most of the settlers never trekked beyond Western Siberia. 
A more generous grant of land was offered by the government further 
east, but the long land journey proved too much of an obstacle for 
most. Only about 600 new settlers reached the Far East annually. 
With the military obligations taking up much of their attention, 
the Russian population could scarcely feed itself. The situation 
improved slightly after 1879 when the government pressed the five 
ships of the Volunteer Fleet into the Odessa-Vladivostok run. 
Another 1000 peasants reached the Maritime Region annually by this 
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means. Because of the slow, cumbersome transportation system, the 
imperial government was forced to administer the Amur region as a 
remote colony, much as it had Russian-America. To a government which 
prized centralized control, being cut off by weather from effective 
administration of the colony for six months of the year proved to be 
intolerable. 1 
Gradually, the government was brought to the realization that 
its hold on Eastern Siberia was extremely tenuous. Lines of communica-
tion were vulnerable along wide stretches of frontier which were no 
longer unpopulated buffer zones. After the Treaty of Peking, China 
reversed its long-standing policy of excluding Chinese settlers from 
the Manchu homeland. By the 1880s several million Chinese settlers 
had moved into Manchuria proper and, because of the recurring diplomatic 
crises with Russia, China had vastly improved its military prepared-
ness there. Most disturbing to Russia, though, were the Chinese who, 
like the Koreans before them, were moving across the borders and 
living in Russian territory. The Russians had themselves used this 
tactic of peaceful occupation often enough to be fully aware of the 
dangers of this type of reconquest. Some means needed to be adopted 
to keep "Russia for the Russians." 2 
A secondary, but nevertheless persistent, concern of the 
tsarist regime was that the remote Siberian colony might break away 
from European Russia. Without a rail connection, Eastern Siberia 
was more easily accessible from across the Pacific. Many areas depended 
on American supplies and included in these shipments were occasional 
batches of material from the Russian radicals. One of the reasons 
that Constantin Pobedonostev, conservative adviser to the Tsar, 
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organized the sealift of peasants to the Far East was to offset 
American influence. "If we do not send Russian vessels to those 
shores, the non-Russian natives of the coast will altogether forget 
that they belong to Russia," he declared in 1879. The Siberian 
Russian population too was a source of concern. Russian radicals 
exiled to Siberia, such as Petr Kropotkin and Mikhail Bakunin, often 
turned to America for their political model. Among the exiles there 
was talk of creating "the United States of Siberia" to be federated 
across the Pacific Ocean with the United States of America. The 
1880s also saw the beginning of a Siberian autonomous movement which 
advocated self-government for the colony and an end to the practice 
of deporting criminals and political dissidents to Siberia. None 
of these diverse secessionist tendencies posed any immediate threat 
to Russia's control, but they did reinforce the idea that a serious 
problem was in the offing.3 
The solution was obvious: build a continuous railroad from 
Europe, across Siberia, to the Pacific. Then the resettlement process 
of peasants from Europe to Eastern Siberia could be accelerated. 
Then troops and supplies could be rushed to defend against threats 
to the frontier in a matter of one to two months, rather than years. 
The railroads that spanned the North American continent, particularly 
the Canadian-Pacific, were proof that it was feasible to build 
a railroad in harsh climate through rugged terrain. Responding to 
the strategic necessity of defending his possessions, Alexander III 
in 1886 decreed: "Let a railway be built across Siberia on the 
shortest way possible."4 
A five-year delay ensued before any Siberian track was laid. 
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While the strategic solution was apparent, practical difficulties 
had to be faced. A route needed to be selected and surveyed among 
the many competing proposals. And means to finance the huge under-
taking needed to be obtained from among other high priority projects. 
By 1891 these obstacles had been overcome and the momentous decision 
announced to the world. Tsarevich Nicholas read his father's rescript 
at Vladivostok: "Let Your auspicious participation in the commence-
ment of this truly national task undertaken by Me serve as a fresh 
proof of My desire to facilitate the intercourse of Siberia with the 
other portions of My Empire."S The laying of the first stone by the 
heir-apparent proved to be more than a symbolic gesture. Nicholas 
was to become the only tsar ever to have visited the Far East. 
During his journey, his travelling companion, Prince Ukhtomskij, 
had so impressed upon Nicholas the notion of Russia's "oriental 
mission," that his interest in Far Eastern affairs remained keen 
thereafter. 6 
Prince Ukhtomskij, long-time student of the Orient and editor 
of the St. Petersburg Gazette, was typical of those influential 
intellectuals, particularly among the Slavophils, who advocated 
transferring the center of Russia's life to Asia. The views of 
these "Easterners" (Vostochniki) gained a wider acceptance and influ-
ence when Russia's pan-Slavic ventures were frustrated in the Balkans. 
If the strategic necessities for a Siberian railroad needed an 
ideological rationale, the Vostochniki had one ready at hand. Though 
expressing their thoughts in a variety of ways, the Vostochniki 
tended to believe that the time had come for Russia to turn away 
from Europe and, instead, work to spread its own unique blend of 
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Eurasian culture throughout Asia. According to them, Russia, with 
its partly Asiatic heritage, was better equipped, geographically 
and spiritually, to bridge the gap between East and West. Dostoyevskij 
expressed this sentiment: 
In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas we shall go 
to Asia as masters. In Europe we were Asiatics, whereas in 
Asia we, too, are Europeans. Our civilizing mission in Asia 
will bribe our spirit and drive us thither. It is only 
necessary that the movement should start. Build only two 
railroads: begin with the one to Siberia ••• and at once 
you will see the consequences. 
The Vostochniki were convinced that the Asiatic people felt a greater 
affinity toward Russian culture than the more materialistic society 
of Western Europe. They conceived that the Russian advance into 
Asia would essentially be a peaceful, peasant colonization which 
would not only protect Asia from the barbaric nomad of the Steppe, 
but also sharply contrast with the commercial and industrial exploita-
tion practiced by the other European powers. To I. S. Aksakov, 
publisher and political thinker, the ships of the European nations 
were regarded as "messengers not of peace and happiness, but war 
and the greatest calamities." According to him the "task of Russia 
was to reconcile the exclusive featJres of East and West and to 
transform the one and the other into one great whole." The philosopher 
Leontyev predicted that Russia would head "some new Eastern realm" 
in which the "Slav-Oriental civilization may replace the passing 
civilization of Latin-Germanic Europe." The contest was foreseen, 
not just for dominion over Asia, but for the world. The Vostochniki 
believed that the Asiatic nations looked to the Russians as liberators. 
They cited Korea as an example of an Asiatic kingdom which had sought 
brotherly protection from Russia. Ukhtomskij expressed the essence 
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of this idea: 
Asia--we have always belonged to it. We have lived its 
life and felt its interests. Through us the Orient has 
gradually arrived at consciousness of itself, at a 
superior life •••• We have nothing to conquer. All 
these peoples of various races feel themselves drawn to 
us, and are ours, by blood, by tradition, and by ideas. 
We simply approach them more closely. This great and 
mysterious Orient is ready to become ours. 
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The path of civilization was, from the Russian standpoint, inevitably 
progressing from West to East.7 
With the decision to construct a trans-Siberian railroad, 
the Vostochniki were able to leave the realm of theory and enter into 
the province of real opportunities. Leading them into action was an 
unexpectedly hard-headed, financially-wise businessman. Sergei Witte 
was a self-made man who rose to position of enormous power when he 
was appointed Minister of Finance in late 1892. In him were synthesized 
the demands of the '~esternizers" for modernization and the ideals 
of the Slavophils which embraced autocracy and orthodoxy. He was 
undaunted by the organizational, financial and engineering problems 
facing the immense railway project. At the same time he could dream 
of Russia's future in the Orient, predicting that "Russia from the 
shores of the Pacific Ocean and the peaks of the Himalayas would 
dominate not only Asiatic, but also European affairs."8 
Witte was fully in accord with the strategic necessity for 
the Siberian railroad. He was also well aware of the need to tie 
Asiatic Russia to Europe by means of a better transport system. And 
he entirely supported the practical necessity for re-colonizing 
peasants from overcrowded European Russian regions, because he 
favored increasing the agricultural exports in order to help finance 
the construction of the railroad. His vision, however, went beyond 
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these immediate goals. He had far more in mind than the Vostochniki 
dream of peasant colonization. To him, the railroad was a means to 
stimulate the industrialization of all Russia and particularly the 
development of Siberia. His plans called for much more than a simple 
track across the Steppe. In addition, he initiated geological surveys 
of Siberia and planned spur lines to connect with the locations of 
natural resources. Waterway improvements were scheduled to supplement 
and expand the rail system. Even the Northern Sea Route was surveyed 
as part of a whole Siberian development project. Perry Collins would 
have applauded his every move. Witte's plans represented the actual 
execution of Collins' own lofty dreams for the region, except for 
one important detail. Witte had no intention of inviting the Americans 
to participate, as this would tend to delay the promotion of domestic 
commerce and industry. 
Indeed, two long-range goals set forth by Witte in 1892 
would eventually disturb Americans as they slowly became more cognizant 
of the full scope of Russian ambitions in the Far East. First, Witte 
envisioned that the railroad, beyond its strategic purposes, would 
open up the commerce of Asia to Russia on a far grander scale than 
that previously carried by the overland caravans and that rail commerce 
with China would surpass and supplant commerce by sea. He believed 
that the teas and silks of China would someday move to European 
markets by way of the Siberian railway. In exchange, he expected an 
increased demand for Russian manufactured goods which, in turn, would 
stimulate Russian industry. In time, predicted Witte, the railroad 
would promote a Russo-Chinese economic unity. The degree of commercial 
competition that this would afford the American merchants only became 
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apparent to them over the course of the next few years, as a greater 
and greater percentage of American trade became concentrated in 
Manchuria and Northern China. 9 
The second impact on the United States caused by Witte's 
blueprint for Asiatic Russia was his projection of Russian influence 
beyond the Pacific shore line. He revived Muravev 1 s dream that the 
Amur region could become, not only an Asiatic bastion, but also the 
pivotal region through which Russia would be a dominant Pacific 
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sea power. He expected the Siberian railway to provide all the logistic 
support needed to strengthen Russia's naval forces in Far Eastern 
waters considerably, which "in case Gf political complications in 
Europe or in the Asiatic East would acquire an especially important 
significance in dominating all commercial movements in the waters 
of the Pacific." This view was at direct variance with the American 
opinion which, after the purchase of Alaska, saw the United States 
gaining the foremost position in the North Pacific. Although not 
fully exploited as yet, Americans fully expected their own trans-
Pacific destiny to prevail. But Witte was not satisfied to await 
the Americans on the Asiatic shore. Rather, he foresaw the Siberian 
railroad as an opportunity to open up "more direct relations with 
the North American States." He only erred in predicting that these 
relationships would bring a closer "solidarity of political interests" 
between Russia and the United States. 10 Instead, this thrust of 
Russian commercial, naval and political power into Northeast Asia 
and out into the North Pacific would increasingly be perceived as a 
threat to America's own interests in the area. These outreaches of 
Witte's plans, of which the Siberian rail system was the central 
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ingredient, foreshadowed an intense rivalry with the United States. 
The actual construction of the railroad started to make real 
progress only after Witte was named Finance Minister. To oversee 
the railroad project and all its auxiliary enterprises, a Railway 
Committee was formed, at Witte's suggestion, representing all the 
major departments of gavernment concerned. This was the forum which 
Witte used to cut through the normal bureaucracy and to coordinate 
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a consensus for his policies. By a masterstroke, Witte persuaded 
Alexander III in 1893 to appoint the tsarevich as president of the 
Railway Committee. Nicholas retained the position after his coronation, 
thus ensuring his continued concentration on Far Eastern affairs fo~ 
more than ten years. Both emper0rs were determiued that the railroad 
would become a monument of achievement during their reigns. Witte 
was also able to garner public support from both the "Westernizers" 
who approved of his plans to industrializeand modernize Russia and 
from the Vostochniki who were eager to carry Russia's "historical 
mission" to Asia. Prince Ukhtomskij, who remained a close confidant 
of Nicholas II, served also as a subordinate to Witte when he later 
headed the Russian-Chinese bank. Under the nominal leadership of 
the tsar, Witte was able to forge, within the Railway Committee, 
official backing for his ambitious policies. Andrew White, the 
American minister to St. Petersburg, was impressed that Russia intended 
to press forward with such a gigantic undertaking. He noted that 
in the press and in all the highest quarters of government there 
was a conviction that Russia had a great civilizing mission in Asia. 
White compared this strong Russian feeling with the "manifest destiny 
idea" in the United States a generation or two since. White also 
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reported that the "ultimate bearing of this Trans-Asiatic railway 
on our own Trans-American system is so evident as to require no 
disaussion."11 
During the years 1886-1894, when Russian leaders were 
fashioning a new and comprehensive Far Eastern policy, the United 
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States government took little heed of the political consequences of 
Russia's Siberian railroad and certainly articulated no foreign policy 
of its own for the region. Having succeeded in spanning the North 
American continent with railroads, individual American entrepreneurs 
could easily appreciate the incentives which drove the Russians to 
undertake such a railway system. They could also, from their similar 
experience, predict the significant economic development which would 
spring up along the route of the railroad. In the construction work, 
in the opening of the land for development, and in the subsequent 
commerce, Americans perceived an opportunity for economic advantage. 
What they failed to grasp at first, was that Russia had no intention 
of sharing these lucrative prospects with Americans. The Russian 
advance eastward was intent, not only in protecting its own possessions, 
but on dominating all of Northeast Asia. Russia was bent on becoming 
a competitor, not a partner of the United States. 
Americans were misled by the comparative ease with which they 
had previously operated across the North Pacific with little or no 
opposition. American whalers and fur trappers had scoured the Pacific 
up to and on to the Siberian shoreline. American naval ships had 
charted the coastal waters and American telegraphers had surveyed 
the terrain of Siberia. American merchants had supplied and were 
still supplying the outlying Russian settlements in Asiatic Russia. 
However, these efforts, though widespread, were not in response to 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
175 
or even supported by any stated policy of the United States government. 
Except for William Seward, Washington officials had been reluctant 
to support actively an extension of America's economic or naval 
role in Northeast Asia. The State Department repeatedly ignored all 
recommendations that the United States acquire a naval base off the 
coast of Northeast Asia from which the Asiatic squadron could better 
protect American interests. The department often discouraged American 
diplomats from using their influence to gain advantage for American 
businesses in China and Korea, and ignored restrictions placed on 
American merchants on the Amur. Some of the hesitation, no doubt, 
sprang from the generally weak staffing of the department, which 
could not cope completely with all the world situations. The 
relatively remote region of Northeast Asia was not yet accepted as 
the strategic key to China and, being outside the Western Hemisphere, 
received low priority. This reluctance to assert a positive and 
consistent policy for the region, despite the long-term, but scattered 
American presence there, stemmed from two prevalent attitudes. 
First, until the last decade of the century, most Americans 
remained unaware of the full economic potential of the region. Manchuria 
was largely an unknown territory. Siberia was still considered bleak 
and uninviting. Korea was beginning to be appreciated, but believed 
to be too unstable politically to risk much. When Americans considered 
commerce with the Orient, they thought mainly in terms of Japan and 
China from Shanghai south to Canton. They rarely glanced at the 
possibilities in the interior of Northeast Asia. The advent of the 
Siberian railroad was one major factor in dispelling this attitude. 
American interest was aroused from the beginning of the project and 
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increased proportionately as each verst of track was laid. Hereafter, 
the region tended to represent more and more of an opportunity. 
The second American attitude which hampered the formulation 
of positive program for Northeast Asia was the accepted theory that 
the United States need not be hasty. America's superior position 
in the North Pacific was assured, went the thinking, once Alaska 
and the Aleutians were purchased. Time was on the side of the United 
States. The bulk of the ocean commerce traversing the Pacific would 
inevitably fall to American merchants. And with commerce would 
come American influence in Asia and western civilization, courtesy 
of the Anglo-Saxons. The historical course of empire from east to 
west would continue to be followed as soon as the North American 
continent had been consolidated and developed. 
Coincident with the commencement of construction of the Siberian 
railroad that time had now arrived in the United States. The nation 
was in a transition period. The internal frontier of the West was, 
according to the 1890 census, largely gone. Energies which had been 
devoted to developing the interior of the continent were now ready 
to be turned outward to extra-continental enterprises. To replace 
expansion in the West, some began advocating overseas expansion, 
not only as a new frontier, but also as an outlet for the surplus 
being produced on farm and in factory. A broader world outlook began 
to be articulated. Senator Platt urged that something beyond the un-
paralleled activity at home was needed: 
The opportunity for the adventurous spirit of our citizens 
to have free course is being limited as we are settling 
up our lands, and it is to the ocean that our children 
must look, as they have looked at the boundless West, for 
the opportunity to develop their ambitions and their talents. 
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Alfred Thayer Mahan termed this the United States "looking outward." 
He and a growing number of spokesmen urged the nation to contest 
vigorously for overseas markets and to expand commerce to all quarters 
of the globe. 12 The growing tendency of the United States to look 
beyond the Western Hemisphere was manifested in a variety of ways: 
demands for a transisthmian canal connecting the Atlantic to the 
Pacific, a program to modernize the navy, acquisition of bases in 
Hawaii and Samoa, recommendations to increase the merchant fleet, 
and demands to improve the effectiveness of the consular service. 
Frederick Jackson Turner summed up this pressure for American 
expansion: 
For nearly three centuries the dominant factor in American 
life has been expansion. With the settlement of the Pacific 
coast and the occupation of the free lands, this movement 
has come to a check. That these energies of expansion 
will no longer operate would be a rash prediction; and the 
demands for a vigorous foreign policy, for an interoceanic 
canal, for a revival of our power upon the seas, and for 
the extension of American influence in outlying islands 
and adjoining countries, are indications that the movement 
will continue.l3 
Because of the advent of the Siberian railroad, Northeast Asia became 
one of the quarters of the globe which attracted increased attention 
as an outlet for American enterprise and influence. One observer who 
looked outward for a release of America's pent up energies was Henry 
Adams. He had sailed to the South Pacific to find an outlet for 
American pressure, but found the islands not worth touching. Instead, 
he turned his attention to Siberia: 
On the whole, I am satisfied that America has no future in 
the Pacific. She can turn south, indeed, but after all, 
the west coast of South America offers very little field. 
Her best chance is Siberia. Russia will probably go to 
pieces; she is rotten and decrepit to the core, and must 
pass through a bankruptcy, political and moral. If it 
can be delayed another twenty-five years, we could 
Americanize Siberia, and this is the only possible work 14 
that I can see still open on a scale equal American means. 
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While Adams' opinion of Siberia as America's new frontier 
may have seemed farfetched and premature, others took a more immediate 
and practical tack. American businessmen had kept themselves informed 
of the Siberian project from its inception and speculated about its 
consequences for them. One result was a revival of the earlier 
dream of developing the riches of the Amur basin in partnership 
with Russia. Newspaper accounts began to emphasize the wealth of 
raw materials and the rich farm lands, rather than the bleak and 
forbidding aspects of Siberia. The "incalcuable treasures of iron, 
coal, copper, lead, timber, platinum, petroleum, etc. which such a 
railroad would pour without stint into the markets" were described. 
It was estimated that the land, particularly the "black lands" in 
the Lake Baikal region, could support a ten-fold increase in popula-
tion. The possibilities of this vast country were thought to be 
"tremendous both commercially and industrially." America, it was 
expected, would reap the benefit of this "highway of commerce" 
because the "railroad ~ill take us into the heart of Northern Asia." 
The rail system was foreseen as a "commercial trail into the confines 
of Asia, India and Africa by way of the Pacific and Siberia." 
During the famine in Russia of 1891, W. c. Edgar, editor of the 
Northwestern Miller, headed a relief movement to send flour to 
Russia. One of the conclusions he derived from his visit was that 
an enormous trade would flow between Vladivostok and San Francisco, 
bringing the two nations into closer commercial relations to their 
mutual profit.lS 
Commentators in both Russia a~d the United States were of 
the opinion that the Siberian railroad would bring the two nations 
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into closer proximity. Novoye Vremya thought that "when Russia has 
bound itself by a railway to the Pacific Ocean, it will stand face 
to face with the new world, and who knows--will not this event con-
tribute to bring into close accord Russia and the United States." 
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The Commercial and Financial Chronicle agreed that Russia "will have 
become a next-door neighbor" and that transit between the heartlands 
of the two nations will become simple and direct. Speculation went 
so far as to dwell on the possibility of an intercontinental railway 
linking Asia and North America. In 1888, at an early stage in the 
planning of the Siberian line, General Annenkoff, the man largely 
responsible for directing the construction of the trans-Caspian rail-
road, expressed a wish to extend the Siberian railroad along the 
Aleutians to connect with an American line on the Pacific coast. 
Although he reportedly endeavored to interest American capitalists 
in the enterprise, the scheme apparently never was taken up seriously 
by the Russian government.l6 
William Gilpin, the first American geopolitician, had a 
similar dream of connecting the continents. Land transportation, 
he thought, had far more advantages than communications by sea. 
Gilpin noted that both Russia and the United States had followed 
comparable paths. Both were large and strong and growing more so, 
while the other powers of Christendom were falling into decay. Both 
had expanded continentally to the Pacific shores. Pointing to the 
previous cooperative effort on the intercontinental telegraph pro-
ject, he proposed that the two nations jointly construct a "Cosmo-
politan Railway" which would cross the Bering Strait by car ferry 
and then cross Siberia to connect with the European systems. By 
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cooperating on this joint effort, Gilpin foresaw the United States 
and Russia joining hands against the rest of the world, militarily, 
commercially, and industrially. The "Cosmopolitan Railway" would 
become the "chief highway of the nations." Gilpin urged the United 
States to look to Asia, not Europe, for the future. Speaking of 
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the "boundless expanse of almost uninhabited country," he prophesied 
that Siberia would be civilized by the railroad and that the ' 1United 
States will become Asia's schoolmaster." Soon after Gilpin's book 
was published, the New York Times editorialized that the old project 
of connecting America and Asia by rail was one step nearer to 
practicality. 17 
While the intercontinental railroad never went beyond an 
exercise of imagination, the news of the trans-Asiatic railroad 
spurred more practical efforts to link the two continental rail 
systems by means of trans-Pacific steamship service. Since the 
inauguration of regular American steamship service across the Pacific, 
the shipping lines had largely been under the control of the trans-
continental railroads of the United States. The Pacific Mail 
Steamship Company, operating ships from San Francisco to the Orient, 
was directed by railroad magnates such as Jay Gould, Collis P. 
Huntington, and Edward H. Harriman. Starting in 1893, the Pacific 
Mail began to modernize its operations. By 1904 it had a fleet of 
large, steel steamers in regular service including the Korea, the 
Siberia, the Manchuria, and the Mongolia. As the enthusiasm for 
Asiatic trade mounted in the United States, these railroad men would 
look for means to control the transportation services into the 
interior of Manchuria and Siberia. 18 
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Of all the American railroad builders, James J. Hill took 
the greatest interest in trade with the Orient. His Great Northern 
Railway opened for through traffic to Seattle in 1893. Since his 
ambitions went beyond the Pacific coast, he began to plan an ocean 
link to Asia. Hill hoped to create a huge market in the Orient for 
the wheat of the Dakotas and Minnesota, for the cotton from the 
South, and for the steel products from the eastern states. For 
ten years he sent competent men to study Asian markets and their 
relation to American business. In the process, he spent more money 
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in this research than the government, according to President Cleveland. 
Although his shipping ventures later failed, during the 1890s Hill 
offered, through his transport system, rosy prospects for Midwest 
and Southern farmers and Eastern manufacturers. 19 
News of the Siberian railroad also brought great expectations 
that Americans would actively participate in the construction. 
Americans had had a long association with Russian railroad building. 
Two Americans, George Whistler and Tho~as Winans, have been called 
the "fathers of Russian railroads." Invited to Russia in 1842 by 
a mission studying American rail construction methods, the two were 
instrumental in building the St. Petersburg to Moscow line, the first 
major Russian railroad. They also established a plant to manufacture 
locomotives. The Winans firm continued to manufacture products for 
the Russian rail system until bought out by the government in 1868. 
After that, as its rail network expanded, Russia often purchased 
locomotives from the Baldwin Locomotive Company. It was not surpris-
ing, therefore, when Russia initially considered letting concessions 
for constructing the Siberian railroad, that General Annenkov 
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broached the possibilities of an American concession with Wharton 
Barker, a Philadelphia banker. Barker was a familiar figure to 
the Russians. He had acted as their financial agent in 1878 for 
the purchase and outfitting of four ships to be used as commerce 
raiders. In 1892 Barker travelled to St. Petersburg to form a 
syndicate to finance construction of the railroad, but was unable 
to raise the needed investment capital without a firm commitment 
from the imperial government. Meanwhile, Witte had decided to have 
the state finance the entire enterprise, supported by loans from 
France. 20 
Americans still hoped to furnish the bulk of the railroad 
supplies, as they were able to manufacture locomotive engines and 
steel rails far more cheaply than Russia, despite transportation 
costs. The United States had previously shipped large quantities 
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of machinery into Siberia and it was anticipated that orders would 
increase. Americans thought that they had a special advocate in 
Prince Khilkov, the Minister of Ways and Communications. Khilkov 
had come to the United States in 1857 as an apprentice to learn 
every facet of railway building. Despite these good omens, American 
manufacturers were to be somewhat disappointed. Witte's pr~gram 
was designed to promote national economic self-sufficiency, so that, 
whenever possible, domestic sources were favored. The Baldwin 
Company did sell hundreds of locomotives to Russia during this 
period, but at the same time, symptomatic of Witte's policies, plans 
were made to re-locate an entire locomotive manufacturing plant 
from Philadelphia to St. Petersburg. 21 
Again in 1894, when Daniel Butterfield, a New York banker, 
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tried to obtain a concession for the building of the rail line to 
Siberia, his offer was refused. That same year, in response to an 
application from Senator Gordon, the American minister to St. 
Petersburg inquired whether American contractors would be afforded 
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the opportunity of b;i.dding for the construction of any of the segments 
of the Siberian railroad. He was advised that all construction would 
remain in Russian hands. 22 The refusal of the Russian government 
to countenance outside contractors did not entirely discourage all 
Americans. The idea that the United States could gain its economic 
ends in Asia through cooperation with Russia persisted for many 
years in the face of these repeated rebuffs. The ~respects of 
opening up a vast new territory proved overwhelmingly tempting. 
The seeds of optimism sown first by Perry Collins and then repeated 
by William Gilpin would be planted time and again. This segment of 
American opinion refused to believe that Russian and American interests 
in Northeast Asia, far from coinciding, were actually on the verge 
of coming into direct conflict. 
In contrast to its good reception in the United States, news 
of the proposed Siberian railway was perceived in China, as early as 
1887, as a distinct threat to Manchuria. Charles Denby, American 
minister to China, shared these views. He was persuaded that, once 
the Siberian railway reached the Pacific, Russia might well become 
the "greatest power on that ocean" and would not "be slow in seizing 
a more southern port." To counteract this threat, Denby was convinced 
that China must build its own rail system to the Amur and Korea. 
Herein Denby also spotted an opportunity for American business. His 
work as a diplomat had been criticized, but no one faulted Denby's 
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enthusiastic support for American business interests in China. 
Throughout his long term in office, he diligently promoted American 
rail enterprises. The Chinese viceroy, Li Hung-chang, was the key 
to any hopes for American involvement in Chinese rail concessions. 
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He was one of the few in government who did not automatically oppose 
foreign loans and modern transportation systems. Denby worked hard 
during this period and later to demonstrate to him that the American 
rail system was best suited for China. Abortive attempts were made 
by American capitalists in the 1880s to obtain concessions. One of 
these was by the ubiquitous Wharton Barker who dV;cussed the establish-
ment of a Chinese-American bank with Li to finance railways and 
mining. However, not until 1891 was the first railway authorized to 
be built from Peking to the Great Wall at Shanhaikuan, and then 
only under Chinese auspices. It was intended that this northwest 
line would eventually be extended into Manchuria for strategic 
defensive purposes. Ironically, the threat of this Chinese line 
provided the final spur that goaded Russia into its all-out effort 
on its own Siberian project. 23 
During this period before the Sino-Japanese War, when 
American interest in Northeast Asia was being stimulated anew, other 
events were causing the remembrance of the "traditional friendship" 
with Russia to fade. As transport and communications systems improved, 
the distance between the two countries narrowed further. The American 
public became better informed about Russian l1fe and institutions. 
Criticism of the "remote northern empire" had largely been withheld 
during the reign of Alexander II in the expectation of genuine 
reform. By the early 1890s these hopes had been, for the most part, 
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dashed. News of the Russian advance into Asia was, therefore, 
received ambivalently. On the one hand, Americans acknowledged 
that in many parts of Asia, Russia had brought increased security 
and prosperity. Russia seemed to have a "genius for colonization" 
and a talent for "assimilating the populations of other races."24 
On the other, Americans had difficulty in reconciling tyranny and 
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absolutism, as they viewed Russia, with a truly beneficent civilizing 
force. George Kennan sparked indignation in the United States with 
his exposure of the Siberian penal system. Commencing in 1888, his 
magazine articles, lectures and his book Siberia and the Exile System 
forcefully reported on the intolerance, oppression and harsh treat-
ment accorded to political dissidents. 25 
The increasing number of Russian immigrants arriving in 
America, too, made it more difficult to ignore the despotism of the 
tsarist regime. The political refugees were especially outspoken 
against the Russian government. They organized a Russian-American 
National League to urge a "Free Russia." Toward the same end, 
another society, calling itself the "Friends of Russian Freedom" 
was formed in 1891. Among the prominent members were Julia Ward 
Howe, T. w. Higginson, Mark Twain, William Lloyd Garrison, John 
Whittier, James Russell Lowell, Phillips Brooks, Lyman Abbott and 
George Kennan. The cause of the immigrants and their friends were 
presented with an issue in 1893~ when an Extradition Treaty between 
Russia and the United States was signed. Opponents of the treaty 
showered resolutions and petitions of protest on the Congress, 
arguing that between the political institutions of the civilized 
world there was "no gap as great as that which separates those of 
Russia and the United States." It was claimed that Russia showed a 
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"conte".:Cptuous disregard of the principles of honor and integrity" 
and that a convention with a "lawless and barbaric despotism" was 
dangerous. Political exiles should not be subject to surrender to 
Russian injustice. 26 
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Concurrently, Russia was alienating the Jews in America by 
its flagrant anti-Semitic policies. In 1882 a Russian edict had 
proscribed certain professions from the Jews, limited their travel, 
and prescribed places of habitation for them. By 1890 the edict was 
being enforced strenuously. A number of indigent Jews, who could 
not subsist within the confines of the Pale, were forced to emigrate, 
many to the United States. There the full story of their sufferings 
became known. Prominent Jewish-American leaders such as Jacob Schiff, 
Oscar Strauss, and Jesse Seligman brought the matter to the attention 
of Washington. Congress considered several resolutions asking the 
Tsar to mitigate the severe measures directed at the Jews and President 
Harrison addressed the issue in his annual message of 1891. Harrison 
was concerned that upward of a million Jews might be forced to leave 
Russia within a few years and he remonstrated with Russia regarding 
this harsh treatment. 27 
In reply to the mounting adverse public opinion against 
Russia, Pi<!rre Botkin, a secretary at the Russian Legation in Washing-
ton, attempted to dispel these "erroneous statements" concerning his 
country. According to Botkin, convicts were not treated inhumanely 
in Siberia and Jews were not subject to persecution in the empire. 
He hoped that many Americans would venture to Russia upon completion 
of the Siberian railway and see conditions in Siberia for themselves.28 
Despite his pleas, never again would Russian authorities be able to 
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evoke the "traditional friendship" with America without the grim 
reminders from the Jewish community and the Russian refugees. This 
growing aversion to the Russian system of government was a factor 
which increasingly turned many Americans away from a policy of 
continued acquiescing and cooperating with the Russian advance in 
Northeast Asia. 
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CHAPTER VII 
EXPORTERS AND FRANCHISE SEEKERS 
The Sino-Japanese War proved to be the decisive turning point 
in American involvement in Northeast Asia, both economically and 
politically. Heretofore, individual Americans had been periodically 
fascinated by the region and lured by the prospects. But American 
interest had only been sporadic and easily diverted. Large-scale 
enterprises were usually short-lived and often encompassed unrealistic 
goals. Lacking sustained government support or sponsorship, initial 
enthusiasms quickly waned. However, because of these previous 
activities, abortive though they may have been, there was greater 
acceptance that Northeast Asia represented a great untapped frontier 
awaiting American involvement. Russia's planned construction of the 
Siberian railroad had spurred renewed American interest. And the 
pace of this new interest was accelerated considerably a few years 
later as the Japanese victory promised additional access into Asia. 
Although some Americans still thought of Asiatic Russia as the key 
to China and Central Asia, many others were coming to the hard 
realization that Russia was not only stubbornly resisting American 
penetration of Siberia, but also had designs of its own on the 
regions south of the Amur. These Russian designs coincided with 
the increasing attention which Americans were beginning to center on 
Manchuria as an alternative strategic approach to Northeast Asia. 
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A wide range of American business interests were convinced, 
based on diplomatic observations, that China, after its humiliating 
defeat, would be forced to abandon her age-old lethargy, to modernize, 
and to reform her ways by accepting western-style civilization. 
These business interests viewed post-war China as presenting two 
interrelated economic opportunities, ready for exploitation. First, 
China appeared to be the much sought after market for the over-
production of American industrial and agricultural products. Al-
though the vast "China market" proved largely illusory in most areas 
of China, the expansion of American exports into Northern China and 
Manchuria became marginally important enough to be considered worth 
nurturing and protecting. As the market opportunities grew steadily, 
it was expected that the American exports would be further stimulated 
by the second economic factor--development franchises granted by 
the Chinese government to American business. Here, too, North 
China and Manchuria looked to be the most promising region, not 
just for its reported wealth in natural resources, but primarily for 
its strategic geographic position. American entrepreneurs, borrowing 
from Collins and Gilpin, saw Northeast Asia as pivotal to an 
integrated, world-wide transportation system connecting America's 
trans-continental railroads via Pacific shipping with Asia and Europe. 
And whoever constructed and controlled the railroads in this strategic 
nexus would command the entire system and all the ancillary commercial 
and industrial activity. 
During the immediate post-war years, the remaining years of 
the Cleveland administration, economic interest in Northeast Asia was 
on a much larger scale than previously, engaging the efforts of merchants, 
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financiers, politicians, manufacturers and railroad men from all 
sections of the United States. As they attempted to put their exploita-
tion schemes into practice, they found, to their surprise, that they 
would have to struggle to win franchises and to compete actively 
for commercial advantage. The United States was ill-prepared for 
this struggle. The chief competition came from an unexpected source, 
that erstwhile friend, the Russian Empire. The United States had 
long recognized Russia's penchant for territorial expansion, but 
now it was faced with the realization that Russia was fully capable 
of substantial economic penetration on her own. Russia, too, had 
assessed the strategic potential that Manchuria and North China 
offered in conjunction with Asiatic Russia. And once the imperial 
government became directly involved, there ensued an unequal struggle 
for concessions in the very sphere in which American businessmen 
thought that they had prior claim. As the American diplomats and 
businessmen became aware that they were in serious danger of losing 
the scramble for franchises in China, they urged government backing 
for their projects. While the Cleveland administration, particularly 
after Richard Olney assumed office as Secretary of State, reluctantly 
retreated a bit from its early "hands-off" policy, American entrepreneurs 
eagerly hoped that a new Republican administration would initiate a 
policy supportive of United States interests in the Far East. 
President Cleveland had been ill-prepared by both temperament 
and experience for setting an aggressive foreign policy in the Far 
East. He was generally indifferent to other cultures and lacked know-
ledge of past diplomatic history. He cared little for affairs outside 
the hemisphere and opposed any form of extra-continental imperialism 
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of expansion by the United States. His first Secretary of State, 
Walter Gresham, was equally loathe to carry out a vigorous foreign 
policy, either to prevent the hostilities between China and Japan 
or to exploit the subsequent peace-making process. Gresham, too, 
was staunchly anti-imperialistic, believing that a free government 
should not acquire territory outside its own continent. He was 
opposed to a large army and navy, without which the practice of 
diplomacy was limited. 1 While both Cleveland and Gresham opposed the 
imperialism of foreign powers in the Americas, their concerns did not 
extend to the territorial integrity of Northeast Asia. They deplored 
the war between China and Japan, but declared that the conflict 
"endangers no policy of the United States in Asia."2 They took a 
friendly interest in the welfare of Korea and its people, but never 
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went beyond advising moderation on the governments of China and Japan 
before Korea became a battlefield. Korea was cautioned not to expect 
any intervention on the part of the United States. The two belligerents 
were well aware of America's neutral stance, as was Russia. 3 
While the Cleveland administration believed that the conflict 
deserved the "greatest consideration by reason of its disturbance of 
our growing commercial interests in the two countries," the United 
States made no determined effort to prevent or end the war. At the 
outset of hostilities the United States had been invited by Great 
Britain to join with the European powers in intervening between 
China and Japan. The Cleveland administration abstained, wishing to 
avoid the entanglement of joint diplomatic representation. Although 
cooperation with other nations during previous interventions into 
China's affairs was not without precedent, the United States, in this 
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instance, chose to await the outcome in a pose of strict neutrality 
and impartiality. The distrust of foreignentanglementoutweighed 
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any desire, either to protect the Korean people, or to advance American 
interests in Asia by influencing the peace settlement.4 
The attempts to maintain an "attitude toward the belligerents 
of an impartial and friendly neutral, desiring the welfare of both," 
were not entirely successful. The United States did become involved 
in a number of messy, minor situations. The United States volunteered, 
for example, to look after the interests and property of each 
belligerent in the opposing nation, which presented some problems 
for American diplomats. Also, in protecting the lives and property 
of its own citizens residing in Korea and China, it was found necessary 
for the American navy and marines to conduct a number of rescue missions 
ashore on foreign territory. 
Nor was Russia anxious to intervene in support of either 
belligerent during the course of the war, but Russia's reasons were 
in stark contrast to America's motives. Russia stayed neutral, at 
the outset, in order to assess which course of subsequent action 
would be in their national self-interest. The imperial government 
did not desire to be "captivated by any one-sided proposition made 
by one or the other of the two powers hostile to each other."5 
Instead, the government retained its freedom of action. When it 
became apparent that Japan would soundly defeat China, a conference 
of Russian ministers adopted a preliminary policy in February 1895. 
They decided that Korean independence must be maintained, that the 
Russian fleet in the Pacific must be strengthened to be superior to 
that of Japan, and that collective action against Japan would be sought 
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should Japan threaten any vital interest of Russia. 6 Unlike the 
passive role accepted by the United States, Russia planned to take 
action, if necessary, to protect its national interests. 
China was desperate after suffering a series of disastrous 
military defeats. With Japan poised to march on the very gates 
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of Peking, China searched for the least humiliating peace attainable. 
She pleaded with the United States to mediate a peace settlement. 
The American government was willing, but Japan insisted on dealing 
directly with the defeated empire. Therefore, China was reluctantly 
drawn into direct negotiations, but not before employing a series of 
diplomatic ploys by which she hoped to mitigate Japan's demands. 
One of these stratagems was to engage as many Americans as possible, 
even as private individuals, in the peace process. Viceroy Li, 
who had been appointed as the chief Chinese negotiator, had been 
advised "flatly and firmly" that the United States' government would 
not intervene on China's behalf. Nevertheless, Li learned from Denby 
that American businessmen were already anticipating increased markets 
and valuable franchises in post-war China. Li was fully prepare~ 
to dangle the commercial prospects in front of Americans. He led 
Denby to believe that the United States would be in the fore of 
guiding China into modern ways. In return, Li no doubt hoped that 
the American presence at the negotiating table would influence 
Japan toward more lenient terms. Li asked Denby to accompany him 
to Shimonoseki to assist him, but Denby, because of his position, 
could not serve. However, a number of Americans were included in 
Li's entourage: his secretary, William Pethick; a Chinese-American 
student, Dr. Lin Luen Tai; an American missionary, Dr. B. C. Atterbury; 
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and most prominent of all, John Watson Foster, former secretary of 
state under President Harrison. 7 
Foster had been the United States minister to Russia during 
the Kuldja affair. At the urging of Marquis Tseng, his Chinese 
colleague in St. Petersburg, Foster had suggested to the Russian 
foreign ministry that the imperial government moderate its demands 
on China. Foster was never certain whether his words were heeded, 
but the Chinese government was grateful, and now hoped for a repeat 
performance. Between 1886 and 1890 Foster had acted as counsel to 
the Chinese legation in Washington. In the year before the war 
Foster had travelled to China and subsequently had maintained busi-
ness contacts there. When China was forced to sue for peace, it 
was natural to turn to him again for advice. As a well-known 
Washington figure, Foster had the aura of an official American 
representative, despite Gresham's efforts to publicize the private 
nature of Foster's role. 
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During the several months of preparation for the peace 
negotiations, the American legations in Peking and Tokyo served as 
conduits for the exchange of messages between the warring nations. 
This communication service gave the American ministers a unique 
opportunity to proffer advice to each side, but the state department 
took no advantage of the situation. Washington expressed no opinions 
on the post-war settlement. It declined to capitalize on this 
middleman role. The United States exerted no official influence on 
the peace process, although Foster may claim some credit for amel-
iorating some of Japan's initial harsh demandso Nor did the United 
States exact any explicit compensation for its services. Rather, 
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the American government favored a quick return to peace and seemed 
utterly indifferent to the terms of agreement. 
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The United States was apparently unconcerned that the balance 
of power in Northeast Asia was at stake. Not only was the ascendancy 
of Japan evident as a future competitor in the area, but also the 
threatened dissolution of the Chinese empire was certain to bring the 
European powers into a race to partition China. The American silence 
on the subject cannot be attributed solely to lack of awareness. 
The American ministers in Peking, Tokyo, and St. Petersburg kept 
the state department remarkably well advised in long analytical 
messages, which accurately forecast the situation months prior to 
the negotiations. In early October 1894, for example, Denby thought 
that the dissolution of the empire only a remote possibility. By 
the end of the month he was reporting that the "empire is crumbling~' 
and if a rebellion should take place that the "formation of an inde-
pendent Manchu principality north of China would be a natural 
consequence." Further, this "principality might easily be converted 
into a Russian dependency."8 As the negotiations commenced, Denby 
speculated that "Japan will claim the Liao Tung Peninsula, including 
Newchwang, Port Arthur and some adjacent parts of Manchuria." To 
Denby, at least, the troubles in China seemed an opportune time to 
plan for Americans to carve out their own share. He suggested that 
American diplomacy be directed toward securing post-war commercial 
privileges, since "there would no doubt be combinations to form, 
rivalry with other nations to conciliate, partitions with them, 
perhaps to be made."9 Denby's advice was not heeded. 
From St. Petersburg, Minister Breckinridge kept Washington 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
199 
equally apprised concerning Russia's moves. A few weeks after the 
Russian ministers had agreed on their preliminary policy, Breckinridge 
presented a detailed prognosis to the state department. He acknowledged 
Russia's concern for a war being waged on her borders. Russia, in 
his opinion, was ready to partition China, if that was indicated by 
the peace settlement. He alerted Washington for the first time that 
routing of the Siberian railroad directly through Manchuria was a 
logical outcome. And he correctly surmised that Russia's prime 
concern would be to prevent Japan gaining a foothold upon the con-
tinent. Russia would not mind if China were crushed by a large war 
indemnity, but most of all, on the Northeastern Asian mainland, 
Russia wanted a "free hand and a fair field for the future." To 
back up its policies, Breckinridge reported that Russia had sent a 
squadron of ships to the Pacific, which brought her fleet there to 
10 four times its normal strength. 
In addition to these official notifications, American news-
papers were filled with speculation about the fate of a defeated 
China in face of the expected territorial demands of a victorious 
Japan and the awaiting European powers, particularly Russia. Con-
fronted with these prospects for the partition of China, the United 
States did not even register verbal support for China's territorial 
integrity. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle reflected the 
American mood that China might not be worth preserving in its present 
shape: 
There has been much foolish talk about the danger of the 
breaking up of the great Chinese empire. We have been 
asked to look upon such a possible result in the light 
of a world-wide calamity. We confess to some difficulty 
in seeing where the danger lies. Indeed, is it not 
possible that the world-wide calamity might prove to be 
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rather a world-wide blessing? ••• Might not the final 
result be good not evil? Is China worth preserving?ll 
The complete indifference of the United States to the partition of 
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China was perhaps not surprising in the context of the American tradi-
tion of non-involvement outside the Americas, but is noteworthy when 
juxtaposed with the strikingly opposite attitude adopted by the 
American government toward this same region four years later. The 
aloof stance adopted by the Cleveland administration in 1895 may well 
have misled Russia later in discounting the degree of American 
subsequent interest in Manchuria. 
For its second diplomatic ploy, China tried in every possible 
way to entice the European powers to intercede in her behalf. During 
the course of the peace negotiations, China kept the world explicitly 
informed of the Japanese demands. Though reluctant to relinquish 
Formosa and the Pescadores, China particularly argued against Japanese 
acquisition of the Liaotung Peninsula in Southern Manchuria. 
Chinese diplomats claimed that the occupation of Port Arthur would 
inevitably lead to Japanese control of the Gulf of Pechili, the 
complete separation of China from Korea, and the eventual domination 
of Peking by the nearby Japanese forces. These arguments, unlike 
in the United States, hit a responsive note in the Russian capital, 
where these very issues were being debated. Russia had two choices: 
join in the post-war scramble for territorial concessions in Northern 
Manchuria, or oppose Japanese claims in Southern Manchuria. The 
latter course would pose the danger of war with Japan before the 
Siberian railway was yet complete, but would have the decided 
advantage, if diplomatically successful, of retaining a weak China 
for her immediate neighbor, rather than an aggressive Japan. Led by 
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Witte, the ministers decided at a special conference on April 11, 
and the tsar approved on April 16, to forego territorial annexations 
by Russia at China's expense at this time. Instead, it was declared 
that Russia would "not allow occupation of Southern Manchuria by 
Japan and that in the case of failure to realize our aim • • • to 
take appropriate measure." Should Japan, contrary to expectations, 
not listen to this diplomatic insistence, the Russian fleet "would 
be ordered to open hostilities. 1112 
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Next day, the very day that the peace treaty was signed at 
Shimonoseki, Russia's new Foreign Minister, Aleksej Lobanov, officially 
asked Germany, France and England to join in the protest against 
Japan's acquisition on the mainland. Only England refused. The 
other three powers acted quickly and decisively. By April 23 they 
had sent identical notes to Japan stating that "the possession of 
the peninsula of Liaotung~ claimed by Japan, would be a constant 
menace to the capital of China, would at the same time render illusory 
the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle 
to the peace in the Far East." At the same time the Russian minister to 
Peking advised the Chinese government to delay ratification of the 
treaty until Japan acceded to the three-povJer demand. To back up 
its position, Russia assembled its recently augmented fleet off 
Chefoo, the ratification site. American observers, among others, noted 
that the Russian ships were stripped down and ready to fight--9 men-of-
war and 3 torpedo boats. 14 The Russian fleet movements, in conjunction 
with its allies, convinced everyone that war was imminent if Japan 
did not modify its demands. On May 5, Japan yielded. In return for 
a larger war indemnity Japan agreed to retrocede Southern Manchuria 
back to China, which it did in November 1895. By any standard, 
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Russia had pulled off a diplomatic masterpiece. The Russian govern-
ment had clearly assessed its national interests, weighed the risks, 
and adopted a far-reaching policy. In a short time frame Russia 
had mustered important allies, marshalled the necessary forces to be 
convincing, and had achieved its goals. This coup would provide 
the foundation for the Russian ascendancy in Manchuria for the next 
ten years. No Russian diplomat had advised Li at Shimonos~ki, 
but China had practical reasons for being grateful to its seeming 
protector. 
In lieu of any policy guidance from Washington, American 
representatives were content to have China suffer any losses in 
order to terminate the fighting. Denby had urged Chinese officials 
to be prepared to face sacrifices and Foster continued this theme. 
At one point in the negotiations, when Li thought it better to 
continue the war rather than give up so much territory, Foster 
reminded him of the "extreme danger to the reigning dynasty and the 
autonomy of the empire if the war should be renewed and the contest 
prolonged." When Li returned to China, he discovered that most of 
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the generals and viceroys were petitioning the emperor not to ratify 
the treaty. Li persuaded Foster to go to Peking in his stead and 
defend the onerous terms before the privy council. Thus it transpired, 
during the latter days of April, that Count Cassini was arguing 
for a delay in theratificationin order to save Southern Manchuria 
for China, while Foster was defending the treaty which would cede 
this same Chinese territory. Foster, albeit a private adviser, 
nevertheless was lodged at the American legation, used a legation 
interpreter, and his advice was not gainsayed by Denby. 15 
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The United States had hoped to ingratiate itself with both 
warring nations by its even-handed approach. And no doubt Japan 
was grateful for the non-intervention of the United States, the open 
pu!:>lic support in the American press, and the use of American "good 
offices" to facilitate the peace negotiations. But looking at the 
situation from the opposing camp, China had little for which to be 
thankful. The United States had neither interveued to protect 
China from Japanese aggression, nor been particularly successful 
in helping to achieve a less humiliating peace. Americans had not 
shown confidence in China's ability to protect foreign nationals 
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and had arrogated that right to themselves. The American newspapers 
had castigated China as backward and barbarous, sympathizing over-
whelmingly with the Japanese cause. Then, before the war had actually 
ended Americans were already scurrying for economic advantage. 
From a Chinese perspective it was not surprising for China to look 
elsewhere for post-war support. Nevertheless, Americans naively 
persisted in the view that the China market would be opened primarily 
to them, because, as Denby put it, the United States has an "enormous 
prestige and overshadowing influence in China." John Foster, that 
other close observer on the China scene, agreed. He thought that 
the American diplomatic efforts had come out of the war with "better 
grace" than other countries, because the United States was "recognized 
by both belligerents as purely disinterested."16 
The Cleveland administration may have failed to recognize 
that China would have appreciated material help rather than a disinterested 
approach, but Americans were forced by the war to face a few military 
and political realities concerning their interests in the Pacific. 
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The Sino-Japanese War had caused a significant change in the United 
States' naval posture in Far Eastern waters. At the outset of the 
war the Asiatic squadron had declined in strength to two ships, and 
one of these was far from seaworthy. Three gunboats from the Bering 
Sea patrol were quickly ordered to the China coast and these were 
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soon thereafter reinforced from the West Coast. The American govern-
ment, while pursuing a neutral course, was nevertheless sensitive 
to pleas for protection from its citizens threatened by riots in 
China. The war increased the difficulty of operating off Northeast 
Asia without assured coaling stations and nearby bases. The new ships 
being constructed for the modern navy were all steam driven and 
completely dependent on coal supplies. In peacetime, shore support 
was readily available, but once hostilities commenced Japan declared 
that only two foreign warships could visit her ports concurrently. 
China went further and threatened to close its ports entirely by 
blocking the entrances and removing navigation buoys. If American 
gunboats were to become the "forts along the Asiatic frontier," 
as suggested by the New Orleans Picayune, the Asiatic squadron badly 
needed a safe haven in Northeast Asia for upkeep and replenishment. 
Once the war was over the Cleveland administration made no move to 
resolve this base issue. By 1895 the American squadron still only 
consisted of 8 ships, displacing approximately 18,000 tons. Russia, 
by contrast, supposedly committed primarily to land power, had 
dispatched a potent squadron of 17 ships, displacing 59,000 tons. 
They, too, were searching for suitable ice-freeports to support 
their forces. This became one of their primary aims in their post-
war talks with China. 17 
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The at-sea phase of the Sino-Japanese War, particularly the 
Battle of Yalu, provided renewed stimulus for the proponents in 
congress of a big, modern navy. The supporters of a more vigorous 
foreign policy believed that an accelerated battleship construction 
program and a "few outposts" would serve to promote and protect 
America's foreign commerce. During the debate on naval appropriations 
in early 1895, proponents from all sections of the nation cited 
Japan's naval actions as vindication for Captain Mahan's theories on 
seapower. They urged the immediate construction of a large number 
of battleships so that American naval forces in the Pacific could 
be expanded. Doubts were expressed whether the Asiatic squadron, 
despite its build up, was sufficiently strong to protect American 
lives, property and commerce. It was reco~~ended that as many as 
10 battleships be based in the Pacific. Congressmen were concerned, 
not only for the defense of Hawaii and the West Coast, but also for 
the protection of the "agricultural products of the South and the 
West on the seas." The Sino-Japanese War helped embark the United 
States on a "big ship" navy concept, justified in part by expected 
Asiatic commitments in the years ahead. 18 
Nor could the American public completely ignore that, as a 
result of the war, the political balance in Northeast Asia was pre-
carious. The post-war diplomatic and editorial assessments differed, 
but most agreed that further changes and threats of war in the region 
were probable. No one seriously believed that Russia would not 
eventually seek compensation from China for its services. The only 
question was where and when. The predictions included Korean ice-
free ports, a railway right-of-way across Manchuria, and according 
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to one prescient observer, Russia really coveted the strategic 
Liaotung Peninsula for itself. Minister Breckinridge, echoing 
the Russian press, raised the vision of a unified and regenerated 
"Yellow Race" more powerful than all of Europe. Others saw the 
d J . d H •. 19 ascen ant apanese as pos~ng a anger to awa~~. However, most 
American comment concerning Japan was favorable. The Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle, which was unconcerned about a Japanese hegemony 
in Asia, thought Japan had been robbed of her rightful conquests. 
The Chicago Tribune thought that all the western nations owed a 
"debt of gratitude" to Japan which had earned the "respect of the 
world" for civilizing China. The New York Times was comfortable 
with the idea that the war had added to Japan's power and prestige 
enough to make her dominant in Asian affairs. Americans were ready 
to welcome the "Yankees of the Orient" as partners in western 
civilization. They especially appreciated the commercial reforms 
which China had been forced to accept as part of the peace treaty. 
The United States anticipated sharing equally in the benefits deriv-
ing from these reforms. Because of this overwhelmingly favorable 
opinion toward Japan, the United States was much more likely to side 
with Japan in any future conflict in Northeast Asia. Japan was 
pictured as "good" and "progressive" and upholding a free marketplace 
20 policy. 
During the treaty ratification process, there were even 
rumors th.·.t: the three maritime, merchantile powers with the greatest 
stake in China, that is, England, Japan and the United States, 
·;vould band together to oppose Russia and her allies. American 
sympathies, according to the New York Times, were against the 
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aggression of Russia. While the United States at that time was 
unwilling to be more than a very silent and inactive partner, such 
a concept would germinate in the ensuing years. Heretofore, the 
United States had consistently been content to follow along and take 
advantage of any concessions that England had won in opening up 
China. Now, Americans were perfectly willing for Japan to act as 
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its surrogate. Japan had showed what it could accomplish and England 
was no longer evincing the same interest in maintaining the balance 
of power in Northeast Asia. It was visualized that Japan could 
be useful as a counterweight to Russia. Theodore Roosevelt, for 
one, in commenting on the capabilities demonstrated by Japan in 
the war, considered that Japan would be a "formidable counterpoise 
to Russia in the Far East. 1121 
The post-war economic possibilities of increased trade with 
China loomed, for the time being, far larger in the American mind, 
than any worries about new power struggles in Asia. American manu-
facturers and growers were eager to sell to the 400 million potential 
customers. As a result of the commercial reforms, it was anticipated 
that the market for American goods would be wide open. New ports 
were to be opened. Trade into the interior was to be allowed. 
Foreign industries were to be permitted to be established in Chinese 
cities. And best of all, China 1 s internal provincial tax levies were 
to be abolished. Forecasters of future trade volume in China's 
trade needed only to compare the growth statistics of the trade 
with Japan's mere 40 million customers ove~ the previous thirty 
years to determine the enormity of the China market potential. 
American consular officials were particularly energetic in 
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stirring up interest in the China market. Consul-general Thomas 
Jernigan in Shanghai typically predicted greatly increased trade 
relations with China. According to him, the field for American 
businessmen was very inviting since the United States held a 
"commanding position" because China was convinced that the United 
States had "no aggressive design save in the legitimate field of 
commercial a·nli industrial enterprise." During the week that the 
peace treaty was being ratified, Jernigan urged the presence in 
China of some of the most enterprising American merchants so that 
the "opportunities presented by the general 'break-up' can be utilized." 
American ne~vspapers also hailed the beginning of a "new industrial 
and commercial epoch for China." The Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle foresaw: 
The awakening of the people of Eastern Asia and the 
development of industry among them cannot be contemplated 
by the citizens of the United States but with hopefulness. 
Such awakening--such development--will be an immediate gain 
to us, and will build up and give an entirely new character 
to our Western coast.22 
Regardless of their early start and their high expectations 
of good fortune, Americans achieved only a modest success in increasing 
exports to China. Looking back, the magnitude and the importance of 
American-Chinese trade had grown steadily until the American Civil 
War. For the next four decades, however, the trade activity had 
leveled off at between 20 and 30 million dollars per year. In 
relative terms, the importance of this trade had declined sharply from 
3.2% of the United States total foreign trade in 1860 to a mere 
1.75% in 1894. Only about 6% of China's trade was with America at 
the time of the war with Japan and the bulk consisted of imports 
into the United States. 23 
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Of the many causes for this decline in trade, most were still 
applicable in 1895, despite the renewed interest in trying to revive 
the China trade. Consular officials had repeatedly called attention 
to deficiencies in the American approach and would continue to do 
so. First, the decrease in trade was caused, in part, by the 
steady decline in the American merchant marine. In 1860 nearly all 
the China trade with the United States was carried in American ships; 
by 1893, only 13%. Of the 2,178 merchant ships which visited Shanghai 
in 1897, only 50 were American. James J. Hill complained that his 
Great Northern Railroad had to refuse shipments of 60,000 tons of steel 
rails and 30 million pounds of cotton for lack of sea transport 
from Seattle to Asiatic ports. Even allowing for some exaggeration 
on Hill's part, the lack of American shipping hindered the United 
States from seizing a larger share of the China market. 24 
Second, was the failure over the years of many of the pioneer 
American mercantile establishments in China and the seeming lack of 
ability and vigor on the part of those remaining. Only one new 
American trading firm was established in China after the Sino-
Japanese War. For the most part, American goods were not only 
carried in foreign hulls, but also displayed and sold by foreign 
merchants. Moreover, the American commercial community was 
severely handicapped by the absence of a single American-controlled 
banking and financial establishment in China. Yet American consuls 
warned, year after year, that to expand the export trade properly 
American merchants needed to be on the scene, have the proper 
credentials; spend time to cater the product to the customer; show 
the Chinese the actual products, not depend on brochures; be 
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acquainted with the fluctuating currency exchange; and be ready in 
person to settle disputes and pay claims. Although many American 
businessmen visited China for short periods, they were unwilling to 
risk the long-term commitment in time and effort which was required 
to increase American export trade significantly. 25 
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Third, the American consular service in China was undermanned 
for providing a full range of service to American businessmen. And 
the consular staffs which were available, were stationed in the wrong 
places to stimulate American exports. American consuls were available 
in the southern ports where the bulk of the trade consisted of 
Chinese exports. In the North, at such ports as Chefoo and Newchwang, 
where American export goods predominated, the United States depended 
on merchants, often foreign nationals, to act as part-time vice-
consuls. An American consulate was not established at Chefoo until 
1896; at Newchwang, not until 1900. Thus, the Shantung peninsula 
and Manchuria were poorly served during a period crucial to market 
expansion. In sum, the circumstances which led to the stagnation 
of American-Chinese trade over the past four decades left a legacy 
which was difficult to overcome in a few years. A high degree of 
interest and optimism were not sufficient to build a substantial 
market. When the glowing prospects failed to materialize fully in 
the first few years, American businessmen were reluctant to blame 
their own practices and shortcomings. Rather, they attributed their 
lack of instant success to the policital machinations of the other 
foreign powers in China, especially Russia, and the lack of a 
business-oriented administration to support American economic interests 
overseas. 
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The story of American successes in exporting to China can 
be summed up by considering just two key products: manufactured 
cotton goods and refined petroleum (kerosene). The statistics in 
Table I tell the tale. From these data one may conclude that in 
absolute terms, the American exports to China were negligible, being 
only about 1% of the total annual exports world-wide. Cotton products 
and kerosene represented the only sizeable export, accounting for 
80-90% of the exports to China. Of more significance to those two 
industries, the China market turned out to be a considerable portion 
of their world-wide exports: 40-50% for cotton and 5% for kerosene. 
The port of Chefoo alone, for example, received more American cotton 
goods than any country or colouy in the world and received more 
American kerosene than the United States sold throughout the Caribbean. 
The market for these two products was excellent and the prospects 
for expanding sales was good. In 1897, when foreign cotton piece 
sales to China dropped off due to local manufacture, American sales 
actually increased slightly. In quality and price, the American goods 
were competitive and they sold the market. 27 
The most remarkable statistic concerns the geographical 
distribution of American £xports to China. In 1897 Consul Fowler in 
Chefoo noted the overwhelming importance of North China and Manchuria 
to American trade, a situation that had apparently gone unnoticed 
heretofore. Nearly 8.4 million dollars worth of American goods, 
about three-fourths of the total, entered the three ports of Chefoo, 
Tientsin and Newchwang. American exports into Chefoo alone exceeded 
those from Great Britain ten times. This emphasis on North China 
cannot be explained either by a more elaborate consular system or 
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TABLE I 
1895 1896 1897 1898 
(in millions of dollars) 
Total u. s. exports worldwide 825 1,006 1,100 1.256 
u. s. exports to China 3.7 9.8 ll.3 12.3 
Total u. s. imports worldwide 802 682 743 635 
u. s. imports from China 21.8 17.7 23.1 17.4 
u. s. cotton exports to China 6.0 6.5 6.9 
Total u. s. cotton exports worldwide 16.2 14.8 15.5 
u. s. kerosene exports to China 2.8 3.4 2.4 
u. s. kerosene exports worldwide 51.6 54.6 47.0 
TABLE II 
Per Cent of China's 
Kerosene lmEorts 
Point of Origin 1880 1890 1894/95 1900 
United States 100 80 62 45 
Russia 0 20 36 37 
Other 0 0 2 18 
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a more efficient American mercantile network, quite the contrary. 
One reason for the American success may have been that American mills 
produced heavier cottons, more suitable for northern climates. 
It seems more likely that England deliberately chose to concentrate 
her economic sphere along the Yangtse River and south. For whatever 
reason, the path of American trade expansion was unconsciously set 
to the North of China and Manchuria. Of all the regions of China, 
the United States would be most sensitive to keeping an open market 
there. 28 
Already, Russia was a strong competitor in the sales of 
kerosene. Before 1890 the United States was the sole supplier of 
kerosene to China. By 1900 the Russian share of the market was 
nearly on a par with the American, as shown in Table II. American 
consuls kept careful track of Russia's progress in selling this 
commodity. 
-:~·''IVOI!l\1\,·~•-.1.,'11,' 
American oil was reported to have the edge in quality, 
but sold fractionally higher. The New York Times, noting that the 
price of oil had risen in two years from 53¢ a barrel to $1.80, 
complained that "should oil continue to go higher ••• the miserable 
Russian oil will take its place."29 
Aside from these two products, the American concept of the 
China market, limited as it was by its own mercantile system, was 
largely based on wishful thinking. A consul could predict a "market 
for millions of bushels of wheat and corn annually," but the tastes 
and customs of the Chinese did not change all that rapidly. Increasing 
amounts of American wheat flour did reach China late in the century, 
but the consumers were mostly the growing English, German, and Russian 
communities in Northern China. Similarly, such claims as "the 
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National Association of Manufacturers can find no better field than 
China" were empty unless American entrepreneurs could obtain mining, 
railroad, and like franchises.3° 
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When it became obvious that China was losing the war, Denby 
accurately forecast the ecc-nomic necessities which would face the 
imperial government in the post-war years. The situation offered 
unlimited opportunities to American enterprise. Realizing that 
China would be hard-pressed to pay off her war indemnities, Denby 
concluded that China would be forced to sell valuable franchises to 
meet her obligations. It was Denby's purpose to alert American 
syndicates, at an early stage, to be preparen to bid successfully 
for the rights to build railroads, construct ships, open mines and 
establish banks. He considered that the United States would have 
every advantage. Repeatedly he urged that diplomatic influence 
be exerted to assist American groups in securing these privileges 
against expected rivals. In interviews with Viceroy Li he went so 
far as to recommend that the franchises for modernizing China be 
placed only in the hands of "English speaking people."31 
By the time that the peace treaty was signed, a great amount 
of interest in China was being exhibited by American busines~men. 
As early as May 1895, Denby was overwhelmed by applications for 
assistance. Existing instructions, however, limited the direct 
assistance that he could render. Denby had previously been directed 
to abstain from furthering any individual plans or contracts connected 
with China until they had first been approved by the state department. 
Seeking up-dated, explicit instr•:. tions to guide him in the new post-
war situation, Denby recommended that, in the absence of any relaxation 
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of the rules, the department select among the dozen or so competing 
American syndicates so that he could advocate its intereste and 
disregard the others. Otherwise, Denby warned, China would rely 
on those European powers which had provided her with the signal service 
of forcing the retrocession of Southern Manchuria. 32 
In an ambiguous reply, Denby received little relaxation 
from the restraints under which he was operating. In exercising his 
best judgment, Denby was advised by telegram that he might hereafter: 
introduce American citizens to the Chinese government with 
such representation as their character and responsibility 
as known to warrant, but without using your diplomatic 
character or influence to further their business enterprises. 
Though Denby stretched these rules to the limit, he was not able to 
capitalize fully on whatever store of goodwill that the United States 
may have engendered. He continued to express to Chinese authorities, 
"on all proper occasions," the preeminence of American railroad con-
struction and manufacturing products, but essentially he wielded 
little leverage. American syndicates were forced to scramble for 
concessions against foreign competition without United States backing 
or guarantees. 
When Foster's role as adviser to the Chinese peace negotiators 
became public in December 1894, he, too, was besieged by friends and 
would-be clients with a multitude of grand schemes for the exploitation 
of post-war China. Financial firms were interested in lending China 
money to cover her war indemnity. Shipbuilding companies wanted to 
modernize China's navy. A steel company offered to sell and trans-
plant an entire plant to China. Standard Oil thought they might have 
some business requiring his attention. The most numerous applicants 
were those with railroad proje~ts in mind. According to his memoir, 
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Foster put aside all these various schemes and gave his undivided 
attention to his "imperial client." In return for his services, 
the Chinese government offered Foster an opportunity to reside in 
Peking and act as an adviser to the cabinet and the emperor in moves 
to reform the government. In this capacity he would have been able 
to give material help to American syndicates, but, convinced that 
the task was too difficult, he declined the post. Nevertheless, 
through his previous service and with his wide acquaintance among 
Chinese officials, he managed to act as adviser to a number of 
American concerns. 34 
The large war indemnities did make China seek foreign loans. 
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Recognizing that the lending institution chosen would gain substantial 
leverage in China, financiers of many countries vied for the opportunity. 
Among these was a syndicate represented by John Foster. Unlike other 
bidders, the American group was unsupported by its government, and 
its bid was not accepted, probably because the privately sponsored 
American syndicate could not, or would not, match the favorable 
terms of the Russo-French combine.35 
Russia had severe handicaps of her own in contemplating a 
loan to China. She was just recovering from a period of famine, the 
expenses of the Siberian railway construction were heavy, and, on 
balance, Russia had generally been a borrower of foreign capital 
to support her own industrialization. Nevertheless, Witte jumped 
at the chance. At his instigation a combination of six French and 
four Russian banks granted the loan to China at four percent interest, 
the lowest rate ever offered to China. France, with a surplus of 
capital, supplied the bulk of the loan. Russian financial participation 
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was minimal, but the Russian government did guarantee the loan. By 
successfully negotiating this loan, Russia had gained advantage over 
the other foreign competitors in the scramble for economic influence 
in China. Denby thought that Russia, being the practical creditor 
of China, "will exercise an overwhelming influence over this weak, 
distracted country."36 Russia's lead was somewhat overcome when 
China went to the world's financial markets again in early 1896 to 
meet the second installment on her payment. This time an Anglo-
German syndicate granted the loan. A persistent effort by a group 
of American banks represented by the American Trading Company was 
again unable to offer suitable terms. 37 
To the same consortium of French and Russian bankers, Witte 
next proposed the formation of a Russo-Chinese Bank. As before, 
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the French would provide the major portion of the funding and the 
Russian government would guarantee their investments in the event of 
international crisis. The bank was deliberately organized for the 
purpose of spearheading the economic penetration of China. In 
addition to normal banking operations connected with the Russian tea 
trade, fleet operations and government loans, it was planned that 
the bank would set up subsidiary commercial and industrial enterprises 
within China, such as the construction of railroad and telegraph 
lines. The bank was chartered in December 1895, and within a few 
years had branches in Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Chefoo, and 
Vladivostok. The bank was placed under the sponsorship of the 
Railway Committee. In this way, Witte was able to control its 
affairs. Prince Ukhtomskij was named the chairman of the bank. 
One of its first functions was to provide a special fund from which 
the Russian minister to Peking could bribe Chinese officials. 
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Looking at the success of Russia in establishing her own financial 
apparatus in North China, Denby could only wistfully note that he 
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had "greatly hoped that American financiers would enter this field."38 
Only one did, but in a very feeble manner. Wharton Barker 
returned to China in August 1895, with an elaborate scheme to establish 
an American and Oriental Trust. He hoped that the Trust, in turn, 
would be granted contracts for railroads, ships, mines, steelmills, 
and textile factories. To capitalize this far-reaching plan, Barker 
had only been able to raise fifty thousand dollars of venture capital 
from his backers. Like so many other American franchise seekers in 
China, Barker hoped to secure the franchise first, and then use the 
franchise as the basis for raising money. The Chinese were too 
astute for that. Li encouraged the formation of a private American 
bank, but he was not prepared to grant unrestricted economic power 
to foreigners, not even Americans. Barker made repeated proposals 
over the next several years, chiefly through the Chinese consul in 
New York. Unlike other frustrated American franchise seekers, 
Barker did not blame his failure on the political machinations of 
Russia. Barker was one of those Americans who never lost faith 
that Russia would endorse American development in Northeast Asia. 39 
The most sought after concessions in China were franchises 
to build railroads. Americans were convinced that control of the 
rail system would not only bring profit, but would open the interior 
of China to subsidiary industrial franchises. It was thought that 
the railroads would modernize China and permit the resources and 
productive capacity throughout the great nation to be harnessed 
under foreign, hopefully American, direction. Both the American and 
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the Russian railroad promoters chose to concentrate their efforts in 
the same geographic sector, Manchuria. Both looked to control that 
vital transportation link between the markets of populous North 
China and the Siberian railway. Before the war, Americans were 
interested in being charged with extending a railroad northward 
from Tientsin into Manchuria, but China had decided to commence the 
project on its own, reaching the vicinity of the Great Wall. The 
war strengthened and revived American resolve. Since the days of 
Perry Collins, they had held the thought that Northeast Asia was an 
open field for American expansion and now the time had arrived. 
The cooperation of Russia was believed to be assured, only the 
permission of China was required. 
The best organized, most persistent, and nearly successful 
effort to win a railroad franchise was displayed by the American-
China Development Company. The plan was originally conceived by 
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A. W. Bash, an ex-collector of customs in the state of Washington. 
Representing a nucleus group from the Northwest, including Governor 
McGraw, Judge Hoyt of the Supreme Court, and ex-Senator Dolph of 
Oregon, Bash arrived in Peking before the peace treaty was ratified. 
With the aid of Foster, he was able to present his ideas to Viceroy 
Li and to the Dowager Empress. Receiving sufficient encouragement 
from Chinese authorities, Bash returned to the United States to 
enlist financial support. By December 1895, the American-China 
Development Company was incorporated with a capital stock of one 
million dollars. The announced purpose of the company was to operate 
railways, steamships, telephone and telegraph lines in China. Former 
Senator Calvin Brice of Ohio became president of the company which 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
numbered an impressive list of stockholders associated with a wide 
spectrum in the mainstream of American business and government: 
Levi P. Morton, former vice-president; Thomas c. Platt, senator 
from New York; W. D. Washburn, former senator from Minnesota; 
Frederick P. Olcott, president of Central Trust Company; John Water-
bury, president of Manhattan Trust Company; James Stillman, repre-
senting Rockefeller interests; George F. Baker, president of the 
First National Bank of New York: Charles Coster, of J. P. Morgan 
and Company; Jacob H. Schiff, of Kuhn, Loeb and Company; E. H. 
Harriman, chairman of the Union Pacific Railway; G. R. Hegeman, 
president of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Clarence Cary, 
New York lawyer; and others representing the Chase National Bank, 
Bank of America, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, the American 
Sugar Refining Company, and Carnegie Stee1.40 
Denby used the first visit of Bash to China to underscore 
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and remind the state department of the restrictions which were hamper-
ing him from helping Bash in any material fashion. He told Washing-
ton that if the "administration could get the glory of greatly 
increasing and spreading American interests in China, it would be a 
grand consummation." The administration did not give in to this 
appeal to their vanity. Bash and his associates had to rely on 
their own resources. Denby himself may not have been completely 
aware of the extent that the Bash plan called for interaction with 
Russia. He certainly knew that the plans were "farreaching and 
comprehensive" and were confined initially to North China.41 The 
full scope of the ambitions of the American-China Development Company 
were included in Russian correspondence, for they were extremely 
sensitive to the idea of American encroachment into Manchuria, 
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however tentative and immature. 
In the spring of 1895, during his first trip to Peking, Bash 
broached his plans to the Russian minister, Cassini. According to 
Cassini, he was informed that a large American syndicate composed 
of prominent politicians, financiers, and commercial activities planned 
to construct railroads and extract mineral riches, preferably in 
Northern China and parts of Manchuria. The syndicate fully under-
stood that Manchuria, espacially, would enter into the Russian sphere 
of influence and did not wish to act without the full approval of 
the tsarist government. When asked for support and sympathy for 
the American project, Cassini evaded the question by referring the 
42 
matter to St. Petersburg. Prior to Bash's second trip to China, 
Foster laid the groundwork by enlisting the aid of William Pethick. 
As secretary to Viceroy Li and a director of the Shanhaikuan 
railroad, Pethick was a valuable point of contact with Chinese officials 
and a conduit for inside information. Foster assured Pethick that 
the American-China Development Company had the "capacity to command 
control ~£ all the capital necessary for the accomplishment of any 
enterprise in China." In his turn, Pethick attempted to smooth the 
way for Bash by writing to Cassini on behalf of the syndicate. He 
advised Cassini concerning the eminent membership in the syndicate, 
the vast scale of their financing, and their lofty intentions "in 
harmony with Russia to open the gates of Northern China" to security 
and progress.43 
As Bash further explained the American plan to the Russians 
in the spring of 1896, it was indeed grandiose. The first step was 
the "construction of a line through Manchuria in order to join the 
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Siberian line with the railways of Northern China." Connecting lines 
would then be extended to Korea and the Gulf of Liaotung. This 
undertaking was conceived as a complete monopoly with the "right to 
exploit mines and timber in Manchuria and adjacent areas of Mongolia." 
For a period of thirty years the Chinese government would be unable, 
without the consent of the company, to construct any other railroads 
or rail branches in Manchuria. The next step planned was for the 
syndicate to "swallow up the existing Chinese railroads--Tientsin 
to Shanghei and Tientsin to Peking" whose operation was impossible 
under the clumsy Chinese management." Finally, the syndicate planned 
to extend or join trunk lines southward to Hankow and then on to 
Canton. In presenting the A~erican plan to Cassini, Bash claimed 
to be able to tap capital funding of 250 million dollars. The only 
hurdle visualized was the attitude of the Russian government. The 
prevalent view was that Russia would seek compensation in Northern 
Manchuria for passage of the Siberian rail line. To the Bash group, 
the route of the Siberian line was immaterial, as long as their 
system could connect with it. Bash again recognized the preeminent 
influence of Russia in Manchuria and acknowledged that his group 
could only proceed with their plans with the "full knowledge and 
approval of the Russian government." To make the American plan 
more palatable, Bash offered to give preference to Russian investors 
interested in purchasing shares in the American-China Development 
Company.44 
In trying to reach this "secret understanding" with Russia, 
Bash and his associates foolishly disclosed the entire scope of 
their endeavors, while the plans of the Russians were truly being 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
222 
kept secret. Like their predecessors, the American syndicate held 
the illusion that Russia would welcome, or at least tolerate, the 
involvement of American business and industry in Eastern Siberia and 
Manchuria. As late as June 1896, the American consul at Tientsin, 
Sheridan Read, was predicting that the Bash syndicate had the "inside 
track" to build the Manchurian railways under the protection of 
I believe Russia would look with favor upon the building 
and owning of railroads in China by Americans and I 
think China can be persuaded to see such a course as a 
safeguard to herself. 
It must have come as a complete shock to the American-China Develop-
ment Company tc have their plans for Manchuria thwarted, not by 
China, but by Russia. Cassini flatly advised them that the Russian 
government, unknown to them, was proceeding with its own plans for 
Manchurian railroads and was not going to apply to any foreign 
company for help. Having conceded the political influence of 
Russia in Manchuria, and being unable to contest with Russia, un-
supported by its own government, the American-China Development 
Company had no other choice except to give up its original plans and 
change goals. The syndicate decided to concentrate its efforts 
on franchises for railroads in central and southern China to serve 
as feeder lines to the Manchurian-Siberian network. The forlorn 
hopes of working together with a friendly Russia in Northeast Asia 
were seriously dampened, but not completely dashed. Bash himself 
held on to his Manchurian dreams until at least late 1897. And 
Denby, even while reporting that the Russian survey parties were 
already engaged in Manchuria, still hoped that Americans would 
construct the connecting lines to the Siberian railroad. 45 
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The details of the American plan had been received by Cassini 
at a fortuitous time, for he had been instructed concurrently to 
negotiate with the Chinese government concerning Russian railway 
concessions in Manchuria. The stakes were high. The outcome of 
the railroad negotiations of 1896 were pivotal as to which nation 
would dominate Manchuria. Witte insisted that Russia not only must 
be allowed direct access through Manchuria for its Siberian rail 
line, but also "must make every effort to divert into her own hands 
the network of rails in Northern China."46 Russia intended for 
Vladivostok to become the principal port of entry into Manchuria. 
Witte feared that another terminus, constructed and controlled by 
a foreign power, such as the United States, would give the commercial 
advantage to the seaborne powers. 
The American-China Development Company had pointed out the 
advantage to China in "entrusting the development of Manchuria to 
citizens of a power which is uninfluenced by political interest or 
ambition touching on the affairs on this continent." That argument 
was simply not persuasive enough to counter Russian political pressure 
and willingness to offer protection. Concessions to Russia were 
inevitable. The only question was one of dimension and what China 
might expect in return. Unknown to the Americans, the setting for 
the negotiations had already shifted to St. Petersburg, both to avoid 
the diversions of foreign claims and to use the coronation of Nicholas 
II as a cover. Viceroy Li was designated in February 1896 to be the 
Chinese representative to the coronation with plenipotentiary authority 
to conduct negotiations with Russia. To hasten discussions and to 
bypass the other European capitals, Prince Ukhtomskij arranged to 
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meet Li at Alexandria and to transfer him and his entourage to a 
Russian ship for a passage direct to Odessa. The Chinese delegation 
arrived in Russia three weeks before the ceremonies, which allowed 
for the parties to come to an understanding. In June, Witte, 
Lobanov and Li signed a secret treaty of alliance between China and 
Russia. The treaty was facilitated by a bribe of three million 
rubles to Li. The terms of the treaty called for the joint defense 
of either country in the event of an attack by Japan. The agree-
ment also permitted Russian naval vessels to use Chinese ports as 
part of the defensive alliance. For this increase in security 
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China had to pay a price. The Russo-Chinese Bank was given the 
privilege of constructing and operating a railroad through Manchuria 
to connect at each end with the Siberian line. A few months later 
the bank let a contract for the construction of the railroad to a 
newly formed joint stock company, the Chinese Eastern Railway 
Company. By purchasing the majority bloc of th~ shares in the company, 
the Russian government, i.e., Minister of Finance Witte, was able to 
control the company, hire employees, administer the settlements 
along the railroad and police the leased right-of-way. In addition, 
Russian and Chinese tariffs were lowered on all of their own goods 
transported on the railroad. For the time being, Russia was denied 
the right to exploit mineral rights or to construct branch lines 
into Northern China. Nevertheless, Russia had achieved its immediate 
objectives. Russian penetration of Manchuria had cotrunenced and the 
Americans had been shut out. 47 
Aside from the Russians, the Bash syndicate had to contend 
with rival American franchise seekers, the principal group being one 
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headed by General James H. Wilson and John J. McCook. Though never 
as formally organized as the American-China Development Company, 
Wilson and McCook had equally pretentious ideas. They, too, conceived 
of a vast, integrated Eurasian rail network with the core of the 
eystem lying in North China and Siberia. They aimed to form an 
American s)rndicate of the "best men" to build and operate this core 
system. Wilson was familiar with the rail needs in China from his 
travels there in the mid-1880s. McCook was already a prominent 
railroad promoter. Instead of rushing in like the Bash group, 
Wilson-McCook bided their time, gathering information and cultivating 
what they hoped were useful contacts. They prcbably were expecting 
that the overseas investment climate would improve if a Republican 
administration were elected. Although invited to join the Bash 
group, they chose to follow their separate enterprise, often engaging 
in undercutting the rival syndicate. John Foster kept Wilson apprised 
of the peace process. Major J. G. Pangborn of the World's Transporta-
tion Commission provided them with the results of his eighteen-month 
study of the Chinese and Russian transportation needs. News from 
the state department was passed along by William Rockhill. In 
Korea they corresponded with Horace Allen. From China they were 
in touch with Minister Denby and with Pethick. Their Russian contacts 
were both Minister Breckinridge and Herbert Peirce, secretary of the 
legation.48 
Wilson and McCook saw as their first step the winning of 
preliminary approval from Russia and China for American participation 
in developing the rail network. Since McCook was attending the tsar's 
coronation also, they used this opportunity to sound out the two 
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individuals that they deemed were key to gaining this approval: 
Viceroy Li and Prince Khilkov. McCook had several audiences with 
each and arranged for further talks later, when each was scheduled 
to visit the United States. Being encouraged by these preliminary 
discussions, McCook and Wilson began to approach the "best men" 
to finance the second step of their plan. They hoped to raise 
$250,000 in order to send a businessman, a lawyer, and a diplomat 
to St. Petersburg to work out details with the Russian government. 
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They were undeterred by news from Pethick concerning the Russo-Chinese 
treaty. Pethick's opinion that all Manchuria, Mongolia, and Northern 
China would come under Russian control, only confirmed to them that 
the proper approach was through Russia. Wilson and McCook were 
gripped by the same delusion that the traditional friendship between 
the United States and Russia was still in full force, that Russia 
needed American knowhow and would welcome American participation in 
Northeast Asia. Wilson went so far as to advocate the outright 
partition of China. 49 
The objective of the Wilson-McCook syndicate being formed 
was to make a vigorous, systematic "effort to control the railway 
building and kindred business, not only in China, but in Siberia." 
Among the prominent businessmen whom Wilson and McCook approached 
for backing were: George Westinghouse, Chauncey Depew, George 
Pullman, Collis Huntington, Philip Armor, August Belmont, John D. 
Rockefeller, J. Pierpont Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, Frank Thom?son, 
John Converse, and Henry Flagler. The results were disappointing. 
They were generally met with either disinterest or a refusal to 
consider the project at such a preliminary stage. 50 
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With their grand plans temporarily side-tracked for lack of 
financial support, Wilson and McCook turned to a third step in 
their scheme. They proposed placing William Rockhill as minister to 
China, Wilson as minister to Russia, and McCook in the cabinet. 
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By occupying these strategic posts, they anticipated that the "plant" 
would have been established whereby the project could flourish. 
An impressive list of business and political figures importuned 
McKinley on their behalf, but only McCook received an offer.51 
Thus, without capital and without political position, the Wilson-
McCook scheme came to a halt. 
American franchise seekers across the Yalu River found a 
completely different set of circumstances from those prevailing in 
Manchuria. In Korea, many nations competed for concessions, with 
Japan initially having the predominant influence. Russia was satisfied 
with the simple independence and territorial integrity of Korea. 
She had no missionaries, no franchises, and only thirteen subjects 
in all of Korea. Then, in October 1895, the Japanese made the mistake 
of supporting an unsuccessful coup which backfired. The king sought 
asylum in the Russian legation and again petitioned the Russian 
government for protection. A secret Russo-Korean protocol was 
arranged, which called upon Russia to protect the king and palace; 
to train and officer the Korean army; and to provide financial and 
economic advisers to the Korean government. 52 Until late 1897, 
Russia held primary sway over Korean affairs. The tsarist government 
moved cautiously during this period. Witte considered Korea a 
secondary theater to his main objective, Manchuria. In this time 
of Russian ascendancy, Horace Allen saw an opportunity to push for 
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an American concession for the Seoul-Chemulpo railroad. He had been 
striving to win such a contract for six years, but had always been 
thwarted by Japanese claims. Having worked closely with the Russian 
/ Charge Weber during and after the coup, Allen again requested that 
the grant be awarded to the American Trading Company. This company 
had been unsuccessful in its bids for several franchises in China, 
but with the concurrence of Russia won the Korean railroad contract 
in March 1896. Unlike the situation in Manchuria, Russia was 
endeavoring to offset Japan's growing monopoly in Korean economic 
affairs. Or, as Allen thought, Russia approved the American contract 
because "it gives a fine appearance to Korean independence on the 
outside." From here on, Allen would hold a pro-Russian bias, at 
' least vis a vis the Japanese. However, this attitude did not become 
widespread enough to countervail the hostile picture of Russia 
being engendered by her advance into Manchuria. American investors 
were still wary of Korean projects, and, in the end, the American 
Trading Company was forced to sell their concession rights to the 
Japanese, because insufficient American capital was available. 53 
The fate of the other major American concession in Korea 
was more profitable for its investors. In July 1895, with Allen's 
help, James Morse was awarded the Unsan gold mining concession, 
which eventually proved to be very valuable. Morse sold the franchise 
rights to Leigh S. J. Hunt, a Seattle financier, and J. Sloat Fasset, 
a New York businessman. They established the Oriental Consolidated 
Mining Company to exploit their claim. Although some of the officers 
of this cowp3ny had political connections, they did not become involved 
in any international quarrels with Russian officials in Korea. Korea 
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remained a relative backwater for American interests. 54 
Stymied by Russia in the North, the American-China Develop-
ment Company had focussed its efforts on securing the Peking-Hankow 
franchise through which the Americans again hoped to "control the 
industrial progress of China." Alert to the importance of the negotia-
tions, Denby was concerned that the American capitalists would look 
only to the immediate profits and not have the long-range vision to 
obtain lasting results. Denby feared that, if the opportunity 
represented by this franchise were lost, the economic domination of 
China would pass into the hands of men of other nationalities. 
Sensing the seriousness of the situation, Secretary Olney strengthened 
Denby's hand by directing hirn, for the first time, to: 
use your personal and official influences and lend all 
proper assistance to secure for reputable representatives 
of such concerns the same facilities for submitting pro-
posals, tendering bids or offerring contracts, as are 
enjoyed by any other foreign commercial enterprises in 
the country.SS 
Having been encouraged to use his judgment and experience, 
Denby took his strongest stand yet with the Chinese government. 
Treat Americans fairly, he insisted, or else "Americans might develop 
bad feeling among our people at home and make them less friendly 
than they always had been to China." For a time it appeared as if 
the pressure was successful. The American company held a temporary 
contract, but in the end, the Americans wanted more stringent terms 
and more guarantees than the Chinese were willing to concede. A 
Belgian syndicate won the contract under such unfavorable terms that 
Denby suspected that the syndicate was a blind for political maneuver-
ing. Later, it was confirmed that the Belgians were fronting for 
French and Russian interests. The Russo-Chinese Bank acted as their 
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financial agent. Again, what seemed to have been a promising American 
franchise was thwarted. In the opinion of Denby, and no doubt shared 
by others, the long American effort to secure railroad and other 
franchises had "failed because it was frowned on at St. Petersburg."56 
Serious American efforts to construct and control railroads in 
Northeast Asia had been thoroughly frustrated and were not to revive 
until after the Russo-Japanese war. In the interim, the United 
States was chiefly concerned that Russia not obtain too solid a 
foothold. 
In the scramble for concessions, the Americans were over-
matched by the Russians at every turn. From the outset, Americans 
proceeded under the false premise that China and Russia, out of 
friendship and good will, if not necessity, would welcome Americans 
to their continent. Americans were too optimistic concerning their 
prospects and not prepared for a long, hard struggle. With only 
lukewarm government support at best, the American syndicates were 
at a severe disadvantage against the other foreign powers which did 
not hesitate to exert imperialistic political pressures. Often the 
Americans had to operate with only spotty intelligence information--
they were unaware of key negotiations going on elsewhere or tried to 
influence lesser leaders, instead of the top officials, such as 
Witte. Nor was the Yankee business always conducted in an effective 
manner. American businessmen failed to realize that their success 
in developing America was not necessarily transferrable overseas. 
Far more capital investment, far less undermining of other Americans, 
far more patience, far more attention to foreign customs--all were 
needed. Most of all, private enterprise was unwilling to assume any 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
degree of risk. The concept of American investments in foreign 
countries was still in its infancy. 57 
Russia, on the other hand, had a singleness of purpose, 
which eluded the American companies. The Russian government could 
offer China the security of a defensive alliance and the semblance 
of a return to normal self-respect. The treasury of Russia could 
be used to guarantee against short-term losses. Through the facade 
of joint stock companies, Russia was able to control the franchises, 
while giving China a face-saving device to cloak foreign ownership 
of Manchurian railroads. The relative success of the United States 
and Russia in gaining franchises can be measured by the amount 
invested: by 1902 the United States investments in China amounted 
to 19.7 million dollars; Russia's, 246.5 million dollars. 58 
Before the McKinley administration fairly got underway, 
American interests in Northeast Asia appeared to be at a dead end. 
Details of the secret treaty between Russia and China remained 
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murky, but rumors credited Russia with gaining far more than she had 
actually accomplished. Russian spokesmen did nothing to discourage 
the impression that they were invincible in the area. The Governor 
of Vladivostok, General J. Dolanka, commented, while passing through 
Saint Paul, Minnesota, that the "Tsar might be emperor of Asia 
tomorrow. Vladivostok will be the principal port on the Mongolian 
seas, and America will not have the interest she now has in the 
quarrels of the Orient." The Chicago Tribune apparently agreed, 
repeatedly crediting Russia with becoming the "master cf the situation 
on the Pacific coast" and poised to annex Manchuria, Korea and all 
China north of the Great Wall, if not absorb all of China. Prince 
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Khilkov also made the sweeping claim that a Russo-Chinese company 
would not only operate the trans-Manchurian line, but also the 
extensions into China proper. Denby, too, was convinced that Russian 
influence now predominated in Peking and that Russia scarcely veiled 
her dictation of policy to the Chinese government: 
In all important matters touching Manchuria the Russian 
legation is consulted and no enterprise within the borders 
thereof is undertaken without Russian consent. 
Li Hung-chang, upon whose influence the Americans had previously 
depended, was now considered an "obedient servant of Russia." Despite 
this gloomy assessment, Denby saw a ray of hope. He thought that 
future American commerce and contracts could depend that the "goodwill 
of Russia will prove a valuable assistance." Therefore, Denby 
recommended, in the teeth of much contrary evidence that: "in the 
interest of our manufacturers, our friendly relations with Russia 
should be enhanced. She ought to be encouraged, in every way, to 
deal with Americans, who are her historic friends." Only a few 
weeks later Denby had decided that "Russia intends to pursue a 
separate and imperious course in China." This ambivalence was 
typical of the changing American attitude toward Russia. They had 
been forced to acknowledge that American interests had collided with 
Russian interests in Northeast Asia and Russia held the upper hand. 
At the same time Americans were reluctant to give up their ambitions 
in Manchuria and resisted the abandonment of the concept of a tradi-
tional friendship which might re-emerge to their advantage. 59 
Russia, in the immediate post-war years, took little pains 
to mollify the Americans. In previous decades her policy had been 
to dangle promises and offer a semblance of cooperation to the United 
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States in order to avoid potential conflict. Even in Eastern Siberia 
Russia had acted circumspectly toward American surveyors, whalers 
and traders. Whether Russia was too wrapped up in its own projects 
to curry favor with American opinion or whether she believed that 
its relative military and political strength no longer required a 
tactful approach, was not clear. Whether through miscalculation or 
deliberate action, Russia's impending advance into Manchuria had 
weakened the ties of the "historic friendship" in the eyes of 
Americans. From his vantage point in St. Petersburg, Minister 
Breckinridge, in November 1896, sensed the growing rift and reported 
his misgivings: 
I fear that our country has ceased to be warmly or seriously 
taken into account by Russia. Pleasant memories remain among 
the people, that is all •••• we abstain from any policy 
that could make our resentment seriously effective upon 
other continents, and thus we are practically left out of 
the count. The neglect of our claims, the disregard of 
our representations, the marked contrast ••• in the 
reception of our men of war ••• all show a distinct 
change and disregard •••• Our people cherish the mistaken 
ideas that in time of trouble Russia would help us. That 
time is past • • •• I should predicate nothing more upon 
traditional friendship •••• I believe it would be well, 
when occasion affords, if in some suitably marked way our 
government would show conspicuous disapprobation of the 
course of our relations with Russia. She does not recipro-
cate--she does not deserve the consideration we have always 
shown her.60 
Breckinridge had unequivocally set forth the new circumstances affecting 
relations between the United States and Russia. In a large measure, 
it depended on the next administration whether to allow the relation-
ship to drift aimlessly or whether to confront Russia in Northeast 
Asia where the national interests had most closely intersected. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE RELUCTANT EXPANSIONISTS OF 1898 
Until 1898, Russia and the United States had pursued similar 
goals in North China and Manchuria. Each, although by totally 
different means, had sought the peaceful economic penetration of 
the region without territorial aggrandizement. The Russian govern-
ment, through deliberate policy decisions, had eschewed the territorial 
partitioning of China at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War. 
Since that time, led by Finance Minister Witte, Russia had opted 
for a course which overtly called for a "free hand and fair field" 
in Manchuria, while covertly using pressure to gain economic monopoly. 
Witte had hoped to continue Russia's economic advance into North 
China without the use of political force and at a deliberate pace. 
Russia had to forego this policy when Germany occupied Kiaochow on 
the Shantung peninsula in November 1897. Germany's action forced 
Russia reluctantly to reexamine its position with regard to the 
partition of China. Russia's subsequent acquisition of Chinese 
territory revealed more clearly than ever Russia's ultimate designs 
on the region. Thus alerted to the threat to American interests, 
a strong reaction advocating opposition to Russia's domination of 
Manchuria was set in motion in the United States by the press, by 
business groups and within governmental circleso Russia's actions 
stirred just the sort of attention that Witte had hoped to avoid by 
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his own more cautious approach. 
The strain on Russo-American relations was aggravated again 
a few months later when the United States had suddenly to confront 
the consequences of Admiral Dewey's victory at Manila. Gradually and 
reluctantly the United States, too, was forced to adopt a policy 
toward Asian colonial possessions. The acquisition of the Philippines 
altered America's perspective of its own role in Asian affairs. By 
its adventure into trans-Pacific imperialism the United States had 
demonstrated the military means and the will to support national 
interests overseas. Russia was rightly concerned whether this new 
attitude and this naval militarism would extend to Northeast Asia, 
particularly if coupled wi.th the existing English opposition to the 
Russian advance into Manchuria. Heretofore, the competition between 
Russian and American interests had been one-sided in favor of Russia. 
No diplomatic governmental clashes had yet occurred. When Russia 
easily blocked American railway projects, only a degree of private 
ill-will had been engendered. As a result of the territorial 
expansion of each, undertaken however reluctantly, both nations moved 
closer to abandoning their traditional frien~.~.hip in favor of an 
old-fashioned rivalry for the domination of Northeast Asia. 
The first step which brought the possibility of this conflict 
closer to reality was taken by Russia. Having nullified previous 
American attempts to gain an economic development foothold in 
Manchuria, Russia still had a long way to go before consolidating 
its own economic hold on the region. Russia needed, as its next 
logical step, permission to build a branch rail line from the Chinese 
Eastern Railway to a port on the Yellow Sea. However, throughout 
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1897 Li Hung-chang had rejected Russian overtures to this end. In 
order to regain some independence of action in Manchuria, China once 
more proposed to extend its own rail system northward under the 
supervision of a British engineer. Aggravating the Russians further, 
an Anglo-American group of mining engineers had also been permitted 
to make a survey of mineral deposits in Southern Manchuria. The 
Russian charg~ in Peking in June 1897 thought that any further extension 
of Russian railroads into Manchuria might prove hazardous "when 
the feeling of distrust and suspicion among the Chinese toward our 
plans in Manchuria is still far from dissipated and when the feelings 
are being specifically encouraged in them by foreigners." Included 
in those "foreigners" were representatives of the American-China 
Development Company, who inspired articles in the Shanghai press 
critical of Russia. 1 Also lending a sense of urgency to the Russian 
demands, was news of a renewed attempt by the Bash group to build 
railroads in Manchuria. Bash claimed to the Russian charg~ in Washing-
ton in January 1898 that he had concluded a contract with the Chinese 
imperial railway administration for building and operating lines 
from Shanhaikuan to Mukden and Kirin, and from Port Arthur to 
Mukden. As a result, the Russian foreign officer notified Peking 
that permitting the Americans to build railways in Southern Manchuria 
was absolutely undesirable. Coupled with this action, Russian 
diplomats themselves advised the American engineers travelling in 
Manchuria to leave the country or else face "various inconveniences. 112 
This stand-off ended dramatically in November 1897, when the 
German navy precipitated matters by occupying Kiaochow in retaliation 
for the murder of two German missionaries. China immediately appealed 
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to Russia for assistance and, hoping to invoke their defensive 
alliance, opened up all Chinese non-treaty ports to Russian naval 
vessels. This invitation confronted the Russian ministers with an 
entirely new situation. The new Russian foreign minister, M. N. 
Muravev, favored using the German action as a pretext for the iumediate 
compensatory seizure of an ice-free port on the Yellow Sea, long 
one of the goals of Russian expansionists, and a goal shared by 
Nicholas II. Witte argued successfully, for a time, that the acquisi-
tion of such a port should remain secondary to a policy of restrain-
ing the European powers from a scramble for Chinese territory. 
Witte feared that, if others gained territorial compensation, then 
Japan would seize territory also, which might very well lead to 
war. The Russian government decided to equivocate. With the 
"consent" of China a Russian squadron was ordered to be "temporarily 
stationed" at Port Arthur in December 1897. Unlike the Germans, no 
occupying troops were sent ashore for the time being. Two British 
cruisers entered Port Arthur shortly thereafter to emphasize that 
England demanded equality of treatment in Chinese ports. No American 
ships were dispatched. 3 
Concurrently, the Chinese government was faced again with 
the necessity of negotiating for a foreign loan in order to pay off 
the last installment of its war indemnity. Witte agreed to under-
take the loan, but only if China accepted a virtual Russian 
monopoly of all railways, mining and industry in all of Manchuria 
and Mongolia. And, bowing to the tsar's desire for an ice-free 
port on the Pacific, Witte also demanded that Russia be permitted 
to construct a harbor on the Yellow Sea to serve Russian ships. 
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China, desperately trying to stave off these concessions, turned to 
the British. Their initial offer, which was none too generous 
either, included the ingenious demand to open Talienwan as a treaty 
port. This would have tended to stall Russia by ensuring an open 
door for commerce into Southern Manchuria. Faced with two sets of 
onerous conditions, China at this point probably would have welcomed 
an American loan offer, despite higher rates of interest. None was 
forthcoming. Finally, the Chinese government accepted a loan on 
February 1, 1898 from an Anglo-German banking group with the stipula-
tions that there would be no alienation of the Yangtse basin except 
in favor of England and that Germany would be allowed to lease 
Kiaochow. 4 
With the loan question settled, Witte lost his financial 
leverage for attaining the economic monopoly which he preferred. 
Muravev was successful in pressing China for a lease of the southern 
part of the Liaotung peninsula, including both the ports of Talienwan 
and Port Arthur. Russia also gained the right to construct a 
Southern Manchurian Railway connecting the Chinese Eastern Railway 
with these ports. The final lease was signed March 27, 1898. Russia 
had not yet achieved its maximum goals, but had taken a giant stride 
toward securing Manchuria as its fief. 
The other powers quickly availed themselves of the opportunity 
to help themselves at China's expense. To counteract Russian influence 
in the North, England leased Weihaiwei in April. France extended 
its sphere of influence in the South. Fukien province opposite 
Japanese Formosa was recognized as falling within the Japanese sp~ere. 
Also, to placate the Japanese, Russia agreed to withdraw its military 
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and financial advisers from Korea and to acknowledge the special 
economic interests of Japan in Korea. Of all the Pacific powers, 
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only the United States refrained from seeking advantage from China, 
though the Navy Department considered it. In February 1898, Secretary 
John D. Long asked Admiral Dewey for his recommendation regarding 
the best obtainable Chinese port "for the benefit of our ships, and 
the extension of our commerce, as are enjoyed by some other nations."S 
While Great Britain had actively opposed the cession of 
Chinese territory to Germany and to Russia, the United States govern-
ment decided "to keep a watchful eye upon the situation as it 
developed." It was generally agreed that American interests and 
privileges should be protected, but that it was unnecessary to act 
until these interests were specifically threatened. Expressing 
these views in an interview with the Philadelphia Press, Secretary 
of State, John Sherman, claimed that the partition of China was 
unlikely, but even if partition were to occur, American "commercial 
interests would not suffer."6 
This "wait and see" policy of the administration was a 
disappointment to those growing segments of American opinion which 
were increasingly sensitive to American successes and possible 
failures in Northeast Asia. From China, Charles Denby, perhaps 
emboldened by his lame-duck status, expressed his anxieties in late 
January. He warned that "armed strife" between England and Russia 
might occur should Russia attempt to dominate Manchuria. Further, 
if "Russia should claim to control Manchuria and exclude other nations 
from equal rights • the question may come up between the United 
States and Russia." Partition of China "would tend to destroy our 
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markets" in the Pacific which was "destined to bear on its bosom a 
larger commerce than the Atlantic." Having such an interest in 
China, why should the United States "remain mute should her autonomy 
be attacked," asked Denby. Instead, Denby recommended that the 
United States make a stand, take an interest in the "territorial 
question," assert a "moral influence" and not hesitate to announce 
disapproval of acts of "brazen wrong, spoliation, perpetrated by 
other nations towards China." 7 
Upon his return to the United States, Denby refined his 
"Doctrine of Intervention" and published it in the Forum. Simply 
stated, the doctrine pronounced that it was the duty of the United 
States' government to "intervene in all matters occurring abroad 
in which it is our interest to intervene." In a similar vein, his 
son, Charles Denby, Jr., who had served as the secretary of the 
American legation in Peking, writing for the North American Review, 
concluded that there must be a "manifestation of a greater interest 
by the American government in the political and commercial affairs 
of the Orient • • • the American merchant should be assured that 
his government is supporting him."8 
The tenor of the Denbys' opinions was echoed in other ~uarters. 
The United States should "do something" positively; not be bound so 
tightly by strictures against "entangling alliances." Richard Olney 
put these views into a legal framework as he decried the "International 
Isolation of the Un:i.ted States." During his term as secretary of 
state, Olney had gradually toughened his stance in favor of aiding 
American businessmen in China. Consequently, in his address at 
Harvard in early March 1898, he was not nearly as sanguine as Sherman. 
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Olney found nothing in Washington's Farewell Address which would 
prevent America from exercising its "right and duty" to resist 
any European state from setting "vexatious and discriminating duties 
and impositions, to utterly ruin the trade" between China and the 
United States. Moreover, Olney recognized that the United States 
had previously benefitted by the British single-handed struggle to 
keep the ports and territory of China free and open to trade. From 
this he concluded that it was time for the United States to offer 
Great Britain more than "moral support" in continuing this aim. 
He suggested that a temporary Anglo-American alliance, for such an 
extraordinary emergency, would be a more creditable part for a 
great nation to play. 9 
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Clarence Cary, who, as lawyer for the American-China Develop-
ment Company, knew first-hand the odds facing American businessmen 
when they competed against government-sponsored foreign rivals, made 
the most direct attack on the administration's "somnolent policy 
of merely trusting to luck" in the Far East. Cary thought that 
Sherman's views were "quaint and dangerous." Any assurances that 
the territorial cessions would be open freely to trade were discounted 
by Cary as temporary at best. Instead, he looked ahead to a time 
when "the territory north of the Great Wall •• when in possession 
of Russia may be surrounded by a Russian tariff expressly calculated 
to create an exclusive market for her own people." Urging that 
Washington not "let matters drift in happy-go-lucky fashion," he 
recommended that the United States make "one forceful protest now," 
rather than a volume of tardy diplomatic remonstrances and inquiries 
later. The United States, no longer able to depend solely on Great 
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Britain to act, must itself watch over and safeguard American trading 
. h . Ch" lO rLg ts Ln Lna. 
New York City, perhaps because it was more susceptible to 
London influence; or perhaps because the cotton merchants were 
headquartered there, was the center of those advocating a more 
vigorous policy in safeguarding American interests in China. The 
New York Times, taking the lead among American journals, was appalled 
that China was threatened by Russia with becoming a "field for 
colonization and conquest." For nearly a year the newspaper had 
published only one editorial concerning China. Then, in the space 
of four months, commencing in December 1897, more than a dozen 
editorials dealt with tbe crisis. At first, the comments were 
limited to expressions of sympathy for the British efforts to 
guarantee free trade. By January, the danger of a monopoly develop-
ing was recognized more clearly. It was concluded that England should 
not be alone in championing the forces of progress and civilization 
against the forces of reaction and barbarism; the United States 
should declare its "entire and hearty approval" of the British 
stance. There then began a series of complaints that the administra-
tion was slow in acting to "assert the rights of American commerce 
and defend its field from hostile encroachment." While applauding 
Cary's article, the New York Times claimed that the "headless" 
state department was displaying "ignorance and apathy about our 
commercial interests."11 
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle was slower to recognize 
that the partition of China represented any danger to American 
interests. Spheres of influence are "no misfortune to trade and 
civilization." By April, however, the Chronicle had made the 
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significant correlation between Northern China and the expanding 
export of American cotton goods. Apprehensive about the "contingency 
of Manchuria being added to the Czar's dominions" the Chronicle 
thought: 
The loss of this trade by absorption of Manchuria in the 
Russian customs area would be of considerable importance, 
and this fact obviously strengthens the motive for opposing 
such a serious change • • • • Russia would be disposed to 
yield to strong representations in favor of keeping trade 
on equal terms to all nations ••• if these be pressed 
with sufficient earnestness and decision. 
For the purpose of preserving free trade, the Chronicle agreed that 
no "union of the two great Anglo-Saxon powers could be more credit-
able.1112 
Another "old China hand," General James Wilson, assessed 
"America's Interest in China" during this period. He assumed from 
his observations that the Russians intended "to hold on to what they 
have taken, and even take more as opportunity offers." Reluctantly, 
he concluded that American interests corresponded with that "ancient 
antagonist, England" and against those of our "ancient allies, 
France and Russia." Having occupied the whole of America's own 
vacant land, the Americans "must necessarily turn their attention 
more and more to the commerce of the Pacific islands and beyond." 
Therefore, circumstances might arise in Asia, according to Wilson, 
when it would become the duty of the government "to exert its 
power to the utmost" and, if need be, "to accept even the 
cooperation of Great Britain • for the maintenance of our common 
interests beyond the Pacific."13 More explicitly, John Proctor, 
president of the U. S. Civil Service Commission, urged that the 
United States, as a nation with large interests in the open ports 
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of China, should join with England and promulgate a new Monroe 
Doctrine proclaiming that China was no longer regarded as a "place 
for conquest or colonization by any European or other Power.ul4 
In addition to the press criticism of the administration's 
inaction, a group of businessmen, whose firms were financially 
involved in China, organized a Committee on America's Interest in 
China. James McGee of the Standard Oil Company presided. The 
committee began its campaign to transform America's policy by per-
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suading sixty-eight firms to sign a petition urging that chambers of 
commerce in major cities send resolutions to the government demanding 
that American commercial interests in China be safeguarded. Within 
four months ten resolutions to this effect were sent by chambers of 
commerce, commercial or trade organizations around the nation. The 
New York resolution served as a model and had the greatest impact 
when it earnestly urged: 
that such proper steps be taken as will commend themselves 
to your wisdom for the prompt and energetic defense of the 
existing treaty rights of our citizens in China, and for 
the preservation and protection of their important commercial 
interests in that Empire.l5 
Concurrently, there was a virtual tide of British public and 
private pressure exerted on the United States to join in the mainten-
ance of an "open door" in the Far East. Both Ambassador John Hay 
and the secretary of the legation, Henry White, had abundant oppor-
tunity to learn of and sympathize with the English conviction that 
it was imperative to check Germany and Russia from obtaining a 
monopoly. British statesmen were far more skeptical that these 
powers would keep their promises to keep their ports open to trade 
any longer than it suited their convenience. White reported that 
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the consensus in England was that the British government would have 
"the sympathy and the support of the people of the United States 
and not improbably of our government also." In this they were due 
for disappointment. Sympathy was forthcoming; support, no. 16 
Despite these pressures to "do something," the American 
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government did not immediately react. In early March the British 
Ambassador to Washington inquired confidentially whether his govern-
ment "could count on the co-operation of the United States in opposing 
action by foreign powers which may tend to restrict freedom of 
commerce for all nations in China either by imposing preferential 
conditions or by obtaining actual cession of Chinese coast territory." 
In reply, the United States advised that there was no indication of 
foreign occupation which interfered with trade or aimed at exclusive 
privileges. Therefore, there was no "present reason for the departure 
of the United States from our traditional policy respecting foreign 
alliances."17 In this instance, the McKinley administration sounded 
much like its predecessors. 
When the formalities were finally signed, the state department 
made no protest, jointly or unilaterally, to the cessions of Chinese 
territory, but did bestir itself to ascertain from the Russian 
government what it proposed concerning foreign trade through its 
ports in Southern Manchuria. Muravev explained to the new American 
ambassador, Ethan Hitchcock, that Port Arthur would be developed 
solely as a military and naval base, but that Talienwan would serve 
as a maritime commercial terminal, replacing Vladivostok. Further, 
according to Muravev, Russia had no desire "to interfere in anyway 
with the trade of other nations with China, her policy being to 
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develop home industries for supplying her home markets, under a 
protection policy, aided by increased transportation facilities • 
and toward the maintenance and profit of which last she would be 
only too glad to have foreign commerce contribute." To Hitchcock, 
this ambiguous statement appeared to be an assurance of "equality of 
opportunity" to all nations. 18 No one seemed to question how Russia 
expected to profit from the enormous expenses of its Siberian and 
Manchurian railroads. 
Not all departments in Washington were prepared to ignore 
completely the Russian advance into Southern Manchuria and the 
possible consequences. Frederic Emory, Chief of the Bureau of 
Foreign Commerce, in his April 1898 introduction to the annual Review 
of World's Commerce, noted two recent trends: the "American invasion 
of the markets of the world" and the increaing preoccupation of 
European diplomacy to secure new spheres of influence "for their 
own special benefit." Specifically, he went on record that: 
China has for some years been one of the most promising fields 
for American enterprise, industry, and capital •••• The 
solution of the problem of the future commercial conditions 
of the Chinese Empire has, therefore, an immediate and most 
important relation to the expansion of our export trade, 
especially that of the Pacific slope. 
Because of economic requirements, Emory concluded that "international 
isolation" of the United States was a thing of the past and the 
government could "no longer afford to disregard international 
rivalries."19 
William Day, the assistant secretary, replaced John Sherman 
as secretary of state in late April. This change permitted a gradual 
shift in the administration's Far East policy, but, of necessity, the 
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United States was by then concentrating the bulk of its efforts 
towardprosecuting the war with Spain. The surprising element was 
that Americans devoted as much concern as they did over Northeast 
Asia during the four months of the developing crisis in Cuba. Even 
in wartime, China was not completely forgotten. In June, Day 
submitted a proposal to congress to send a fact-finding commission 
to China to study commercial conditions now that "European powers 
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have established themselves at points of vantage in that Empire which 
will enable them to exercise direct influence upon its commercial 
destiny." The proposal made it clear that the present was a "golden 
opportunity" for enlarging commercial intercourse, "not only in 
China itself, but in the contiguous possessions of Russia ••• 
provided the conditions are thoroughly understood and proper advantage 
taken." The congress did not authorize the commission, but the 
shift in the administration's thinking was evident. A month later, 
in explaining to Ambassador Hay why the war precluded any Anglo-
American effort in China, Day did foretell that "the outcome of our 
struggle with Spain may develop the need of extending and strengthen-
ing our interests in the Asiatic continent."20 
The aggressions of Germany at Kiaochow, and especially of 
Russia in Southern Manchuria, had done much to clarify American 
thinking toward Northeast Asia. First, these seizures created an 
atmosphere which tended to soften the historic antipathies which 
some Americans held for the English. In the Pacific, the United 
States had generally cooperated, at least tacitly, with the British 
policy. During this crisis period, the realization of an Anglo-
American identity of concerns for an open door policy was reenforced. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
252 
Two influential Republican members of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations turned away from an independent policy abroad and professed 
a willingness for the United States to work jointly with the British 
to protect free trade with China. Cushman Davis stated to the 
press that if American commerce were threatened in Asia, the 
United States would be "justified in departing from its time-honored 
policy and if necessity required seek a coalition with England." 
And Henry Cabot Lodge, erstwhile Anglophobe, was sufficiently concerned 
about the seizures in Northeast Asia to declare: "I should be glad 
to have the United States say to England that we would stand by her 
in her declaration that the ports of China must be open to all nations 
equally or to none." 21 Americans, then, werevariously prepared to 
do nothing, to offer "sympathy" to the British, to tender "moral 
support" for their stance, to enter into joint protests, or to take 
the ultimate break with the past and make a temporary Anglo-American 
alliance to forestall the exclusive systems the continental European 
powers might impose on Chinese trade. This half-way change in 
attitude from hostility to friendship was only one facet of the 
Anglo-American understanding which was reached at the end of the 
century, but, because of the locale and the issues involved, it 
tended to undermine one of the bases for the traditional Russo-
American friendship. The latter had always relied rather artificially 
on each partner holding an equal grudge against Great Britain. In 
Northeast Asia it was now abundantly apparent that the grudge was 
not against England; the rival was Russia. 
Second, the government became more prone, though still 
cautious, to offer its support to American commercial endeavors in 
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the Pacific region. In Manchuria particularly, the direct stake 
that American cotton mill owners and cotton exporters had there was 
becoming more widely recognized. This new willingness at least to 
contemplate backing American business in China was reflected in 
President McKinley's annual message to Congress: 
The United States has not been an indifferent spectator of 
the extraordinary events transpiring in the Chinese Empire, 
whereby portions of its maritime provinces are passing 
under the control of various European powers • • • • Our 
position among nations, having a large Pacific coast and a 
constantly expanding direct trade with the Orient, gives 
us the equitable claim to consideration and friendly 
treatment in this regard, and it will be my aim to 
preserve our large interests in that quarter by all means 
appropriate • • • .22 
This increased willingness to engage in "commercial imperialism" in 
China, though coincident in time, did not spring directly from the 
so-called "large policy" of imperialism. The Lodge-Mahan-Roosevelt 
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group of imperialists were preoccupied with the approaching conflict 
in Cuba. Mahan, while a staunch advocate of Pacific naval bases, 
such as in Hawaii, did not seriously address the "Problem of Asia" 
until two years later. Roosevelt, when asked to support the New 
York Chamber of Commerce position replied uncommittedly: 
I do not believe in any entangling alliance, but neither 
do I believe in any entangling antipathies. Russia, and 
Russia alone, of the European powers, has been uniformly 
friendly to us in the past. I have no question that this 
friendliness came almost solely from self-interest, but 
with that I need not deal •••• If our trade relations 
with China are valuable, I should most unquestionably side 
with or against any European power out there purely with 
regard to our own interests.23 
The American reaction to the threatened partition of China, though an 
accidental adjunct of the new aggressive mood in the nation, was more 
defensive in nature and, at the beginning, a far cry from any thoughts 
of territorial aggrandizement. Later, the idea of readier access to 
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the China market would serve as one more justification for the annexa-
tion of Hawaii and the keeping of the Philippines, but beforehand, 
there was no connection between the foreign cessions in China and the 
American conflict with Spain. Even many of the anti-imperialists 
who spoke out against the war and colonialism favored the more subtle 
form of economic expansion. Men like Edward Atkinson, Carl Schurz, 
David Starr Jordan and William Graham Sumner preferred an "informal" 
empire based on American economic superiority and equal, if not 
special, access to commercial privileges and naval support facilities. 
They appreciated the importance of American trade with regions such 
as Northeast Asia, but failed to specifically address how a commercial 
empire could be achieved in the face of any concerted effort by 
another nation, such as Russia, to deny American equal participation 
in the market. 24 
Third, Americans were far more concerned by the Russian 
acquisitions than by those of the other powers. The others, particularly 
Germany, as the first to seize territory, drew some adverse comment, 
but the intentions of Russia provoked overwhelming distrust. Americans 
realized that their prime market now lay within the Russian sphere 
with the dire prospects that the sphere might eventually extend into 
all of Northern China. Russian promises to keep the region open to 
trade and not to discriminate against other nations were not completely 
accepted. Unlike the other foreign spheres of influence which were 
distant from the European states, Manchuria was contiguous to Asiatic 
Russia. Americans knew from their own experiences in continental 
expansion that an initial presence can be transformed into absolute 
sovereignty. Moreover, the parallel examples of Russian absorption 
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of the Central Asian states and the Amur region did not encourage 
optimism. The American consul in Tientsin expressed this sense of 
unease: "Russia is rapidly fortifying Port Arthur and the feeling 
is growing that as soon as the Siberian railroad is completed and 
a secure foothold is gained that Manchuria will be forever lost to 
China. " 25 
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American observers, intent upon the approaching conflict in 
Cuba during the early months of 1898, may not have entirely appreciated 
the full scope of these nascent changes in the American attitude 
toward events in Northeast Asia. But the Russian government was 
fully attuned to the subtle hints emanating from New York and Washing-
ton that American policy in the Far East might be on the verge of 
shifting toward a rapprochement with the English in blocking the 
Russian advance into Manchuria. As early as 1895, the foreign 
minister had advised the Tsar that England was "our most dangerous 
adversary in Asia," but "as soon as any kind of Asiatic difficulties 
cropped up the friends of England always were our enemies and vice 
versa." To this assessment Nicholas II commented "Naturally." 
During the next few years, the Russian foreign ministry became "well 
aware what kind of aspirations direct Americans in their corr®ercial 
and trade enterprises on the entire Western seaboard of the Pacific 
Ocean." The ministry was also in receipt of estimates from both 
London and Washington of the "English agitation" attempting to draw 
the two Anglo-Saxon nations "toward a common position on Far East 
events." Russia's objective was to counteract the growing American 
spirit of cooperation with Great Britain and to forestall the American 
government from engaging in more vigorous competition for Manchuria. 
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Russia did not want to quarrel with the United States and sought to 
avoid any overt economic or political rivalry.26 
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To accomplish this end, the tsarist government took several 
measures, the first of which was to nominate, in early February, 
Count Cassini, a veteran diplomat and Far East expert, as the Russian 
representative to Washington. At the same time each nation's 
diplomatic envoy was raised from the ministerial level to that of 
ambassador. Muravev lost no time in attempting to re-cement the 
"traditional friendship." On the occasion of the mutual exchange of 
acceptances of the.new diplomatic rank, he confidentially informed 
Hitchcock that the Spanish government's solicitation for support 
over Cuba had been plainly refused since "the warm friendship 
existing between our Governments made it quite impossible for the 
Imperial Government to entertain any propositions which could be 
construed to be unfriendly to the United States." Hitchcock was 
gratified at this "expression of the cordial and friendly feeling of 
Russia."27 
The instructions provided to Cassini upon entering his 
ambassadorship also were revealing of the Russian strategy. Having 
been provided with a summary of the historical foundations of the 
Russo-American friendship, Cassini was directed to maintain and 
strengthen ties with the United States and to "evince complete 
sympathy with the interests of the Americans." Of the current American 
concerns, the foreign ministry believed that the two nations could 
find a solution to the problem of pelagic seal hunting in the North 
Pacific. Similarly, the self-interest of the two nations coincided 
over Hawaii. Russia was pleased to support the United States in the 
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annexation of the islands rather than have them fall into the less 
friendly hands of Great Britain or Japan. Second, Cassini was 
instructed to "make every endeavor to create conflicts between the 
Federal Government and England and Japan" while at the same time 
"remaining in the aura of Russo-American friendship." In particular, 
he was to pay careful attention to the relations of the United States 
and Canada. The secession of Canada from Great Britain was important 
to Russia, but the foreign ministry was not quite certain whether 
the union of Canada with the United States might not strengthen the 
latter into an even greater Pacific threat and competitor. The last 
and most difficult task assigned to Cassini concerned American 
enterprises in Asia. He was to use his background knowledge to pay 
"special attention to the significance to us (Russia) of the develop-
ment of American industry in the Far East." Cassini was supposed 
to make a distinction bett.Jeen American enterprises, promoting those 
which would be favorable to Russia and taking energetic action 
against those which would "impinge on our sphere of influence."28 
In this delicate policy of distinguishing between good and 
harmful American enterprise lies the key to understanding what appears, 
at first glance, to be an incongruous strategy. For, over the next 
several years, American exports into Asiatic Russia tripled and 
quadrupled. And more dramatically, millions of dollars worth of 
American goods were suddenly in demand in the Russian sector of 
Southern Manchuria. To build the port facilities, to construct the 
Manchurian railroads and to feed the growing Russian population there, 
the tsarist government needed to import foodstuffs, coal, steel rails, 
locomotives and all manner of machinery. It was estimated that 80% 
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of the equipment and material used in Russia's Manchurian zone was 
purchased from the United States, by 1900 perhaps four million 
dollars worth. American exports to Asiatic Russia increased sharply 
also during a four-year period (in millions of dollars): 
1897 
.45 
1898 
1.4 
1899 
1.86 
1900 
2.64 
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Selecting the United States to be the major supplier, not only seemed 
to make good economic sense, but also good diplomatic sense. It was 
a tactic that Russia had used successfully before. By appealing to 
the short-term commercial instincts of the Americans, Russia may have 
hoped to divert attention from Russia's long-term political and 
economic penetration of Manchuria. Instead, the tactic tended to 
emphasize that all Northeast Asia was a market to be prized and 
protected. 29 
During 1898 there were numerous examples of Russia exercising 
this cautious trade policy with the United States, wary of becoming 
economically dependent on the United States, but yet hoping to soften 
relations through the offer of temporary trade advantages. To 
stimulate trade through Vladivostok, for example, no tariffs were 
imposed on imports. In view of the growing importance of this trade, 
the United States proposed placing an American consul there, but 
this was rejected by the Russian government. Only a commercial agent 
was allowed in Asiatic Russia. Again, Russia repeated once more its 
intention to construct the Manchurian railroads by itself, but 
awarded a contract for 36,000 tons of steel rails for these lines 
to the Maryland Steel Company. Later, when some contract difficulties 
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arose, Witte settled the matter personally by directing that "financial 
conditions being equal, the order for rails should be given to the 
Americans." Similarly, Russia was prepared to give an American firm 
a lumbering concession in Siberia, but only for the 6-8 year period 
necessary to learn American technology. Also, while Russia was plac-
ing large orders for American locomotives and air brakes, the long-
term prospects for this type of export to Russia were limited by the 
successful trial run of the first locomotive built domestically, 
albeit with American machinery and under American supervision. The 
prospects for the sale of American ships, sewing machines and 
agricultural equipment were all encouraging, at least for the time 
being. 30 
Hitchcock had been sent to Russia with instructions t~ push 
trade and he was making progress. Why then was American foreign 
policy not affected by this sizeable "Siberian market" to the same 
extent as by the "China market"? For one thing, the Siberian market 
never received the same ballyhoo from the American press, consular 
officials or business circles. No Siberian lobby was formed to 
influence the government to safeguard commerce with Asiatic Russia. 
Most Americans were no longer deluded that friendship with Russia 
meant American access to the development of the Amur basin. The 
Americans knew that Russia, unlike China, was capable of and intent 
on establishing domestic industries and once in operation would, 
like the United States, protect their output with high tariffs. 
Reports had already been received from Enoch Emory, an American mer-
chant engaged in importing American goods into Siberia, of rumors 
that tariffs v1ere about to be reimposed at Eastern Siberian ports. 
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Emory operated on a large scale, having eleven warehouses. Siberiau 
merchants had already complained about American competition and de-
manded that American products be excluded. When queried as to this 
possibility, Witte acknowledged that the matter of duties on imports 
was under consideration, but not for the immediate future. The 
Novoye Vremya, a few years later, portrayed the Russian dilemma: 
Siberian merchants are beginning to feel the pressure. 
Some are demanding the exclusion of American imports. 
The buyers of American products protest against any such 
action on the ground that in Siberia there is an 
industrial standstill, no enterprising spirit exists, 
and that the prices are extremely high. During the time 
that we are quarreling about a tariff and the abolish-
ment of the free port of Vladivostok, the Americans will 
have taken possession of the Siberian markets and erected 
factories and mills of all kinds. We are now building 
a railway into China, but the chances are that the 
Americans will benefit more from the Chinese markets than 
the Russians. 
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Eventually, it was expected that American exports into Asiatic Russia 
would have been restricted and the United States would have no recourse 
to prevent that happening. For that reason, American diplomatic 
efforts were concentrated on Manchuria and North China where there 
was a better opportunity to keep the avenues open indefinitely. 31 
The Spanish-American War brought a further testing of Russo-
American relations. Though sympathetic with a fellow European monarchy, 
the tsarist government could not afford to antagonize the United 
States by seriously considering joining any European concert to 
intervene in the conflict on Spain's behalf. Instead, Muravev 
assured Hitchc~ck officially of Russia's strict and impartial neutrality 
in the war. Unofficially, he offered friendly assurances personally 
and on behalf of his government.32 If the war had been confined to 
the Caribbean, these declarations would have sufficed. When, however, 
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Admiral Dewey gained his naval victory at Manila, this Pacific 
dimension to the war complicated Russia's problem--what stance should 
she take on the disposition of the Philippine Islands? This question 
placed the Russian foreign ministry in a quandary. Outright opposi-
tion to America's ambitions in the Philippines would alienate the 
United States further and bring the Anglo-American rapprochement 
one step closer. Supporting permanent occupation of the islands, 
on the other hand, would be to encourage the full-fledged participa-
tion of the United States in Asian affairs, not just as a passive 
voice of moral persuasion, but possibly as a first-class naval power 
with forward bases. In any new role as an active Pacific power, 
the United States might well be more inclined to unite with England 
in trying to stop Russian expansion into Manchuria. 
At first, one month after the American victory, Muravev 
assured Hitchcock that "Russia felt no interest whatever in the 
Philippines," implying that Russian interests were centered entirely 
in North China. Nevertheless, rumors persisted that Russia was about 
to join Germany and France in settling the future status of the 
Philippines. These rumors gained some credence when a St. Petersburg 
newspaper insisted that "America must voluntarily submit her pretensions 
to a tribune of the powers." Other press comments urged the Russian 
government not to lose a moment in seizing a portion of the Philippines 
for itself as a coaling station. American diplomats had difficulty 
in gauging the degree of government influence on individual newspapers. 
All, they were certain, were cautious of censorship; some, they 
believed, actually reflected government policy accurately. Again, 
Muravev dismissed these rumors, declaring that toward the United States 
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"we were friends, we are friends and we intend to remain friends."33 
From Washington, Cassini reported his belief that the United 
States intended to annex all of the Philippines. Rather than console 
himself with the "passing of the Philippines into the hands of our 
friends, the Americans~ whom we love and value," Cassini regarded 
the impending annexation with "considerably less well-wishing." He 
foresaw the Americans using the Philippines as "a point of departure 
in the Far East" and bringing a new factor into the Far Eastern 
political situation. He was particularly concerned that the circum-
stances would lead to a closer agreement between the "two great 
naval powers," should the United States share or transfer the islands 
to Great Britain.34 
In July the influential Novoye Vremya published comprehensive 
recommendations regarding the policy that Russia should follow on 
the Philippine question. Russia should not join any concert of 
European powers. Russia's interests in Northeast Asia were too 
far removed from the Philippines to coincide with the commercial 
interests of the others. The islands should remain undivided under 
the control of the United States. An immediate categorical declara-
tion by Russia on this point would be as decisive as the movement of 
the Russian squadrons to American ports during the Civil War. In 
reward for this friendly attitude, Russia would "get what would be 
necessary for us," including the lease of coaling stations in the 
Philippines. 35 
However, the Russian government hesitated and never made 
such a categorical statement backing the United States. Both England 
and Japan did. When Herbert Peirce, American charg~, took the 
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initiative and inquired specifically of the Russian foreign office 
whether Russia intended to interpose any objection to the American 
claim to the islands, Count Lamsdorff disengenuously answered that 
his government had never occupied itself with the matter. When 
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word of this unauthorized query reached John Hay, the new Secretary 
of State, he was greatly irritated. Peirce was told, in no uncertain 
terms, that the acquisition of the Philippines was solely the concern 
of Spain and the United States. Hay had no intention of the United 
States appearing to be beholden to Russia for its war-won gains. 
Far from seeking cooperation and backing in Asian affairs, as had 
been frequently sought in previous decades of American policy, 
Hay was determined to strike a course independent of Russia. 36 
Russia had hoped that America's newly demonstrated "naval 
militarism" could be confined to the distant Philippines and kept 
entirely separate from America's previously passive and purely private 
commercial concerns in Northeast Asia. Despite the two thousand mile 
separation, this proved to be wishful thinking. Once the United 
States commenced to occupy the islands, American affairs throughout 
Asia were inextricably intertwined. Although Americans who favored 
annexation primarily prized the intrinsic commercial value of the 
islands and their potential as a trading entrepot off Southern China, 
interest was not limited to the immediate geographic sphere. Imperial-
ists saw the islands as a gateway to all the markets of East Asia. 
Heretofore excluded from the territorial scramble on the mainland, 
here was .a chance for getting a "share of what is going on in Asia." 
Holding on to the Philippines would serve to protect American trade 
with China, provide "naval and military force on the western shores 
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of the Pacific," and pave "the way for future interventions on the 
part of the United States in the affairs of the East." Far from 
providing a substitute for their commercial interests in Manchuria, 
American businessmen were encouraged that this taste of imperialism 
foreshadowed more active governmental backing in keeping the China 
market open in the North. Instead of forestalling or diverting a 
potential conflict of Russian and American national interests in 
Manchuria, the acquisition of the Philippines brought the rivalry 
one step closer to reality. 37 
In Russia it was also recognized that the American victory 
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probably presaged a new era in American diplomacy throughout the Pacific. 
Novoye Vremya, in acknowledging the now proven naval power of the 
United States, thought that Manila Bay would only be the "first 
trial of the American fleet." The newspaper, probably reflecting 
the government's own views, went on to examine Russo-American relations 
in light of these developments: 
We really cannot understand what could induce the govern-
ment of the American republicans and democrats to break 
the century old friendship and alliance which exists 
between Russia and the United States or that it would allow 
the lightest cloud to darken these relations. It is 
impossible that the reason could be the empty question of 
the "open door" in Corea or Manchuria. For our opinion 
the Americans should not be blinded by such narrow ideas 
• • • • The desire of Russia as one of the Asiatic Powers 
is much more modest: we only claim that the countries 
touching Russia's boundary in Asia not be disputed ••• 
the extent of Asia is great enough to satisfy all the 
other Powers including the United States •••• Neither 
on this account nor on account of the cession of the 
Philippines shall we in any way interfere ••• but we 
feel a moral right to claim from the United States a 
reciprocation of this kind feeling by not interfering in 
Russia's political action in the Far East.38 
But the United States had no intention of so reciprocating and leaving 
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Russia a free hand in Northeast Asia. American eyes were turned to 
the Pacific as never before and keeping trade open to Manchuria 
remained an important consideration. Having faced down the possibility 
of foreign interference in the Philippines and in its new mood of 
confident imperialism, America was far readier to meet challenges 
to its commercial interests in North China. One instance of this 
feisty mood cropped up in response to reports that Russia had 
prevented British investors from constructing a rail line to Newchwang, 
Manchuria's principal seaport. To the New York Times, this was a 
premonition of a Manchurian shut-down. The United States should 
stand by Great Britain against the "unjustifiable aggressiveness of 
Russia." According to the Times, the United States should be heard 
with more respect since the Battle of Manila and, if necessary, the 
American navy should keep Newchwang open. 39 
Russia's concern about America's growing militarism had some 
validity. Dewey's victory had been a dramatic demonstration of the 
use of seapower as an instrument of national policy. While the 
ultimate disposition of the Philippines was being debated thoroughly, 
few doubted that the United States should, as a minimum, acqu,,ir~ .. a 
naval base there. Nor were the arguments favoring a trans-Pacific 
projection of naval strength limited to Hawaii and the Philippines. 
It was also recognized that a base further north would be required, 
closer to the center of America's commercial interests. Admiral Dewey 
had not had time in early 1898 to find a suitable port in North 
China and, unfortunately for the United States, the spheres of 
influence established within the next several months had reduced 
their availability drastically. In October the American consul in 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
266 
Chefoo was urging that the United States secure a base along the 
North China coast "to protect our interests in North China, by our 
own guns, and by our own coal." A month later the new minister to 
Peking, Edwin Conger, recommended that the United States "either by 
negotiation or by actual possession" should "own and control at least 
one good point from which we can potently assert our rights and 
effectively wield our influence." The navy, too, had been considering 
this problem. The Naval War Board studied the navy's need for coaling 
stations worldwide. Among their findings was the requirement for a 
station one thousand miles north of Manila in the Chusan Islands off 
the mouth of the Yangtze River. Commander R. B. Bradford, chief of 
the bureau responsible for supplying coal to deployed naval ships, 
also thought that "with the recent concessions made by China in the 
way of granting territory to other first-class nations, it would 
appear that the United States might, with becoming modesty, ask for 
one of these islands (the Chusans)." Intermittently in the past, 
individual Americans from Perry to Rockhill had foreseen the need for 
an American base along or off the coast of Northeast Asia. By the 
end of 1898 the need was becoming more apparent and being expressed 
f . f 40 rom a var~ety o quarters. 
Once the fighting ceased, the McKinley administration was 
better able to view the Far East situation as an interconnected whole. 
Another concept which tied Manchuria to the Philippines was the idea 
of an open trade policy. The New York press had early pointed out 
that the United States, to be consistent with its demands for equal 
trading opportunity in all parts of China, must afford the same 
treatment in its own Asiatic possessions. In this vein the President 
first outlined an American concept of a broad open door commercial 
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policy for his peace commissioners to follow: "We seek no advantages 
in the Orient which are not common to all • • • • Asking only the 
open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to 
others. 1141 
Using Robert Beisner'a concept as a model, 1898 was the year 
of the transition of the United States to a new diplom~cy toward 
Northeast Asia. The components of the "new paradigm" began to take 
shape. Americans had long believed that the United States would 
eventually become the dominant force in the North Pacific. Now it 
appeared as if this was no longer in the indefinite future, but about 
to happen. Americans commenced to see the United States as a first-
class world power with its share of responsibilities to assume in the 
Far East, unshackled by the shibboleths of the "old diplomacy." 
Events in Northeast Asia assumed a more direct impact and a more 
immediate significance. American exports to Manchuria and elsewhere 
in North China became a "vital" concern. Safeguarding that commerce, 
even at the expense of vitiating a traditional friendship, became a 
matter of national priority. All that the new diplomacy lacked in 
1898 was a "policy," crafted and planned from Washington, not solely 
as a response to outside opinions or individual actions, but as a 
carefully considered determinant in controlling events.42 
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CHAPTER IX 
CHANGING SIDES 
At first glance, the most puzzling of the many questions 
raised by the American intervention into China's affairs that resulted 
in the first "open door" notes, was why did the United States Govern-
ment, during the latter half of 1899, suddenly consider it necessary 
to engage in this diplomatic venture outside of its hemisphere? 
Why this drastic departure from a long-standing policy of governmental 
non-involvement at a time when no new, major crisis in China seemed 
imminent? The most recent cessions of Chinese territory, which had 
taken place eighteen months previously, had hardly caused a ripple 
in the administration. Since then, minor attempts by Italy and France 
to nibble away at the Chinese Empire had easily been turned aside. 
The predominant influence of Russia in Manchuria had apparently been 
accepted in the United States as an accomplished fact. American goods 
were not only still flowing into Manchuria and North China, but 
business with Asiatic Russia was booming as well. As yet, Russia 
had raised no obstacle to commercial equality in the region. Under 
the old diplomatic rules the state department would have let the 
situation be. No initiative would have been taken without being pro-
voked by some immediate, direct cause, and perhaps not even then. 
By choosing to champion the open door policy at this time, the United 
States was, for a change, attempting to anticipate events and take 
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the lead. 
This change in diplomatic stance was facilitated by the rapid 
dissipation in the traditional Russo-American friendship, which had 
previously obscured a realistic appraisal of America's prospects in 
Northeast Asia. At the same time, the full extent of the stake that 
Americans thought they had forged across the North Pacific and 
thought that they should be allowed to lay claim to was not only 
being appreciated by a larger segment of the American public, but 
in most cases greatly exaggerated. During the century, the Americans 
and the Russians had met in the North Pacific in a multitude of 
situations and been able to accommodate each others' ambitions in a 
reasonably amicable fashion. But over the past decade, deeply held 
suspicions had accumulated as the United States watched Russia's 
unilateral advance into Manchuria. These suspicions were based 
partly on factual diplomatic observation, partly on an extrapolation 
of Russia's previous behavior, and partly on conjecture and rumor. 
And, beginning during the latter part of 1898, these suspicions were 
aired and given widespread credence by a spate of publicity, which 
borrowed heavily from the anti-Russian views expressed by English 
writers. Joining in this propaganda campaign were "old China hands," 
academicians, business associations with interests in China, the 
New York press and a few members of the administration. The publicity 
ranged from discussions of the very real dangers to American commercial 
interests in Northeast Asia to the more extravagant, and perhaps more 
irrational, fears that Slavic Russia was intent on the suC'cessive 
domination of Asia, the Pacific, and the world. 
For their part, the Ru~sians, too, were experiencing a growing 
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feeling of anti-Americanism. The old friendship was ebbing in the 
course of heightened American imperialism. Russian leaders no doubt 
distrusted this new mood and reappraised the aggressiveness of the 
Americans, who seemed to be pushing their own interests, at the 
expense of Russia, and on the Russian side of the Pacific. In a 
counter-campaign of propaganda, Russian spokesmen attempted to offset 
the British influence, to allay American fears, and to persuade the 
United States to concentrate its ambitions in its own hemisphere. 1 
The backdrop of British and Russian propaganda attempting to 
capture the American mind and influence policy was only quasi-official. 
Although the arguments did not always emanate directly from either 
of the foreign offices, the opinions offered to the American public 
coincided closely with the official positions. The propaganda did 
not present any strikingly new information or concepts, but it did 
tend to focus American attention more sharply on the potential pro-
blems in Northeast Asia. Materially and ideologically, the arguments, 
particularly those of the English writers, struck a responsive chord. 
These same ideas had been gathering in America's collective memory, 
but now were being expressed comprehensively and with a sense of 
urgency. The debate clarified the issue and narrowed the choice: 
either follow Britain's course and try to stem the advance of Russia, 
or follow Russia's advice to remain neutral and trust, based on 
past friendship, that American interests would not be discriminated 
against. 
Lord Charles Beresford was one of those prominent in the 
development of an American climate of opinion favorable to a 
reaffirmation of an "open door" for China. Under the auspices of 
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the British Associated Chambers of Commerce, Beresford travelled 
extensively in China commencing in October 1898, inquiring into 
commercial matters with British merchants. Before leaving England, 
he discussed his plans with Ambassador Hay, who urged him to talk 
with American merchants also. What Beresford observed alarmed him. 
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At nearly every stop he found the merchants apprehensive of Russia's 
increasingly dominant military position in North China. Manchuria, 
he discovered, was rapidly becoming a Russian province, garrisoned 
with Cossacks. English influence in China was correspondingly 
slipping, as the position of the "hostile northern power" improved. 
The commercial open door to North China was entirely dependent on 
the goodwill of Russia and then, Beresford asked, what would happen 
in a few years when the completion of the Siberian railroad closed 
Russia's strategic gap? To counteract this threat to "Anglo-Saxon" 
trade, Beresford urged first, Anglo-American collaboration in securing 
the integrity of the Chinese Empire against the impending break-up. 
Second, he recommended that the "four trading powers"--England, 
Germany, Japan and the United States--join together to reorganize 
and unify China's int~rnal defenses, a move obviously designed to 
check Russia's military advance. 2 
In February 1899, Beresford toured the United States on his 
return trip to England. He spoke to the Chambers of Commerce in 
San Francisco, Chicago and Buffalo, as well as to the American Asiatic 
Association in New York. In Washington he met with President McKinley 
and had lunch with Secretary Hay. 3 Everywhere he stressed that the 
"open door" was essential to American trade in China. His trip and 
speeches evoked wide interest in the press of other cities and he 
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was the recipient of much correspondence on the subject. His complete 
report, Break-up of China, was published in book form soon after his 
return and was widely reviewed in the United States. This was 
followed by a special appeal to American readers in an article for 
the North American Review, in which Beresford summed up his recommenda-
tion for a coalition to guarantee the independence of China--implicitly 
against Russian aggression. Or, as Beresford put the question in 
his book: "Are the great trading nations of the world going to 
allow the powers that seek only territorial aggrandizement to 
blockade the wealth of China and shut the door in their faces?" 
The New York Times, in reviewing Beresford's work, knew precisely 
which power the coalition should be directed against: 
Has not Russia shut a long line of doors very tight in 
the northern street of China? And is she not preparing 
for future encroachments? And there is no power on earth 
that will prevent future rulers of Russia from possessing 
an extensive seaboard on that Pacific Coast which was 
once called China. 
His solution might not prove to be entirely palatable, but Beresford 
had successfully transmitted his sense of urgency to the American 
public as well as to key members of the McKinley administration. 4 
Archibald Colquhoun, an English engineer, explorer and commer-
cial pioneer, in his widely read and reviewed China in Transformation, 
had presented an even gloomier prognosis of the political situation 
in China. In his opinion, England had lost its opportunity to 
influence imperial China. British diplomacy was failing to stem the 
Russian advance, which was obeying the law of "sunward and seaward." 
He was deeply concerned about the rise of Asiatic Russia, which being 
semi-Asiatic, knew how to deal with China and make itself feared. 
England only wanted Chinese trade; Russia wanted Chinese provinces. 
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Having posed as a protector of China against Western aggression, 
Russia would organize Manchuria and advance on Peking and the Yellow 
River basin. Then, utilizing resources of China and with millions 
of Chinese to work and to fight for her, Russia was destined to 
dominate all of East Asia. To Colquhoun this outcome was patently 
unjust. Russia did not deserve a place in China because its trade 
was insignificant. Russian promises of "equal trade" in Manchuria 
were illusory. Manchuria, in particular, was too full of valuable 
resources, too splendid a country to let fall to Russia. Manchuria, 
according to Colquhoun, was a "white man's country.n Therefore, 
the mercantile, maritime nations must press on China administrative 
reforms and a "comprehensive policy of opening the country." Colqu-
houn called on England, Australia, the United States and Germany to 
stop the "new Genghiz." The "Anglo-Teutonic races" must avoid 
domination by the Slav.5 
For his American readers Colquhoun wrote two articles, one 
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in Harpers and the other for the North American Review. In these he 
emphasized that, commercially and politically, the United States, 
as a nation with an enormous stake in the future of the Pacific, 
should be deeply concerned about the China question. Americans would 
be hard pressed to sell their cotton and oil in Northeast Asia 
without some guarantees of equal treatment, but commercial enter-
prises must go hand in hand with government policy. China and the 
Far East now lay practically at the back door of America because 
of its recent acquisitions in the Pacific. The United States had 
a "great mission" and an opportunity for "national enlargement," 
but must choose between the "sweet words" of Russia or join England 
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in the struggle to prevent the Pacific from being turned into a 
Russian lake. Colquhoun, also believing that the ultimate question 
was the future of the Teutonic race, appealed to the Anglo-American 
bonds of race, language, religion and form of government. 6 
Colquhoun's dire predictions were echoed in the Outlook: 
More important than the development of commerce is the 
great issue--ominous of dire results if Russian ambition 
is unchecked--whether a crushing autocracy shall, by 
military conquest and political intrigue, use the three 
hundred hundred and fifty million inhabitants of China 
as an instrument to bind Asia to itself and threaten 
the world. 
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The Sewanee Review, noting that Manchuria was rich in valuable minerals 
and populated by an industrious people, was concerned that the region 
was becoming a "Cossack camp." The completion of the Siberian rail-
road would further endanger China and the peace of the world. No 
longer, according to this journal, could the United States ignore 
events in the distant Far East, which more properly should now be 
considered the "Near West. 117 
After these opening salvoes, Vladimir Holmstrem and Prince 
Ukhtomskij, in a "Plea for Russo-American Understanding," offered a 
rebuttal to the English commentators. They argued the Russian case 
at length along two main lines. Their first plea, renewing an 
earlier concept, urged that Russia and America each concentrate its 
efforts in its "own half of the globe." America was a "universe" in 
which the United States predominated. The "absorbing, all-embracing 
and determining interest" of Americans should center on their own 
continent and foster h2althy "Americanism." North America should be 
emancipated from English influence, casting off the "shackles of 
British tutelage." At the same time, Russia, as an Asiatic power, 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
278 
must assume guardianship of the East, because "its consolidation means 
our consolidation." The influence of Asia had been the dominant 
factor in the history of Russia--"she crushed us, but has also 
regenerated us." It was now the duty of Russia to develop peacefully 
the Asiatic nations along strictly national lines in accordance with 
the characteristic individuality of its races. Only if forced by the 
machinations of non-Asiatic nations, would Russia adopt a "policy 
of absorbing a nation of four hundred million souls."8 
Too many Americans had played a role in the North Pacific 
and in Northeast Asia, over too many decades, and with too many 
expectations to retreat now to the North American continent. From 
fur traders to whalers, from Commodore Perry to Secretary Seward, 
from Perry Collins to William Gilpin, from railroad entrepreneurs 
to cotton sheeting exporters--the vision of an American North Pacific 
economic empire had persisted and grown. One terminus of this 
empire was conceived as being firmly planted in Northeast Asia. For 
many the "Far East" had, in reality, become the "Near West." 
Americans were not surprised to meet an expanding Russia on the 
Asiatic side. That had long been foretold. The only question was 
whether the meeting would result in confrontation or cooperation. 
And the former was seeming more likely, for Holmstrem's veiled 
threat to absorb all of China accorded more and more with the idea 
which many Americans held was the true, underlying purpose of Russia 
in Asia and that the first step was nearing completion in Manchuria. 
Realizing, at this juncture, the improbability of the United 
States completely abandoning its interests in Northeast Asia and 
confining its attention to the Western Hemisphere, Holmstrem developed 
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a second plea. The United States and Russia should cooperate in 
supporting the independence and integrity of China. The presence 
of Russia in Asia, it was claimed, was the only factor inhibiting 
English aggression against China. The cry for an "open door" was 
only an English subterfuge. If the United States joined in any 
anti-Russian combine, it would only lead to the immediate dismember-
ment of China. Instead, Holmstrem argued that the destinies of 
Russia and the United States in the Far East were interwoven and 
drawn together by "invisible ties of friendship and goodwill." 
Only one condition was necessary for continuing this fine relationship: 
America "must come over to our (Russian) side and accept the Eastern 
conception," as opposed to the concept of imposing Western, revolu-
. f · ch· 9 tLonary re orms Ln Lna. 
Among those who sympathized with this Russian view was 
Andrew Carnegie, a fervent anti-imperialist, who believed that the 
United States should not hold onto the Philippines and certainly 
should not enter a contest for further possessions. Carnegie was 
afraid that a war in the Far East was in the offing, but thought 
that the United States was too ill-prepared militarily to engage in 
a major power struggle. He did not want America to be at the mercy 
of stronger nations or the "catspaw" of England. Carnegie had no 
illusions about Russian intentions in Northeast Asia, but Russia 
had always been the "friend of the United States." Besides, the 
Russian expansion was "legitimate, because it is over coterminous 
territory, which Russia can absorb and Russianize." Of those who 
rushed to print in the 1899 debate over the Far East question, 
Carnegie was one of the few who still evoked the memory of Russian 
friendship. 10 
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The Reverend Gilbert Reid was another who did not consider 
Russia an aggressor in Manchuria. Reid had been attempting to 
establish an International Institute of China in Peking, ever since 
1898. During the course of his work he became well acquainted with 
Prince Ukhtomskij, who praised Reid's educational mission, comparing 
it favorably in a number of editorials as the antithesis of the normal 
crass materialism of the other Americans in China. In turn, Reid 
thought that Russia's intentions toward China were entirely friendly 
and peaceful. Russia had not, in Reid's opinion, yet possessed 
Manchuria and the area was still open to foreign trade. Only if 
the other nations began the dismemberment of China would Russia be 
prepared to seize Mongolia and Manchuria. 11 
American missionaries in China and those that had returned 
home were an important factor in keeping public interest in the 
China situation at a high ~itch. As a group, the missionaries were 
deeply concerned about keeping China open to Western civilization and 
American commerce, so they generally welcomed state department initia-
tives along these lines. Whether they yet recognized, by 1899, any 
threat posed by Russia's advance into Manchuria is problematical. 
Manchuria was not in the American sphere of missionary endeavor and 
may not have held th~ same degree of significance for them as it 
held for American merchants. 12 
Through the lengthy Holstrem-Ukhtomskij plea the administration 
no doubt gained a clearer understanding of Russian objectives, but 
in return, no long-term guarantees were vouchsafed that American 
trade would continue to enjoy equal opportunity within the Russian 
sphere. Significantly, no further commercial enticement was dangled 
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before the American businessman to sway his opinion, as had been 
tried in the past. Russia's plea for understanding failed to con-
vince the New York Sun 
that Russia does not contemplate the acquisition of all 
that part of China which lies north of the Yangtse basin 
and of the section of Shantung claimed by the Germans; 
that is to say, the part of the Celestial Empire to which 
most of our trade is, at present, confined. Neither does 
he (Holmstrem) give us reasons for believing that, after 
Manchuria, Liaotung and Chih-li and the rest of Northern 
China have been absorbed by Russia, which is wedded to a 
protective policy, American products will have as free 
access to that vast region as they have today.l3 
Nor was the New York Times persuaded. Holmstrem's article was dis-
281 
missed as a plea for an "Anglo-American misunderstanding." It saw 
no basis for an understanding between an Asiatic despotism and a 
Western Republic, whereas the Anglo-American understanding was a 
reality. The United States no longer needed to "take sentimentally 
and at least passively the Russian side." The plea to "hate England 
• because Russia hates her" proved no longer to be an effective 
appea1. 14 
The Russian ambassador to the United States, Count Cassini, 
having been briefed along lines similar to the Holmstrem plea, tried 
valiantly to stem the tide of hostility which he saw in the American 
press. In one interview he explicitly declared that Russian policy 
did not conflict with the interests of the United States in China. 
It was not the purpose of the Russian Government to annex Chinese 
territory. In his opinion, there would be "no real par1:ition nf 
China. 11 In another interview Cassini did hi.s best to ccmnteract the 
arguments of Lord Beresford, emphasizing once Qore that the door to 
China was not shut. According to Henry Adams, Com.<t Gassini "let 
few days pass without appealing through the press to the public." 
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The New York Times thought that "the very able representative of 
Russia to Washington" was doing too good of a job and "was able to 
befog the minds that were never clear upon the question (open door)." 
In his endeavors Cassini was reportedly aided by certain American 
newspapers which had "actually been subsidized from the secret 
service fund at the disposal of the Russian Embassy, so difficult 
was it to explain their utterances on any other hypothesis." While 
Cassini had prevented the "administration from perceiving and 
pursuing our National interests in the East" previously, Secretary 
Hay, it was hoped, would not be duped by the "cleverness of a Russian 
Ambassador. nlS 
The countrymen of both Russia and England were assiduously 
courting the favor and support of American public opinion on the 
open door question. Soon after the publication of the Ukhtomskij-
Holmstrem article, two English re-rebuttals appeared, one in the 
North American Review by Archibald Little, an English author who 
had travelled extensively in China, and the other in the Forum by 
A. Maurice Low, an English journalist writing on American affairs. 
Aside from a rehash of previous arguments, Little elaborated on 
one point which had only been touched on by Beresford. He stressed 
the importance of the treaty port of Newchwang as the major entry point 
for American exports to Manchuria. Also, he reviewed England's 
unsuccessful negotiations with Russia concerning rail concessions 
in North China. Russia had refused to promise not to discriminate 
against non-Russian merchandise, thus raising the spectre of American 
products being subject to premium transportation rates, while competing 
Russian goods would have their transportation costs subsidized. Low 
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took another tack. He began the process of debunking the historical 
myths which had been used previously to underpin the traditions of 
Russo-American friendship. He summed up by reiterating the proposi-
tion that the United States must choose between the way of Russia 
or the way of England, between the "militarism of the Slav" or the 
16 
"freedom of the Saxon." 
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In this broader dimension the debate began to assume geo-
political, ideological and even racist overtones which had been latent 
in American thinking since mid-century, and which were now being 
revived and expanded upon by American writers. The growing concern 
that Russia ~·Jas bent on the military domination of China which would, 
in turn, lead to the control of the Pacific, all of Asia and then 
the world took two general forms. Most frequently, the explicit 
question was posed: "Which shall dominate--Saxon or Slav?" David 
Mills, the Canadian Minister of Justice, raised exactly this issue 
in the North American Review. He predicted that, as a natural con-
sequence of the commerce of Asia falling to Russia, it would then be 
the dominant sea power and the "Pacific Ocean would be a Russian Lake." 
Unless the United States joined the Anglo-Saxon community in stopping 
the ascendancy of Russia, the "leadership of the Saxon would be 
at an end and that of the Slav would begin." George Burton Adams, 
a professor and historian, writing in the Atlantic Monthly was more 
optimistic about the prospects for Anglo-Saxon expansion. He saw 
the nineteenth century as only an "age of preliminary and introductory 
expansion" preparing the way for vaster expansion in the twentieth. 
But this would only be accomplished if the whole Anglo-Saxon race 
were brought into line on a common policy and shared common burdens.17 
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Gardiner Hubbard, founder and first president of the National 
Geographic Society, thought that the destiny of Asia was most 
intimately connected with Russia and that Russia would "become the 
leading nation of the Orient," but voiced no particular alarm at 
the prospecta On the ether hand, James K. Hosmer, minister and 
historian, believed that the Anglo-Saxon fraternity must inevitably 
confront Russia. He thought the world faced two alternatives: 
the reduction of the human race to vassalage under a "Czar installed 
in the position of dictator," or the development of the human race 
with "Anglo-Saxon freedom."18 
Frederick Wells Williams, son of Commodore Perry's interpreter 
and a prominent Orientalist in his own right at Yale, also viewed 
the Slav and the Anglo-Saxon as competitors for control of the world: 
These are the only races whose territories and consequently 
whose potential strength in population and material resources, 
are adequate to the stupendous task, whose subjects are 
colonizers in the true sense that comprises both the 
peopling of vast spaces and the assimilation and subjection 
of foreigners to their institutions. These great rivals 
have already been long at work, each in characteristic fashion, 
fulfilling ••• their manifest destiny, each a participator 
in the conquest of Asia • • Behind one or the other must 
sooner or later be ranged all the potential forces of the 
world. 
The contest, which according to Williams had already begun, allowed "no 
alternative between victory on the one side and destruction on the 
other."19 
Andrew Raymond, President of Union College, saw the prominence 
that Russia had gained in the affairs of China as the "greatest danger 
that threatens." For him, the heart of the Far East question was 
whether Anglo-Saxon or the inferior Russian civilization would prevail 
in China. Russian ambitions were unquestioned. Unless checked, that 
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nation would absorb more and more of China. Such an extension of power 
by the Slav would become a "serious menace to the rest of the 
civilized world." To prevent this from occurring, Raymond advocated 
that England and America work together through diplomatic means 
and the presence of naval and military force to preserve the integrity 
of China. 20 
The concern about Russian world domination took a second, 
related form. In this, the semi-Asiatic nature of Russia was stressed. 
The point of this argument was that Russia had demonstrated a great 
capability for assimilating people. If Russia should arm and train 
the legions of Central Asia and North China, history might repeat. 
For as Williams noted, it was here that have been "bred in the past 
the races which overran and dominated the civilized West and where 
these swarms were once raised other millions may spring in the 
future to obey the call of the conqueror and spread devastation 
among those more cultured but less lusty people who represent our 
race."21 Theodore Roosevelt had much the same thought, suggested 
first by his friend Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, a British diplomat: 
Indeed, Russia is a problem very appalling •••• 
Russia seems bound to developing her own way, and on 
lines that run counter to what we are accustomed to 
consider as progress. If she ever does take possession 
of Northern China and drill the Northern Chinese to 
serve in her Army, she will indeed be a formidable 
power •••• The growth of the great Russian state in 
Siberia is portentious.22 
This growing concern for the strategic necessities in the 
Pacific stemmed, in part at least, from the increasingly prevalent 
view that the United States was now a world power and that certain 
responsibilities accrued to this new status, especially in Asia. 
The United States, the one major power which had not seized Chinese 
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territory was looked upon as the "arbiter" of China's future. If 
China were to be saved from breaking up, it depended on America. 
England had proved incapable of stemming the Russian menace alone. 
Now it was up to the United States somehow to take the lead to 
preserve and reform the ancient civilization. The first necessity 
was to sustain and press for an open door policy for China. According 
to the New York Times: 
Since it (open door) tends strongly to promote not only 
the prosperity of the American people but of the world, and 
general peace, it is clearly our duty to maintain it with 
all the resources at ou~ command. It is the true mission 
that we have to carry out as a "world power." 
The Nation agreed that interest and honor both prompt such a course. 
Again, the Times called upon: 
Americans to organize her vast resources during the next 
four years when the trans-Siberian will be finished • • • • 
American individuals and American capital can put strength 
into the inert mass without involving our Government in 
the least. Let us pursue our way without alliances and 
see whether the Great Democracy cannot win the prize from 
the Great Despotism by raising the Chinese to higher levels 
without asking them for an acre of land.23 
The idea of the "Great Democracy" competing with the "Great 
Despotism" for the sway in Asia harked back to a long tradition. Which 
would prevail--"plowshares" or "swords;" "freedom" or "servitude?" 
Could American reliance on the "unguided exertions and common-senses 
of the citizens" offset the authority of a society centered in a 
single arm? Alexis De Tocqueville had asked these questions as early 
as 1835 when he observed: 
There are, at present time, two great nations in the 
world which seem to tend towards the same end, although 
they started from different points • • • • Their starting-
point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet 
each of them seems to be marked out b2 the will of Heaven to 
sway the destinies of half the globe. 4 
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De Tocqueville's oft-quoted prophecy remained a portion of the intellec-
tual legacy of both Russians and Americans and was still being cited 
during the 1899 debates. 
The idea that America and Russia would contend for supremacy 
was, at the end of the century, being expressed more frequently and 
vociferously, less encumbered by constraints of friendship. Moreover, 
the drumbeat of warnings strongly suggested that the United States, 
as a young, increasingly powerful partner in the Anglo-Saxon community, 
must take the lead, and soon. Many of the concepts of manifest destiny, 
which had provided the rationale for American expansion across a 
continent and into the distant Pacific, were viewed as having equal 
applicability to Northeast Asia--perhaps not by outright, blatant 
territorial acquisition, but certainly through economic development, 
political guidance, and the civilizing influence of Christianity. In 
1899 one needed only to renew the precepts trumpeted by Strong, Fiske, 
Mahan, Turner and Burgess to accept the responsibility for the salva-
tion of China. A new frontier beckoned in Siberia, as well as in 
Manchuria. Henry Adams had earlier conceived of the notion for the 
Americanization of Siberia. Now with the increasing trade with 
Asiatic Russia there began a resurgence of interest in the region 
that Collins had first travelled. Within a few years, a number of 
articles, books and travel accounts would focus on Siberia. The 
Harper's Weekly visualized "Siberia as a field for Americans" urging 
American youth to "Go West, young man, go West to the Far East." 
Vladivostok was depicted as the "doorway of American interests in 
northern A.s ia. n 25 
A scattering of Americans had long predicted that the North 
Pacific would become an avenue of foremost strategic importance to 
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the United States. By the end of the century, this perception had 
heightened. Trans-continental railroads had reached the Pacific 
west coast and soon Asia would be spanned by rail. The Pacific states 
were rapidly increasing in population and the same phenomenom was 
occurring in Northeast Asia. Men like John Proctor, head of the 
U. S. Civil Service Commission, and John Barret, former minister to 
Siam, revived the forecast of Seward fifty years earlier that the 
placid Pacific would soon supplant the Atlantic as the "theatre of 
stirring events." The time was at hand when points of advantage were 
being occupied. If the United States were to assume its rightful 
position as the "paramount power in the Pacific," it must take 
cognizance of this threat. Any occupation of the Chinese Empire 
by Russia would be "dangerous to the peace and safety" of the United 
States. The development of Russia into a great naval power would 
introduce a "disturbing factor" into the Pacific Ocean. If necessary, 
Barret thought it advisable to "secure a port in northern China." 
Mahan saw Russia's "aggressive advance moving over the inert Asiatics 
like a steam-roller." To him, only the prospect of America and England, 
side by side, demanding that China be left open for trade, would 
cause Russia either to change her policy or go to war.26 
Paul Reinsch, political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, 
assessed the great importance of the Pacific as a highway of commerce 
in glowing terms: 
More than half the population of the globe lives in countries 
approachable by the Pacific. The resources of this portion 
by far exceed those of the older parts of the world, so that 
the commercial and industrial possibilities are of a dazzling 
nature. To no country is this change more important than 
to the United States, because, of all civilized nations, we 
are nearest to China. Even Russia, although connected with 
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China by railroad, is, for commercial purposes, much 
farther off than the United States. 
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Similarly, in summarizing the history of America in the Pacific, William 
Eliiot Griffis, educator and clergyman, traced the movement of American 
pioneers into the great ocean over the past century and predicted 
that the main body of the American people had now joined up with the 
advance guard and were preparing for further national development and 
. 27 
new enterpr~ses. 
Charles Conant, prominent New York banker, likewise pictured 
Americans as the "children of the Anglo-Saxon race," embarking, for 
the purposes of self-preservation and survival, on the path of 
imperialism. But Conant's imperialism had an economic basis. He 
called for energetic political action to keep the markets of China 
open to American commerce. In an analysis of Russia as a world 
power, he warned that Russia was organizing the machinery of its 
economic system such as to make it an "early and dangerous rival" 
in the "competition for political and commercial supremacy." 
Specifically, he observed that, while Russia had always been a grain 
producing rival, it had also become a serious competitor as an exporter 
of petroleum. He also predicted that the completion of the Siberian 
railroad would shift the centers of trade away from the existing ports 
and create new centers in the heart of Asia around which would gather 
civilization. From this heartland Russia, in a generation, would be 
the great competitor of the Anglo-Saxon race for the commercial and 
military supremacy of the world.28 
Brooks Adams synthesized these various attitudes of imperialism, 
racism and militarism and added in a mixture of his own perspective of 
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historical processes and his own analysis of economic forces. All of 
this was tempered by ideas and critical comments from his brother 
Henry. Previously discouraged about the course of civilization, 
Brooks was stimulated by the American successes in the war with 
Spain into believing that vigorous national action could reverse the 
"law of decay." In two articles, Brooks presented his arguments for 
an Anglo-Saxon coalition, under the leadership of the United States, 
to form a great empire extending over a goodly part of Asia. He 
believed that the economic center of the world had already moved 
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across the Atlantic and that within two generations, American interests 
would center on the Pacific, which it would cover like an inland sea. 29 
Shading Brooks' optimism was the real and clear danger of 
Russia thwarting these plans. He, too, was worried that Russia 
intended to reverse the flow of the China trade away from the maritime 
powers. But American expansion depended on an available market for 
its surplus products, which only China had the boundless capacity to 
absorb. Manchuria was already in Russian hands and all of North 
China was threatened. Should these natural outlets for American 
trade be closed, Brooks thought that American society would be shaken 
to its foundations. He was also worried about Russia's seemingly 
limitless capacity to assimilate adjacent populations. In the case 
of China, this would permit Russia to concentrate powerful economic 
forces, based on the abundance of natural resources and a mass of 
inexpensive labor. East Asia was a prize awaiting an energetic nation 
to grasp. To Brooks, the struggle for survival of the two competing 
systems--the Anglo-Saxon maritime coalition and the Russian-led con-
tinental system--seemed imminent. He saw the inevitable conflict 
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breaking out on the "shore of the Yellow Sea." In his view the 
United States must compete for this iiseat of empire" and it was his 
duty to bring this message home to the American public and their 
leaders in Washington.30 
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It is difficult to measure how seriously these various public 
expressions of the coming global confrontation between the Anglo-Saxon 
and the Slav, American and Russian, were taken by the McKinley administra-
tion. In the face of dealing with a real-life Philippine insurrection, 
they probably seemed somewhat exaggerated and futuristic. Nevertheless, 
the repeated airing of these concerns about Russia dominating Asia 
and the Pacific probably provided additional incentive for the 
solving of the most immediate problem, safeguarding American commercial 
interests from Russian encroachment. We can be positive that Henry 
Adams, intimate friend and adviser to John Hay, seriously believed 
that the future portended a struggle between the two world powers, 
Russia and America. 
Though far more cautious and less an avowed imperialist than 
his brother, Henry did provide a conduit for Brooks' ideas. Henry's 
own approach to Asia was far less simplistic. He thoroughly agreed 
as to the importance of Asia and the Pacific. But while he believed 
that American interests would inevitably move eastward, he could not 
help seeing the difficulties. He drew back from his earlier predictions 
concerning the Americanization of Siberia, perhaps in light of Russia's 
recent demonstration of might in Manchuria. For a time Henry thought 
Germany might be submerged into the Russian Empire as a province. 
Together, the two nations would then represent too large a mass, too 
central a position, and an unassailable opponent for the United States 
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whose geography stopped at the oceans. But all this wavering took 
place before the Spanish-American War. 31 
When Hay was summoned from London to Washington to become 
secretary of state, Adams followed shortly thereafter in response to 
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Hay's request for Adams to be an associate in his new responsibilities. 
Hay's experience and background suited him for his new position admirably, 
except for his lack of any first-hand knowledge of Asian affairs. 
Hay probably thought that Adams could be of assistance in Washington 
in dealing with problems arising in that sensitive region. Adams 
had travelled in the Pacific area, and though he had intended his 
trip to include China, he never reached there. But he had studied 
and read about China under the tutelage of Rockhill in preparation 
for the journey. William W. Rockhill, then serving in Athens, did 
have the requisite China experience, so Adams urged that he be returned 
to Washington to bolster a "very weak" state department staff. As 
for himself, Adams concluded that: 
Hay will greatly 
responsibility. 
enough for that. 
body like me • • 
need some man who can take real 
Even Rockhill is not quite strong 
Hay needs an alter or double; some-
•• 32 --
Adams was to be disappointed. Hay had no power to select his 
own staff. A position was eventually secured for Rockhill in Washing-
ton as the Director of the Bureau of American Republics, from which 
he could also serve as a Far East consultant. Adams was forced to 
remain in ..:he background in his familiar role as a "stable companion 
of statesmen." Although Adams modestly disclaimed any influence on 
Hay's foreign policy, he had ample opportunity to share his views with 
his inseparable friend. The two lived in adjoining houses in Washing-
ton and it was their practice to take an hour's stroll together each 
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afternoon discussing the "day's work at home and abroad." This 
interlude lasted from November 1898 until the end of March 1899. 
Adams then departed once more for Europe, months before the open door 
notes were actually being drafted, yet he was present during a 
period when Manchuria's fate was much discussed. Not being privy 
to the Adams-Hay conversations on the subject, one can only glean 
Adams' input from his views expressed in earlier and contemporary 
correspondence.33 
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Adams habitually gave vent to wide-ranging geopolitical views, 
alternating between extreme confidence and deepest pessimism in his 
world view. Of all the world powers he remained "more immediately 
curious about Russia." He never claimed to fully understand the 
secret of Russia. Following Russia's successful intervention at the 
close of the Sino-Japanese War, Adams made a new assessment of Russian 
power. To him, Russia then appeared as a "great new element" which 
had just given a "prodigious example of her energy in the East." 
At that time, Adams considered that the United States itself was at 
the "end of our rapid expansion" and would henceforth be forced to 
face more "favorably situated competitors." His field of vision 
extended into Asia, but there he saw Russian "omnipotence" which he 
feared greatly. To Adams, Russia was the "great disintegrator" and 
the chief cause for the "political perturbations in the world." He 
alternated from a belief that Russia could sweep both England and 
America "out of her path without a squeal" to a hope that the Russian 
advance in Asia would "throw England into our arms, and make things 
easier for us."34 
By early 1898, Adams noted to Hay with satisfaction, prematurely 
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it turned out, that "Russia had been obliged to drop her plunder in 
the East, and to let herself be corked up on the Amur." Adams regained 
more confidence in America's capabilities with the naval victories in 
the Pacific. For the future, Adams repeatedly forecast two centers 
of power in the world, an American center, offset by a Russian center 
forming across Asia. By February 1899, he was predicting: 
There are two future centres of power; and of the two, 
America must get there first. Some day, perhaps a 
century hence, Russia may swallow even her; but for my 
lifetime I think I'm safe. 
With returning confidence he could predict, before he left Washington, 
an advance by the United States toward the Orient: 
The country is big, and our energies are vast, and, 
sooner or later, to the East we must jo, for a situation 
is always stronger than a man's will. 5 
It is not difficult to imagine that this was the thought that Adams 
left behind with his friend Hay. 
The Anglo-Russian debate would have been of little moment 
had it not reflected a topic much on America's mind. The articles 
favoring each side of the controversy and the furor they were creating 
were very familiar to the framers of the open door notes. While still 
ambassador, Hay had already heard the official English position and 
was entirely sympathetic to it. The debate also served the purpose 
of marshalling the opinion of the American business community to which 
the Administration also was listening closely. While the actual 
amount of trade with China had not increased substantially over 
previous years, the American estimation of their current and future 
economic stake in the region had increased tremendously by 1899. Much 
of the heightened interest was created by the American Asiatic Associa-
tion. The association had among its officers and honorary members 
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men such as Everett Frazer, Clarence Cary, Edwin Conger, Charles 
Denby and John Barrett, all knowledgeable concerning conditions in 
China. A large number of financial, trading and industrial companies, 
principally from the northeastern states, were listed as members by 
May 1899. The association also had established connections with a 
number of Chambers of Commerce and was attempting to set up branch 
offices around the country and in the Far East. Of particular signifi-
cance, the association had its own journal and an energetic publicist, 
John Foord. Through this journal, the reprint of articles, speeches 
and the minutes of meetings provided an effective sounding board to 
cover Asiatic political and economic affairs. The association used 
all its means to focus attention on America's national interests in 
Northeast Asia. The association also had sufficient political in-
fluence to gain direct access to administration and congressional 
leaders. 
Another influential pressure group consisted of all those who 
manufactured and exported cotton textiles to Northeast Asia. Within 
this group the manufacturers in the South were rapidly acquiring 
the greatest share of exports. Between 1889 and 1899, the number of 
spindles in the South increased over 190 percent and consumption of 
cotton in southern mills over 206 percent (compared to 11 and 29 per-
cent in the North and 71 and 88 percent in India, which showed the 
second largest growth). Since most of this increase was directly 
attributable to increased shipments to Northeast Asia during those 
ten years, the South could justly claim a vital interest in the open 
door policy there. Overwhelmingly. the cotton manufacturer in the 
South joined the northern industrialist in being concerned that they 
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continue to receive fair and equal treatment. The only foreseeable 
threat to their prosperity came from Russia's possible future moves 
against them. As D. A. Tompkins, a southern mill owner expressed it: 
Unless we soon take steps to maintain permanently our trade 
in Manchuria or other Chinese States, we shall see the day 
when that trade will be annihilated. The time is rapidly 
coming, unless there is a change of policy, when Russia will 
be strong enough to show us the door out of Manchuria, 
instead of keeping the door open.36 
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As the opening of their campaign to safeguard their interests, 
the Pepperell Manufacturing Company and numerous other prominent 
cotton manufacturers and merchants sent a petition to the state 
department in January 1899, pointing out the "danger of being shut 
out from the markets of that portion of Northern China which is 
already occupied or threatened by Russia." Unlike the lack of official 
reaction that the petition might have provoked in years past, the 
department was quick to examine the situation on behalf of persons 
of such "high character and standing." Conger in Peking and Tower 
in St. Petersburg were directed to give serious attention to the 
subject. Interestingly, the directions to Tower included Siberia as 
well as Manchuria as an area of concern. When Muravev was queried, 
his answers were far from reassuring. His replies were generally 
evasive, claiming that Russian policy had not yet been completely 
formulated. Besides, Witte, the minister of finance, had the prime 
responsibility. Muravev did tell Peirce that "due profits on the 
railway lines would be exacted." Peirce also related that Witte 
had previously pronounced a policy to him of "absolute protection of 
Russian industries to the point of a prohibitive tariff, whenever 
the conditions will permit." Peirce's report back contained no more 
specific Russian guarantees of an open door for the future than 
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Hitchcock had received a year earlier. This did not end the matter. 
The administration had been alerted to a situation of prime importance. 
To Peirce's report the First Assistant Secretary, Alvey Adee appended 
the following note: 
Ambassador Tower will continue to w~tch this matter which 
has from the outset of the recent move of various foreign 
powers to gain a foothold in China had the President's most 
serious consideration. Mr. Tower will be expected to use 
every opportunity to act energetically in the sense desired 
by the numerous and influential signers of the petition.37 
The public debate concerning what America's course of action 
should be in Northeast Asia served several purposes. It concentrated 
attention on Russia as the primary obstacle to American interests in 
the region. It blunted any criticism that the McKinley administration 
might expect from joining in an open door cause already espoused by 
its former nemesis, Great Britain. It coalesced business groups into 
bringing additional pressure to bear on a Republican administration 
already sensitive and sympathetic to their cause. All of which tended 
to overcome previous caution and permitted a departure in policy to 
be contemplated. To John Hay and his associates, the future of 
American interests in Northeast Asia augured so poorly that it seemed 
necessary to make some unprecedented move to forestall Russia. The 
United States was ready to change sides, away from Russia and toward 
Great Britain. 
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CHAPTER X 
CLOSING THE DOOR ON A FRIENDSHIP 
Although the United States had previously evinced interest in 
the entire Northeastern Asia, including Siberia, the provinces of 
North China, and to a lesser extent Korea, by 1899 Manchuria had 
become the center of attention. It was in Manchuria that Americans 
considered the open door most thteatened. And the key to Manchuria, 
from the American standpoint, was the treaty port of Newchwang. If 
Newchwang could be kept open, the mercantile, maritime nations had an 
alternative to the Russian transportation system for the distribution 
of their merchandise and a means to assert their influence inland. 
A system of native transshipment of goods inland by water and land 
had long been used effectively. Russia was awake to competition to 
its Manchurian enterprises from this quarter and that is why Russia 
had vigorously opposed any nnn-Russian rail terminal there. 
Manchuria-watchers, then, looked closely at developments in 
Newchwang for clues to Russia's intentions. Unfortunately, the United 
States had no consul of its own as yet stationed at Newchwang for 
direct observation and reports. Secretary Hay had, in view of the 
now recognizable importance af the port, asked Congress for authority 
to fill such a post. Meanwhile, the state department kept abreast of 
events there through reports from the other consuls in North China, 
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particularly the one at Chefoo, nearest to the scene, and from 
newspaper accounts published in China. This mixture of fact and 
fancy must have given Hay and his advisers cause for more concern. 
A grim picture was painted. 
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Already by 1899, Russia was remorselessly and surely strength-
ening its grip on Manchuria and proceeding with the Russification of 
the province. Thousands of Russian Cossacks and railroad guards were 
stationed throughout the region, many at locations where the railroads 
were not yet planned. The Russo-Chinese Bank was establishing 
branches throughout Manchuria in order to control financially all 
enterprises in the interest of the Russian Empire. Agricultural 
and mineral resources were being exploited for the sole benefit of 
Russia. Land was being acquired, by force, at artificially low rates. 
The Russian language and currency were more and more frequently used 
by the Chinese inhabitants. Russia had virtually occupied Newchwang. 
Chinese customs were ignored. At Newchwang the Russians paid not 
the "slightest attention to the Chinese government, nor do they pay 
duties to that government on the millions of dollars worth of stores 
and materials which they are now landing." During a November 1898 
visit to Port Arthur, Consul Fowler was impressed by the urgent 
preparations the Russians were making. He came away convinced that 
in a short time all of China north of Chefoo, including the port of 
Newchwang would be annexed outright by Russia. 1 
To Fowler, the United States, like it or not, was inextricably 
involved in Asiatic politics and must decide whether "to be respected 
or annihilated commercially, as well as politically." In order to 
protect American interests in North China "by our own guns, and by 
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our own coal," he recommended again the acquisition of a nearby 
coaling station. The most feasible base was in the Miao-tao island 
group. These islands were strategically located in the middle of 
the narrow strait guarding the entrance to the Gulf of Chihli, 
approximately half-way between Chefoo on the Shantung peninsula and 
Port Arthur on the Liaotung. Steamers belonging to the Russo-Chinese 
railroad were already making regular runs between the two ports. 
Then Fowler received word, probably exaggerated, but nevertheless 
disturbing, that Russia claimed the Miao Tao island group as part of 
its Southern Manchurian cession. In addition, Russia planned to 
construct its own port facilities at Chefoo. Such a Russian presence 
at this choke-point could, in time of conflict, conceivably deny the 
maritime powers access to both Newchwang and Taku, the port for Tientsin 
and Peking. 2 
By mid-1899 most observers probably agreed with John Foard 
of the American Asiatic Association that the North China market "was 
threatened by the virtual supremacy of Russia in Manchuria and the 
Liaotung peninsula and the consequent danger that the treaty port of 
Newchwang • might at any time be declared a part of the Russian 
empire." The American Consul-General in Shanghai agreed: 
Our trade in China is now most largely with the Northern 
part which today is almost in Russia's grasp. Our interest 
is great but the emergency is so pressing that only the 
promptest and most effective measures can safeguard our 
interests. 
The question had become, not would Russia take unequal advantage of 
commercial opportunities in Manchuria, but when would they shut the 
door. Most estimated that Russia would wait no longer than the com-
pletion of the Siberian-Manchurian rail system, scheduled for 
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completion no later than 1903. 3 
The pressure for the United States to take a more active role 
in Northeast Asia intensified when it was learned that England intended 
to retrench. England, having been unsuccessful in single-handedly 
preventing the cession of Southern Manchuria to Russia, was, by mid-
1898, prepared to negotiate a settlement with Russia to prevent any 
further advance of Russia southward toward the region of England's 
paramount interest, the Yangtse basin. For its part, the Russian 
foreign office was anxious for a breathing spell in order to consoli-
date its gains. The negotiations, which were conducted on-and-off 
for nine months, were capped by a bilateral agreement in April 1899. 
The principal area of contention centered on railway construction. 
Each nation had plans which included building within the other's 
loosely defined sphere of influence. An English syndicate was ready 
to finance a Chinese rail line running from Shanhaikuan to Newchwang 
and thence on to Mukden. This railroad would have furnished severe 
competition to Russia's Southern Manchurian system. At the same time, 
Russia was intervening in the Yangtse basin by its backing of a 
Belgian syndicate's efforts to construct the Peking-Hankow railroad. 
The main provision of the Anglo-Russian agreement called for each 
to recognize the railroad sphere of the other with a line of demarca-
tion variously interpreted as being drawn through the Great Wall or 
through Peking.4 
This Anglo-Russian agreement had a great impact on American 
diplomatic planning. The United States, as the New York Times was 
want to point out, had missed the opportunity in early 1898 to side 
with England to prevent cessions of Chinese territory. From now 
on, the English government was making its best deal to protect its 
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own interests. The United States would have to face alone the con-
sequences of a hardening sphere of Russian influence in Manchuria and 
Mongolia. The understanding also highlighted the vulnerability of 
Newchwang as a point of entry for American goods. The only likely 
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rail service to the port would be a Russian spur line, subject to 
discriminatory rates. More ominous was the complete refusal of Russia 
to agree to an English proposal calling on both powers to forego 
preferential tariffs and rates on railroads in their respective 
spheres. Witte had vetoed this proposal, for it would have had the 
effect of establishing an open door policy in Manchuria, which would 
have seriously hampered Witte's plans for the commercial and industrial 
exploita~ion of the province.5 
To the New York Times, the announced agreement marked the 
final abandonment by England of the struggle for an open door in 
China: "Russia will of course erect barriers in Manchuria against 
the entry from the sea of commerce upon equal terms" and the "one 
port (Newshwang) in which we have found our chief market for manu-
factures is within the Russian sphere of influence." In this respect, 
the government had not "adequately perceived or protected the National 
interests."6 Henceforth, the United States must look to its own 
resources to keep the door open to Manchuria. 
The consensus reaching the state department from these various 
sources was: (1) Russia had, or would soon attain, a dominant position 
in the region of Manchuria and possibly extending into Northern China 
proper; (2) Russia would soon disregard assurances otherwise and 
discriminate against American trade with the region; (3) The United 
States should lead a coalition of maritime powers to prevent this from 
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happening; and (4) time was short. This sense of urgency was rapidly 
eroding the administration's policy of "watchful waiting." Although 
Hay personally favored joint Anglo-American action and had pressed 
such a course from his London post, he fully realized that, despite 
the growing understanding between the two nations, no formal alliance 
could possibly receive the necessary approval of Congress and the 
public. Besides, the British were drifting toward war with the Boers 
by the middle of 1899 and, having come to an accommodation with 
Russia, were liable to be too preoccupied in Southern Africa to give 
h F h • . . 7 t e ar East t e~r pr~me attent~on. 
Most of the other options available to Hay were equally 
unattractive. To do nothing was tantamount to permitting Russia full 
sway in its ambitions. To threaten the use of•force would have been 
recognized immediately as a bluff. To make the best of any partition 
by preparing to grab a portion of China for the United States held 
little interest for Hay, but had some tentative adherents. Minister 
Conger had laid out a possible strategy for the United States: 
If it wishes to be a party to the division and sharer in 
the assets, then it is necessary that the place be selected 
and its cession or lease demanded at once; even now it may 
be too late • • • • There is practically nothing left for 
the United States but the province of Chihli. This, 
however, with Tientsin as the entrepot for all northern 
China, is destined in the future to be commercially one 
of the most valuable permanent possessions in the Orient 
• • • if all China is to fall into the hands of European 
powers, a strong foothold here by the United States, with 
something tangible to offer them, might compel them to 
keep permanently open doors for our commerce. 
President McKinley may have entertained some such idea himself. 8 
Some of the dimensions of Hay's dilemma were outlined by him 
to the editor of the New York Sun, who had inquired: "Is it impossible 
for the government to exert some influence against China's partition? 
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Has that gone too far?" To which Hay replied in a private letter: 
We are, of course, opposed to the dismemberment of that 
Empire, and we do not think that the public opinion of 
the United States would justify this Government in taking 
part in the great game of spoliation now going on. At 
the same time we are keenly alive to the importance of 
safeguarding our great commercial interests in that 
Empire • • • • We do not consider our hands tied for 
future eventualities, but for the present we think our 
best policy is one of vigilant protection of our commercial 
interests, without formal alliances with the other Powers 
interested.9 
One recourse, which might have proved fruitful, had it been 
pursued vigorously, was direct bilateral negotiations with Russia to 
obtain the long-term guarantees that Americans sought in Northeast 
Asia. American diplomats in St. Petersburg had, from time to time, 
questioned the Russian foreign ministry as to their intentions in 
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Manchuria and been turned aside with vague, not completely satisfactory, 
assurances. But no serious talks were held. Toward the end of 1898 
and early into 1899, the United States had an opportunity to reopen 
with Russia the old prospects for joint economic development of 
Northeast Asia. Since the end of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia's 
extraordinary railway expenditures in the Far East had amounted to 
1,442 million rubles, a great drain on the Russian treasury. Moreover, 
Russia was experiencing difficulty in borrowing further capital from 
Europe and had turned to American bankers for financial assistance. 
A syndicate formed by J. P. Morgan and Baring, Magoun and Company 
offered ite services to the Imperial Government. On behalf of the 
syndicate, William Ivins proposed to take 80 million dollars in Russian 
bonds. The two parties never reached final agreement on the financial 
terms. Nor did the United States, though aware of Russia's financial 
position, use this situation as a wedge for government-to-government 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
negotiations for a cooperative policy in Northeast Asia. Perhaps 
this was too great a leap into the new diplomacy for Hay to consider. 
He certainly doubted whether the Senate "would accept any treaty of 
consequence with Russia." Nevertheless, negotiations might have 
succeeded. Later, when coufronted by the open door note, Witte 
advised Muravev that it would be possible "under pressure of extreme 
necessity" to renounce Russia's railway and customs tariff privileges 
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in Manchuria, provided that any power wishing to profit by these 
special advantages "likewise participated in the enormous material 
expenditures" that Russia was under. At the time he wrote this 
opinion, Witte was again negotiating the issue of railway bonds, this 
time with George Perkins of the New York Life Insurance Company. 10 
Another clue to Russia's financial straits was disclosed when 
the tsar proposed a conference of the powers to halt the increasing 
development of armaments. It was generally understood that at least 
one, if not the prime, motive behind the Russian proposal was the 
inability of Finance Minister Witte to continue spending the necessary 
funds on railroads, while concurrently effecting needed modernization 
of military equipment. Many nations were suspicious of the Russian 
scheme, or were skeptical of such a utopian project, but no power 
wanted to spurn the conference and be branded as an obstacle to peace. 
As a consequence, the Hague Peace Conference was meeting May to July 
1899, just when, coincidentally, Alfred E. Hippisley and William W. 
Rockhill began to fashion a strategem for keeping China open to all 
nations on an equal basis. To an extent Hippisley-Rockhill borrowed 
from the tactics of Muravev, who had freely used moral suasion to 
coerce the powers to the conference. In a similar manner they planned 
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to test the sincerity of the Imperial Government, which had posed as 
the champion of peace. Did this Russian grand gesture toward world 
amity extend to the Far East?ll 
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The writing of the open door notes and the process of negotiat-
ing their acceptance has been well documented elsewhere and need not 
be repeated here in every detail. 12 Attention will be focused primarily, 
rather, on those aspects which touched on the changing relations of 
Russia and the United States and these were considerable. For just 
as the American fears about the prospects in Northeast Asia centered 
on the threat from Russia, so too, the notes were composed with the 
object of halting the Russian advance chiefly in mind. 
Rockhill assumed his post in Washington on May 22, 1899, four 
days after the commencement of the peace conference at the Hague. 
Hay once more had an experienced adviser on Far East matters. Rockhill 
had served at the American legations in Peking and Seoul between 1884 
and 1887, had made two trips of exploration to Mongolia and Tibet, 
and then returned to the state department from 1893 to 1897. Through 
these experiences he was well acquainted with the mounting concerns 
among the American community in China about Russia's designs. He, 
himself, was directly involved when the Russian government prevented 
American entrepreneurs from building railroads into Manchuria. As 
he familiarized himself with the current situation in China, discussed 
matters with members of the American Asiatic Association, and read 
the flood of articles treating the impending parition of China, Rock-
hill came to appreciate the fears of the American businessmen. Al-
though he, personally, was probably more concerned with maintaining 
the independence and the integrity of China, for the sake of the 
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pressures being exerted on the administration, he had to give his 
first attention to America's economic interests. 
Rockhill was assisted in his search for a way out of the 
administration's dilemma by the arrival of a long-time friend from 
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his China days, Alfred E. Hippisley, a British subject, who had served 
in the Chinese customs service for more than 30 years. Hippisley and 
his American wife had come to Baltimore to visit her family. From 
there he frequently visited Rockhill in Washington, where they dis-
cussed means for ensuring the equality for all nations in China. 
Gradually from these talks there emerged a scheme for the United 
States, as the nation least interested in annexing Chinese territory, 
to take the lead in calling official attention of the other powers to 
the growing danger of partition and conflict. At the same time, the 
American concerns about securing treaty rights and privileges could 
be emphasized anew. Each of the powers would be requested to pledge 
not to interfere in the treaty ports or disciminate in the application 
of tariffs. Since so-called "spheres of influence" had already been 
generally recognized, it was reluctantly decided that preferential 
privileges dealing with railroads and mines must tacitly remain ~qith 
each power in its own sphere. In mid-July Rockhill and his friend 
briefed Hay on their scheme. Thereafte·r, as Hippisley departed 
Baltimore, Rockhill furnished Hay with the gist of their correspondence 
on the subject. The proposal had many advantages. It did not call 
for an overt alliance. No Senate approval was required. It was not, 
at least on the surface, merely following England's lead. No segment 
of the electorate would be aroused to automatic opposition. The 
project did not contemplate the use of threat to use force, only 
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diplomatic persuasion. But the plan did represent a switch from 
watchful waiting to an active initiative. 
Hay was still wary. As he wrote to Rockhill from his summer 
horne: "I am fully awake to the great importance of what you say, and 
am more than ready to act. But the senseless prejudices in certain 
sections of the 'Senate and people' compel UG to move with great 
caution."13 Unsaid, but perhaps of greater significance, Hay may not 
have been confident that President McKinley was equally ready to 
act. The planners had realized that for the open door notes to succeed, 
all the great powers addressed must join in the guarantees or else 
the plan would fall apart. In their assessment, only Russia and 
France, the most protectionist minded nations, might balk and that 
France would likely go along with whatever Russia did. The key 
threat then, Russia, was also the key to success for the proposal. 
Adding to the sense of urgency, Hippisley warned that: 
I think it would be suicidal for America to drift and do 
nothing for another year •••• My latest advices from 
Peking say: "The activity of the Russians in Manchuria 
is simply wonderful • • • the Russification of Peking 
and North China will proceed as rapidly as has that of 
Manchuria."l4 
Nevertheless, matters might well have rested there, but for 
several fortuitous circumstances in mid-August. First, the Russian 
government made a move which seemed to promise that Russia might 
acquiesce in the general plan to guarantee the open door in China. 
In addition to its press campaign in the United States, Russia now 
took a more concrete measure to forestall the growing American hostility 
towards its action in Manchuria. On August 11, 1899, the tsar issued 
an ukaz proclaiming that Talienwan (or Dalnij, as the Russians renamed 
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it) is a free port, that is, the "right to import and export merchandise 
of every description free of customs duties" was established. Mer-
chandise destined for Russia would pay the customary duties upon 
entering the empire. The ukaz failed to mention merchandise destined 
for China, but Muravev assured Tower that only Chinese regulation 
would pertain in these circumstances, without Russian interference. 
Tower was greatly gratified by the ukaz. To him, as far as Russia 
was concerned, the ukaz spelled an open door to China which "opens 
the way also to the future of American trade and the certain increase 
of American mercantile prosperity."l5 
From St. Petersburg Tower viewed the ukaz differently than 
other observers. It did not guarantee the open door. Proclaiming 
Dalnij a free port was a practical necessity for Russia to stimulate 
the import of the necessary materials to build rapidly the port 
facilities, the rail terminus and fortifications. The same procedure 
had been used to construct Vladivostok, which was now about to lose 
this special status. Furthermore, Americans in China genuinely 
believed that all the hinterland beyond the free port would soon be 
annexed outright by Russia, thus subjecting foreign imports to Russian 
customs duties. Finally, the ukaz included no provision which would 
preclude discriminatory rail rates for goods transshipped from 
Dalnij. The New York Times considered the Tsar's ukaz a slick piece 
of world politics. 16 The framers of the open door notes, however, 
deliberately chose to put the broadest, most optimistic interpretation 
to the ukaz, hoping to gain Russia's concurrence with guarantees of 
far wider applicability. 
Second, Rockhill also chose to interpret the Ukhtomskij-
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Holstrem article as a conciliatory gesture toward the United States. 
Taking out of context and acknowledging that the authors' assertion 
that "the independence and integrity of China is a fundamental principle 
of Russia's policy in Asia" might not be absolutely correct, Rockhill, 
nevertheless, thought the article portended that the "friendly con-
sideration of St. Petersburg" could be expected for the American 
plan. 17 To Hippisley, also, the Tsar's ukaz and the Ukhtomskij 
article seemed to assure, in advance, the respectful consideration 
of the Russian Government for the open door project. The time to 
test the true nature of Russia's friendship seemed at hand. On 
August 24 Hay agreed, requesting that Rockhill draft the necessary 
instructions to the American ambassadors concerned. 
The final and most important factor in undermining any 
resistance of President McKinley to the open door notes were the 
views of Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University. 
Schurman had been appointed to head a commission to investigate 
conditions in the Philippines and to advise the president personally 
on the Far East situation. He arrived back in San Francisco on 
August 14, 1899, and promptly gave his views on the Orient, based 
partly on his conversations with English and Japanese statesmen: 
It seems to me that the great question there is not 
Formosa nor the Philippines, but China •••• To hold 
China intact is the thing of overshadowing importance. 
It is feared, now that Russia has taken Manchuria, it 
will try to encroach gradually on some or all of the 
other eighteen provinces of China, and when it gets them 
it will do as that country has done hitherto--put a 
duty on all foreign goods • • • China • • • should 
maintain its independent position, but its doors should be 
kept open. It means much to England and Japan and not 
less to America. 18 
The president's own advisor had confirmed the nature and the direction 
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of the threat to American interests in the Far East. Rockhill and 
Hippisley were hopeful that Schurman's views would "exercise very 
great influence on the decisions of the Administration." Apparently 
they did. Schurman conferred with McKinley on September 2 and again 
on the 4th. The first open door notes were mailed two days later. 19 
The three principles included in the open door notes, to 
which the United States was requesting the powers to adhere formally, 
were identically worded. However, a comparison of the explanatory 
material which was included in the notes was markedly different in 
the letter to Ambassador Tower. The previous oral assurances given 
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by Russian officials, saying that American trade would ·not be adversely 
affected, were acknowledged. In addition, the note to Russia stressed 
the need for a "permanent form to the assurances" and an extension of 
their coverage beyond the territory already occupied. Such a declara-
tion from the Imperial Government would relieve the business world 
of the United States "from the apprehensions which have exercised a 
disturbing influence during the last four years on its operations in 
China." Furthermore, the "declaration of such principles by His 
Imperial Majesty would • • • powerfully tend to remove dangerous 
sources of irritation and possible conflict between the various 
powers." Although generally ignoring the subject of China's territorial 
integrity, the note to Russia slipped in the gratuitous assumption 
that the "consolidation and integrity of that Empire • • • is believed 
••• a fundamental principle of the policy of His Majesty in Asia." 
Moreover, Great Britain and Germany were requested to lend their 
"support in obtaining similar declarations from the various powers 
claiming 'spheres of influences' in China." Russian assistance was 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
315 
not solicited in the same manner. Instead, it was simplystatedthat 
"the acceptance by His Imperial Majesty of these principles must 
therefore inevitably lead to their recognition by all the other powers." 
When the Russian obstacle was overcome, everything else would easily 
be achieved. By emphasizing the "liberal and conciliatory commercial 
policy" of the tsar, the United States hoped to turn this "policy" 
20 into a reality. 
Upon close examination, it can be seen that the texts of 
the three principles were drafted with the presence of Russia in 
Manchuria specifically in mind. The American note was aimed directly 
at Russian current and anticipated economic practices. For the other 
powers, the principles represented only theoretical preventive 
measures designed to curb any possibility of future abuses. Each 
would gain by the guarantees in the remainder of China, while suffer-
ing no real loss in its own special sphere. But, as the Russian 
ministers soon realized, acceptance of the three principles, despite 
their general applicability, would undo some actual advantages which 
Russia already enjoyed and forestall others which they fully intended 
to acquire. Nor was there any compensatory advantage for Russia to 
gain elsewhere in China. 
The first principle provided "that no power will in any way 
interfere with a treaty port or any vested interest within any leased 
territory or within any so-called 'sphere of interest' it may have in 
China." The United States was immediately concerned about treaty 
rights and privileges at Newchwang. Access to Manchuria depended 
heavily on the fate of Newchwang. Formal adherence to this principle 
would, it was hoped, stop Russian encroachments already reported at 
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that port and strengthen Chinese administration there. This same 
tactic would be used four years later when the United States forced 
China, in the face of Russian opposition, to open up three additional 
treaty ports in Manchuria to American commerce. 
The second principle stated "that the Chinese treaty tariff 
of the time being shall apply to all such ports as are within 'spheres 
of interest' (unless they be 'free ports'), no n,atter what nationality 
it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the 
Chinese Government." Again, this provision would not only bolster 
the Chinese customs service, but would also, in particular, prevent 
the reported practice of Russia ignoring the Chines~ customs at 
Newchwang. And whether the United States was entirely aware of 
the provisions of the Li-Lobanov secret treaty of 1896 or not, Russia 
already had secured Chinese tariff concessions for their goods trans-
ported over the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and perhaps expected further 
favors. Acceptance of this principle would have tended to limit 
these Russian advantages. 
The third principle declared, in part, that "no higher rail-
road charges over lines built, controlled or operated within its 
'sphere' on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other 
nationalities transported through such 'sphere' than shall be levied 
on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported 
over equal distances." This was the most vital clause of the open 
door notes for the American businessman. The other aspects--treaty 
ports and customs--were really a reaffirmation of existing treaty 
rights. As long as China remained relatively intact, the United 
States had the means, along with all the other maritime nations, for 
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insisting that they be honored. Rail rates were an entirely different 
matter. The setting of transportation charges in its sphere was solely 
dependent on the Russian Government. If Russia chose to discriminate 
against American shippers along the Manchurian rail network, or 
further south, if Russian ambitions had their way, the United States 
had little recourse to Chinese authorities. Russia had achieved a 
monopoly and full control. Evidence that Russia intended to use its 
advantage was readily at hand. Russo-Chinese agreements already 
permitted rate-fixing in favor of Russian merchandise. Russia h&d 
flatly refused to agree with England to forego this rate-fixing. 
These factors had been repeatedly emphasized by the publicists of 
the Far Eastern question. Besides, setting rates which discriminated 
against a commercial rival was nothing new to American rail magnates. 
Rockhill and Hay were fully cognizant of the underlying demand they 
were making on Russia. This principle seemed innocent when addressed 
to all the powers, but it had applicability only to Russia. Russia 
was the one power that had a system of railroads nearly operational, 
completely under its jurisdiction and connected to its national rail 
network. Russia ~·las being asked to give up this sizeable advantage 
which would have helped it to amortize its immense construction costs. 
This last provision was not in Hippisley's draft of the open 
door notes. Rockhill added the clause on his own, solely to protect 
American commercial interests operating in the Russian Zone. Despite 
this hidden obstacle, Rockhill and Hay were surprisingly optimistic 
about the response they would receive from the Russian Government. 
Like the other powers, Russia had been put into a position where a 
direct refusal to a seemingly moderate request was thought to be 
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impossible. In fact, Hay was so confident of an affirmative answer 
from Russia, that he delayed addressing a similar note to France until 
late November, trusting that a Russian acceptance would help carry 
France into the fold. His optimism was unfounded. The Russian 
Government strenuously attempted to delay or avoid a direct reply. 
What Hay had accomplished, though, was the sh~fting of his Far East 
dilemma from his shoulders onto the back of Muravev. For more than 
a year, Count Cassini had been reminding Americans that the United 
States must step carefully in the Orient so as not to break-up the 
long friendship with Russia. Now the roles were reversed by the 
American initiative. Muravev must try to squirm out of his predica-
ment without conceding any Russian advantage, but without causing a 
rift with the United States. 
The open door negotiations with Russia lasted for nearly six 
months. Partly this was due to the slowness of the mail, approximately 
two weeks from Washington to St. Petersburg. More of the delay was 
caused by the absence of Muravev from the capital for several months 
and the unwillingness of his deputy, Count Lamsdorff, to make 
decisions in this sensitive policy area. Most of the delay, however, 
can be attributed to the deliberate procrastination on the part of 
Muravev who sought to avoid committing the Russian Government. He 
desperately hoped that one of the other powers would reject the 
American proposal first, which would obviate the need for Russia to 
take any position at all. 
Charge Peirce had delivered the open door proposal to Lamsdorff 
on September 20. When no response of any kind was forthcoming, the 
state department asked Tower about the delay and learned that Muravev 
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had been on vacation. No serious consideration of the open door began 
in the Russian foreign ministry until mid-November, but for the next 
six weeks the matter was reviewed, in the words of Tower, "with unusual 
attention and treated with a degree of consideration which it would 
not have met if it had come from almost any other conceivable source." 
The Russian cabinet, though, was strongly disinclined to make any 
specific announcement of Russian policy in China. The imperial ministers 
were intensely unwilling to bind themselves in writing for the future. 
Even the expression "open door" was distasteful to Muravev, as it 
reminded him of hostile English policies. All of Hay's diplomatic 
skill and persistence was required to force Russia into even a sem-
blance of a definitive reply. Commencing in November, Hay gradually 
increased the pressure on Count Cassini for a reply.21 
Strangely, when Cassini and Muravev first studied the open 
door note, they failed to comprehend fully the underlying purport 
of the American proposition. In an exchange of dispatches Cassini, 
apparently agreeing with the American stance, summarized the American 
aim on November 16 as the "preservation of the principle of the 'open 
door' and the inviolability of Chinese territory, which alone can 
guarantee the interests of the United States in that country." Two 
days later Muravev complained that the note was so unclear and con-
fusing that it was difficult to understand the intentions of the 
American Government. Nevertheless, Muravev, too, had "no serious 
objections against the principles expounded in the note" as long as 
they applied only to the sphere of interest in Chinese territory and 
not to Russia's leased territory. In fact, Mu~avev saw some advantage 
in the American recognition of Russia's "privileged position" in 
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Manchuria. Had Muravev persisted in this view it would have suited 
Hay's purpose mightily. 22 
Tower was not able to confer with Muravev personally on the 
subject of the open door until November 22~ At that time, Tower 
surmised that Muravev must have kept abreast of the topic during his 
travels, which he had. Muravev was quite familiar with the American 
proposal, but hesitated to make a detailed reply until Cassini could 
make further inquiries of the state department which "shall remove 
the doubts at present entertained by the Imperial Government." Al-
though Muravev voiced no specific objection to any of the three 
principles, Tower noted some hesitancy stemming from the commitment 
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concerning rail rates. Upon his return, Muravev had probably received 
· kl" f w· ' h h h b · 21 some 1n 1ng o 1tte s t oug ts on t e su Ject. -
On November 26, Cassini, unaware that the attitude of the 
foreign minister had started to shift, sent a telegram to Muravev 
proposing that he enter into conversations with the United States on 
a number of points, all of which would have been acceptable to the 
state department. One point specifically proposed that: "In our 
(Russian)sphere of influence we retain the exclusive right of con-
structing and exploiting railroads, of mines and other industrial 
enterprises. On these railroads there will be no discriminating tariffs~r24 
Two days later, Muravev sent a letter to Witte enclosing Cassini's 
telegram regarding the desirability of coming to an agreement with 
the United States. 
Witte, who was very familiar with previous American attempts 
to gain railway concessions in Manchuria and Siberia, was not taken 
in by the covert proposal banning discriminatory rail rates. He 
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realized that this was an attempt at "neutralization" of the Manchurian 
railways and, in that sense, directly hostile to Russian goals. To 
agree to the American principles would, he thought, "deprive us of 
a privilege having significance for our economic interests in the 
Far East" without any compensation elsewhere in China. Therefore, 
he suggested to Muravev that any answer given to the United States 
omit any reference to rail charges. With regard to customs duties 
and port levies, he was less concerned. These were regulated by the 
Chinese Government outside the Russian leasehold, so the "Russian 
Government did not propose to seek any exceptional privileges for her 
subjects in this respect as compared with other foreigners. 1125 
Faced with Witte's opposition to the rail rate principle, 
the foreign ministry changed its attitude completely toward the open 
door policy. Cassini was advised on December 1 that it was deemed 
adviseable at the present time only to answer the state department in 
"general terms" not binding on Russia. This put Cassini in a difficult 
position in dealing with Hay and Rockhill who were pressing him for 
a definitive reply. By this time, Cassini had convinced himself 
that the American note had been distributed solely for domestic 
political purposes, that the President only wanted to demonstrate 
"his firm determination to protect the trade interests of the United 
States" in order "to prepare the way for his second election." With 
this idea in mind, Cassini informed Muravev on December 13 that he 
intended to "soft-soap" the United States with an assurance that 
"the commercial interests of Americans in China will be respected in 
our sphere of influence, as always." Muravev hastily agreed to this 
line of approach, but also asked him to sound out the positions of 
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the French and German ambassadors to Washington. 26 
Cassini was unsuccessful in sidetracking the American proposal. 
He held at least three meetings with Rockhill, none of them decisive. 
When Cassini suggested that the United States was only following 
Great Britain's lead, Rockhill parried this charge with a challenge 
for Russia to be the first to espouse America's cause which "would 
have as favorable an effect on the final acceptance of the policy by 
all the powers as it would if England were the first to declare it. 1127 
Hay also refused to be cajoled by generalities. Not knowing Cassini's 
earlier position, Hay was convinced that Cassini had consistently 
opposed the open door policy. As Hay recalled several months later, 
Cassini resorted to protesting "rather vehemently at one time against 
the extent of what he called our 'demands'." Cassini reportedly 
asserted to Hay: '~ou don't know what you are asking; you are 
attempting something impossible; you have no idea of the extent of 
your propositions."28 Hay knew that he did. 
Believing that Cassini would have stood firmly against the 
American plan indefinitely, Hay gradually shifted the discussions 
to St. Petersburg and began to supply Tower with the diplomatic means 
with which to pressure Muravev. On December 9, Hay, perhaps stretching 
the truth, advised Tower by telegram that Germany would "raise no 
objection to the proposition of the United States" and that the 
"adherence of Great Britain to the proposition was assured." Armed 
with this information, Tower met Muravev two days later, requesting 
that the Imperial Government take the American note into "immediate 
and serious consideration" so that he might report a "friendly and 
favorable reply." Muravev hastened to assure Tower that Russia's 
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reply "would be friendly, in any event." At this meeting Muravev 
paid considerable attention to the question of "what had France done 
in the matter?" After the meeting, Tower was uncertain that the 
Russian Government would ever make a complete declaration satisfying 
American purposes. Yet, as was his style, Tower put the best possible 
light on the Russian recalcitrance, blaming the stalemate on Russian 
conservatism and habit of thought, "rather than as a proof of any 
intention upon the part of Russia to oppose the interests of the 
United States."29 
Anticipating that Russia might stall until France had declared 
itself, Hay changed his tactics and decided to tackle France first, 
hoping that French concurrence would assist materially in bringing 
the reluctant Russia into line. Negotiations with France proved 
remarkably amicable. By December 16, the French foreign minister, 
while not agreeing precisely to the American text, was 
ready to apply, in the territories which are leased to it 
(France), equal treatment to the citizens and subjects of 
all nations, especially in the matter of customs duties 
and navigation dues, as well as transportation tariffs on 
railways. 
Furthermore, France favored "equal treatment in the broadest sense, 
throughout China."30 The presumably arch-protectionist France was no 
longer a bulwark behind which Russia could hide. Hay was quick to 
pass this news on to Tower on December 19. Five days later, Tower 
again confronted Muravev, who acknowledged that he was acquainted 
with the French announcement. At this meeting, Muravev took the 
first tentative and highly qualified step toward acceptance. Russia, 
he declared, "intends to pursue the same policy as that announced by 
France, namely, the policy of equal treatment to all nations." But 
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as the conversation developed, it became clearer that Muravev only 
meant that the United States could expect the same privileges that 
were extended to any other, that is, non-Russian nation. Tower 
immediately sought acquiescence "that no privileges should be given 
to Russian merchants or manufacturers which were withheld from those 
of other countries." Tower pressed further on the Russian policy 
regarding rail rates, to which Muravev was forced to admit: 
Well, we have built the railroads, and I think it quite 
probable that we shall give preference to our own people; 
though all foreign nations will be treated absolutely 
alike. 
In the end, Muravev begged off making any formal statement on the 
excuse that the questions raised largely rested within the juris-
diction of the finance minister. 31 
Hay continued to apply pressure. On December 27, he tele-
graphed Tower that the "President (was) greatly disappointed" and to 
"try energetically to have the Russian Government to accept our 
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proposition." That same afternoon Tower called on the foreign minister 
once more and put forth the American case as forcefully as a friendly 
nation probably could. He mentioned the President's disappointment 
at the turn of affairs. He reviewed the stance of the other great 
powers. He reminded Muravev of the beneficial build-up of commercial 
intercourse between Russia and America. And then he added a warning: 
that a refusal upon the part of Russia to adhere to these 
propositions would produce the most painful and unfortunate 
impression on the United States and I urged him to avoid by 
all means in his power a result so damaging to the present 
cordial feeling between the people of the two powers. 
Muravev alternately showed irritation at being addressed in this 
fashion and solicitude to avoid any breach of good feeling between 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
325 
R . d A . 32 uss~a an mer~ca. 
Muravev had been pushed into a corner from which he saw no 
escape. As he lamented to Witte on December 28, he found it impossible, 
after the affirmative answers by the other powers, "to go counter to 
a politico-economic principle generally accepted by the powers, and, 
by undermining the existing friendly relations between Russia and 
the U. s. A., create occasion for the organization of a coalition 
f . h F E t d f · .,33 o powers Ln t e ar as very angerous or our ~nterests. 
Reluctantly, Muravev bowed, two days later, to the American 
insistence for a formal commitment. Hay had achieved a portion of 
his "demands." Regarding the Russian sphere, Muravev agreed only 
that: 
As to the ports now opened or hereafter to be opened to 
foreign commerce by the Chinese Government, and which 
lie beyond the territory leased to Russia, the settlement 
of the question of customs duties belongs to China herself 
and the Imperial Government has no intention whatever of 
claiming any privilege for its own subjects to the 
exclusion of other foreigners.34 
This reply represented a positive gain for the American policy. If 
followed in good faith, it would strengthen the Chinese administration 
in Manchuria and would grant equal access to American merchants 
through the port of Newchwang. No mention of rail rates was included 
in the Russian response, which was disappointing, but probably 
anticipated. To make certain that Cassini understood this omission, 
Muravev, when forwarding a copy of the contents of the Russian reply 
to his ambassador, prefaced the copy with this phrase: "Not addressing 
the question of railway tariffs, I answered the American note in the 
following manner • • .,35 
Hay tried to eke out a further concession on rail rates by 
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using Muravev's previous oral statement that Russia intended to pursue 
the same policy as France. Tower, however, persuaded Hay not to use 
this strategem, when Muravev objected strongly. Muravev did consent 
to a public general statement being made by the state department 
that 11Russia has replied favorably to the American propositions" and 
he agreed to the publication of Russia's formal answer. On March 
20, 1900, putting the broadest and most fa~orable interpretation on 
the various responses from the powers to the American proposal, 
Hay announced that he considered 11 the assent given to it by Russia as 
final and definitive."36 
But would it remain definitive? Not likely, according to 
Henry Adams: "Hay has succeeded in embarrassing Russia very much; 
but the agreement binds no one to anything, and perhaps that is the 
reason why everybody assents. 1137 Nor was Hay quite certain 11what 
line Russia is going to take in the matter," but he was satisfied with 
the outcome. As he reported to Henry White: 
He (Muravev) did say it, he did promise, and he did enter 
in just that engagement. It is possible that he did so 
thinking France would not come in, and that the other 
powers would not. If now they choose to take a stand in 
opposition to the entire civilized world, we shall then 
make up our minds what to do about it.38 
The open door notes may not have been binding on any of the 
powers, but John Hay fully realized that a lasting and significant 
change had been wrought in the Russian-American relationship. The 
impetus behind the sending of the American open door notes had been 
the direct result of the perceived threat of the Russian advance into 
Manchuria. The provisions written into the notes were specifically 
designed to offset Russian advantages there, those actually in practice 
and those believed to be nearing achievement The timing of the notes 
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was deliberately gauged to a period when Russia momentarily seemed 
most ready to countenance an open door for all of China. And the 
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notes were negotiated with a view toward exerting the maximum diplomatic 
pressure on Russia to accept them. Moreover, the imperial government 
was fully awure that the American plan had been consciously aimed at 
checking Russian aspirations in Asia. The United States' government 
had finally decided to join the trek of its pioneers across the North 
Pacific and play a more active and responsible role in the Far East. 
For the sake of the China market and for strategic position in the 
Pacific, the United States was prepared to add its weight to the 
balance of power in Northeast Asia and confront Russia, at least 
diplomat:i.cally, in Manchuria. No longer would a geographic gap 
separate Russian national interest from American. A century of 
cooperative effort between Russia and the United States in the Pacific 
had finally been breached. In the tug-of-war in Asia between England 
and Russia, the United States had decided to pull with England. The 
open door notes had cracked the traditional Russo-American friendship. 
Subsequent events only increased the fissure. 
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CONCLUSION 
Having traced, in some detail, the history of the Russo-American 
relations in Northeast Asia throughout the nineteenth century, the 
question originally posed remains: What caused the estrangement between 
Russia and the United States at the end of the century? While taking 
a century-long viewpoint has helped clarify the nature and progress of 
the relationship, no single, overriding cause for the rivalry was 
isolated. Rather, a complex of factors contributed to it,some of which 
can be factually demonstrated and some of which are based to some extent 
on mere supposition. 
One of the prominent factors which decreased the likelihood of 
continuing the traditional friendship was one which was also generally 
recognized at the time by the participants--the ever narrowing separa-
tion between the two nations. Whether measured in terms of physical 
geography, in time elapsed for transportation and communications, or 
in the growing psychological sense of being close neighbors across 
the North Pacific, the gap was steadily closing. And while propinquity 
of itself did not necessarily lead to rivalry, apartness had significantly 
served to avoid serious quarrels previously. Throughout the century 
the North Pacific fence, which had tended to make good neighbors, was 
repeatedly breached as the Americans refused to be confined to the 
North American continent. 
But more than propinquity was involved when American and Russian 
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interests collided in Manchuria. After all, a multitude of previous 
encounters, friendly and otherwise, had occurred from Sitka to the 
Kuriles and from Kamchatka to the mouth of the Amur. The situation 
that developed in Manchuria was markedly different. Previous episodes 
had not substantially weakened the relationship, primarily because 
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the contacts had largely been the result of private initiatives on the 
part of individuals and businesses. The Russian and American confronta-
tion in Manchuria more directly involved the two governments. The 
increasingly active support afforded by the United States' government 
to its merchants in China and Manchuria during the late 1890s presents 
a typical case history for what Emily S. Rosenberg has described as 
erecting the fout1dations of the "promotional state. "1 The Russian 
government was already heavily involved in promoting Russian enterprise 
in Manchuria and to counteract this "unfair" competition an American 
foreign policy was designed, for the first time, to reduce the threat 
of Russian barriers against American trade and capital in Northeast 
Asia. The first open door notes were an outgrowth of this newly 
assumed posture as a "promotional state." As a consequence of these 
Russian and American partnerships between the government and the private 
sector, the competition in Manchuria was increasingly elevated to the 
diplomatic level, thereby intensifying the rivalry. Moreover, both 
Russia and the United States had recently demonstrated an ability to 
use naval force to gain their purposes in the Pacific. 
With the North Pacific serving less and less as a means to 
insulate the two nations from on.e another and with each government 
prepared to join in to support its citizens i.n any quarrel, a third 
factor prompted the strain in relations. Neither the Russian nor the 
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American leaders seemed surprised or particularly conce~ned that the 
long period of friendship was on the verge of ending. The meeting 
of the two expanding powers had long been predicted. That a crucial 
intersection of interests was actually occurring in Manchuria came 
as a foreordained event, a self-fulfilled series of prophecies. And 
since an eventual rift had long been expected over the course of 
much of the century, the gradual escalation of the rivalry assumed a 
pattern of inevitability. Hindered by this mindset, neither nation 
attempted to air their basic differences or to discuss thoroughly and 
candidly the serious issues that divided them in Manchuria. 
This mental outlook was fostered by the growing realization that 
the tr2ditional friendship had largely been reduced to rhetoric over 
the past three decades. Little in the way of concrete dividends, for 
either side, could be identified in the years following the failure of 
the Asian-American telegraph line. The few gestures of amity that took 
place during this period were more than offset by fresh irritations 
and suspicions of the other's actions. One of these irritations 
concerned the no longer muted American criticism of Russia's autocratic 
rule. While the reign of Nicholas II could hardly be considered more 
repressive than that of Nicholas I, the crescendo of denunciation 
of the Russian political and social systems was both a symptom of the 
decreasing value attached to a Russo-American friendship and at least 
a minor factor in causing embittered relations. Had the friendship 
retained a firmly recognized practical use, the criticism may have been 
less pronounced and been received with less of a sense of outrage. 
The growing Anglo-American rapprochement toward the end of the 
century also has been cited as another factor contributing to the 
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alienation of Russia and the United States. And it was, although not 
necessarily in the manner normally accepted. Separating and identifyin~ 
cause from effect during a period of active and multilateral diplomatic 
maneuverings easily leads to different interpretations. A review of 
the policy debates in the United States during the late 1890s suggests 
that the United States did not turn away from Russia simply because of 
its considerably strengthened ties with Great Britain. Russia did 
not become America's rival just because Russia happened to be Britain's. 
Rather, the worsening American attitude toward Russia was probably 
one of the main factors which strengthened the Anglo-American bond. 
However, had relations with Great Britain not been improving, if there 
had been no alternative to the Russian friendship, then the United 
States might have worked harder to reach an understanding with Russia. 
A complex interaction of factors, then, formed the background 
for the abrupt change in Russo-American relations. By the end of the 
century the distance separating the two empires could no longer be 
depended upon to isolate conflicting interests. The two governments 
had increased the potential consequences of any dispute by assuming 
participatory roles. The ties of friendship, which had once been 
strong, had been allowed to deteriorate. Consequently, the major 
differences in their political systems now pulled them into different 
orbits. The United States became more reconciled with Great Britain, 
whose political system and Far East policies appeared far more compatible. 
Finally, the confrontation in Asia, as it approached, was accepted in 
an almost fatalistic manner, because it had been foretold. 
With that general background, the second question still needs 
to be addressed: Why was Manchuria considered so vitally import?nt to 
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both Russia and the United States? Russia's interests are fairly 
easy to discern. Russia had been expanding in Asia for cen~uries. 
Manchuria, directly on its borders, was a natural next target. The 
promise of the Amur region had never been completely fulfilled. It 
had not afforded Russia ready commercial access to China, ~or an ice-
free port on the North Pacific. The addition of Manchuria to its 
empire would achieve both of these objectives plus gain a wealth of 
natural resources. Russia had invested a huge stake by advancing its 
informal empire into Manchuria. Based on previous experience with 
American seaborne competition, the imperial government realized that 
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its chances of recouping its investment depended heavily on barring 
American investors from Manchuria and placing American traders at 
disadvantage. Any suggestion of an open door policy creating conditions 
for fair competition in Manchuria was clearly an anathema to Russia's 
national interests. 
Searching for the American motives for taking a firm stand 
against the Russian advance into Manchuria is decidedly more complicated. 
Why was the United States more concerned about Manchuria than the spheres 
further south where twenty or more times as many customers made up the 
vaunted "China market"? True, the United States had discovered, some-
what belatedly, that American commerce, unaccountably, was comparatively 
successful in Manchuria and North China, whereas elsewhere in China 
the American share in the market had been dwindling for fifty years, 
despite the prevailing open door policy. It could have been that 
Americans decided to cling to and protect this lesser Manchurian market 
because that was all that was available without facing the stiff 
competition from the British merchants in the South. The text of the 
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first open door notes supports this view, but the scope of the trade 
hardly warranted the trouble entailed. A similar case can be constructed 
that the United States was chiefly concerned that a Russian acquisition 
of Manchuria would swiftly be followed by outright partition of all 
of China by the foreign powers, thus forestalling American expectations, 
however unrealistic, for regaining a substantial share in the China 
market. This view is consistent with America's deep suspicions of 
Russian intentions in Northeast Asia, but does not gibe with the 
contents of the first open door notes, which did not call for any 
guarantee of China's geographic integrity. 
Undoubtedly, the United States was concerned about protecting 
its export trade of cotton goods and kerosene to Manchuria. However 
small-scale, it was marginally important to cotton growers, cotton 
merchants and the Standard Oil Company. At the same time, the United 
States was equally concerned that China would follow the fate of Africa. 
Nevertheless, the complete change in the American stance toward Russia 
over the Manchurian issue cannot be completely explained on narrow 
commercial motives. Market concerns in Manchuria loomed important 
and certainly monopolized the latter-day rhetoric, but relying solely 
on these limited economic motives for answers leaves unresolved contra-
dictionso In differing ways and, more often than not, only in vaguely 
articulated ways, Manchuria had assumed a larger importance in America's 
world view. Americans considered Manchuria as the bulwark preventing 
Russia from dominating China, threatening Japan and becoming the premier 
power in the North Pacific. Checking Russia's advance meant more than 
just protecting the several million dollars worth of sales of cotton 
goods and kerosene. It meant preserving the North Pacific as an avenue 
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for the expansion of the United States. 
Throughout the nineteenth century Northeast Asia had been 
viewed as the strategic key to the Orient, America's own "Northwest 
Passage." Once Siberia and the .\mur region were firmly consolidated 
under Russian control, Manchuria represented the last opportunity for 
securing a foothold on mainland Asia. American ambitions in Manchuria 
were but the culmination of past dreams for Northeast Asia as a new 
frontier, as a terminus for the trans-Pacific steamship-rail connections, 
and as an opening to China, India, all of Asiatic Russia and the back 
door to Europe. 
In his book Virgin Land, Henry Nash Smith explained how the 
American West had become both a symbol and a myth. 2 A part of this 
symbolism concerned the West as a "highway to the Pacific" and beyond. 
In many ways the American image of Northeast Asia had become a natural 
extension of these symbols and myths, although less clearly defined 
and attenuated by distance. Westward expansion was never envisioned 
as stopping at the Pacific shore. Thomas Jefferson had encouraged 
John Ledyard's Siberian venture long before he authorized the Lewis 
and Clark expedition. American poets gave voice to this vision of 
expansion across the Pacific. Two samples illustrate. As early as 
1794 Timothy Dwight was embellishing this symb~l of expansion: 
Soon shall thy sons across the mainland roam; 
And claim, on far Pacific shores, their home; 
Their rule, religion, manners, arts, conve3 
And spread their freedom to the Asian sea. 
Walt Whitman also frequently chanted about America's Pacific destiny as 
mistress of a "new empire" where: 
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His daring foot is on lar.d and sea everywhere--
he colonizes the Pacific, the ~rchpelagoes; 
With the steam-ship, the electric telegraph, the 
newspaper, the wholesale engines of war, 
With these, and the world-spreading factories, 
he interlinks all geography, all lands4 
Despite these visions, the practical aspects of American 
expansion across the Pacific and onto the Asian mainland presented a 
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nearly insoluble problem. It was difficult enough for the early leaders 
of the United States to conceive how republican institutions could be 
maintained over a large trans-continental nation. It was even more 
difficult to rationalize colonizing overseas. The debate over the 
future of the Philippines demonstrated the kind of dilemma which the 
Pacific expansionists faced throughout the century. This is why 
even the most ardent expansionist found it nearly impossible to 
articulate any satisfactory solution. When contemplating the prospective 
regions of Asia, the Northeast, in many ways, offered the fewest 
obstacles. The region seemed most like the "virgin land" of America's 
West, waiting to be developed and civilized--a vast territory, sparsely 
populated and scarcely governed. As earlier chapters have described, 
various approaches were t·entatively attempted. The whalers and hunters, 
without any set plan at all, claimed squatter's rights to any vacant 
beach. Aaron Palmer encouraged Americans to seek out those areas which 
were still unclaimed and ungoverned. Commodore Perry took an insular 
approach, establishing island "points of refuge" from which missionaries 
could penetrate the mainland. William Collins and numbers of later 
adherents hoped that the United States could develop the Amur basin 
and other parts of Siberia under the aegis of Russian administration. 
Hiram Sibley was confident that his telegraph company could administer 
the native populations along wide strips of Siberia. American railroad 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
men, such as the promoters of the American-China Development Company, 
thought that rail franchises would form the pathways for expansion. 
While all these manifestations of the American expansionist drive 
were frustrated, Northeast Asia, and particularly Manchuria, remained 
a tantalizing symbol of what William Gilpin had termed America's 
"untransacted destiny." 
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By the end of the century American chances for expansion into 
Asia seemed to hinge on the fate of Manchuria. While the Manchurian 
market, itself, held limited importance, the immediate issue of keeping 
that market open was opportunistically seized in order to confront 
Russia on a matter of high-sounding, idealistic principle, a demand 
which Russia would have difficulty in refusing. If the Russian 
advantage in Manchuria could be offset, the Russian advance into 
Manchuria could be checked and American access assured. From Manchuria 
it was thought that American influence, commerce and enterprise would 
gradually prevail over wider and wider circles of Asia. The aim of 
the United States was to exert its efforts to holding on to the Man-
churian key to American expansion in Asia. This was a goal deemed 
worth pursuing even at the risk of losing the friendship of Russia. 
Brooks Adams had thought it worthwhile to compete for this "seat of 
empire" despite the prospects that a military struggle with Russia 
might ensue on the shores of the Yellow Seao The McKinley administra-
tion, while never prepared to go to that extreme, was under serious 
domestic political rressure to protect America's interests in Manchuria, 
both actual and symbolic. The promulgation of the first open door 
notes was the result. 
Since the promulgation of these first notes, the so-called 
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open door policy has taken on a celebrated life of its own. Frequently 
cited as one of the bedrock foundations of American foreign policy, it 
has been expanded and interpreted and applied to situations far removed 
from Manchuria and China. Historians have differed greatly, first, 
about what motivated the open door notes and, second, about whether 
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they successfully accomplished their purpose. Tto!O viewpoints demonstrate 
the degree of these differences, both with each other and the conclusions 
of this study. 
Concerning motivations, George Kennan has asserted that the 
first open door notes represented principally the views of the Chinese 
Imperial Maritime Customs Service and were "really aimed largely at 
the British," who, it was feared, were ready to abandon their open 
door policy in China. John Hay, according to Kennan, probably never 
understood the practical significance of the policy that he has been 
credited with authoring. William A. Williams, on the other hand, 
believed that the open door policy grew out of national debate over the 
proper tactics and strategy for American expansion. To him, the policy 
emanated from a coalition of businessmen, intellectuals and politicians, 
who opposed colonialism, but advocated instead a policy of an "open 
door through which America's preponderant econo~ic strength would enter 
and dominate all underdeveloped areas of the world."S 
The motivation behind the first open door notes was both broader 
than the assessment of Kennan, and narrower than that of Williams. 
John Hay and his associates were well aware of the significance of the 
notes, although unable at the time to foresee all of the consequences 
or the eventual sweep assigned by others to the policy. The notes 
were drafted in response to the particular threat to American interests 
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in Manchuria posed by the Russian advance. The notes followed a 
national debate concerning what the United States should do to halt 
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this advance. By selecting and re-emphasizing the old concept of an 
open door in Manchuria, Hay and his advisers were also probably seeking 
a formula to facilitate America's own expansion into the region without 
resorting to colonialism. Despite the "new diplomacy" or the beginnings 
of a "promotional state," however, nothing in the events leading up 
to the first open door notes or in the process of drafting them indicates 
that the state department or any coalition of interests intended to 
craft a national blueprint designed to foster future American economic 
expansion worldwide. 
Kennan has judged the open door policy of the United States to 
have been a failure. The policy, in his view, has been mythologized 
undeservedly as a triumph of American diplomacy. In reality, the 
United States has been unwilling to bolster the policy with any exercise 
of force or to adhere to the policy within its own possessions. Williams 
has made a co~pletely opposing estimate of the policy's accomplishments. 
To him, the open door policy was a "brilliant strategic stroke." By 
ending the debate between the imperialists and the anti-imperialists, 
American energies could be channeled into the formation of an informal 
empire. This imperial anti-colonialism, based on the premises of an 
open door policy, has "led to the gradual extension of American 
economic and political power throughout the world." 
Both Kennan and Williams have looked at the enunciation of the 
first open door policy from the perspective that the notes were only 
the beeinning of long process which is still ongoing. From that 
vantage point the actual motivations that stimulated the first expression 
of the open door policy and the original purposes behind the notes 
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are obscured by our current assessment of the open door policy as it 
has been enlarged and re-shaped. This study has taken a different 
tack. The promulgation of the first open door notes was viewed as 
the last step in a long process, the culminating event in a long and 
generally friendly relationship. The notes had relatively limited 
objectives and pertained only to a particular region during a specific 
time frame. In effect, the notes insisted that the United States be 
dealt a hand in the play for the Manchurian stakes and not be excluded 
from the table. Certain Russian prerogatives within its sphere were 
recognized, but limitations were set on the amount of discrimination 
of American interests which would be tolerated. Implicitly, the 
notes demonstrated an increased American readiness to assume a more 
active role in Asian affairs. They were a realistic appraisal, at 
342 
long last, that American expansionist aims in Northeast Asia were not 
going to be achieved through any kind of partnership with Russia, only 
in the face of Russian competition. The notes were also a frank 
recognition of the true status of the Russo-American relationship. 
Ambassador Breckinrid~e had, a few years earlier, called on the United 
States to show "in some suitably marked way ••• conspicuous disapproba-
tion of our relations with Russia." This, too, was accomplished. The 
superficialities, to which the traditional friendship had been reduced, 
were wiped clean. Russia and the United States could, had they so 
chosen, have entered the new century determined on a fresh start. 
Instead, the United States for the next several years applied diplomatic 
pressure to gain an open door in Manchuria and Russia as stubbornly 
resisted, until the objectives of both protagonists were thwarted by 
Japan. In the final analysis, the United States never has gained its 
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long sought foothold in Northeast Asia. 
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